Reynoso v. Recology Inc.

Background

Eduardo Reynoso sued Recology Inc. in San Francisco County Superior Court over claims arising from his employment. The complaint asserted eleven California causes of action, including disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, negligent failure to train and supervise, unfair business practices, failure to produce records, and statutory prejudgment interest.

Recology removed the case to federal court, claiming federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Recology relied on two federal labor-law theories: complete preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), and preemption under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) known as the Garmon doctrine. Reynoso moved to remand the case to state court.

Reynoso’s claims involved his employment with Recology SF, a Recology subsidiary. The opinion states that Recology SF and a union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement effective from January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2026. After Recology terminated Reynoso’s employment in October 2023, the union filed a grievance. An arbitrator later ordered Reynoso’s reinstatement and directed that he be made whole for lost benefits. Reynoso alleged that Recology delayed his reinstatement by eleven weeks and that this delay, along with other conduct, violated California law and retaliated against him for protected activity.

Request for Judicial Notice

Recology asked the court to take judicial notice of the collective bargaining agreement and the arbitration decision and award. The court denied that request because both documents were already before the court as exhibits to the notice of removal. Judicial notice is a procedure allowing a court to accept a fact that is not reasonably disputed and can be readily verified from a reliable source; the court found that procedure unnecessary here.

LMRA Preemption

Section 301 of the LMRA can completely preempt certain state-law claims involving contracts between employers and labor organizations. The court applied the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test. Under that test, a state-law claim is preempted if it arises entirely from a collective bargaining agreement or requires interpretation of that agreement.

The court held that Reynoso’s state-law retaliation claims were not preempted at the first step. California law, rather than the collective bargaining agreement, supplied Reynoso’s asserted right to be free from retaliation. The court rejected Recology’s argument that Reynoso’s reference to the arbitrator’s reinstatement order made the retaliation claims claims under the collective bargaining agreement. The court explained that Recology could use the agreement or arbitration award as a defense without converting the state-law claims into federally preempted claims.

The court also held that the claims were not preempted at the second step. Recology did not identify a specific collective bargaining agreement provision that required interpretation to resolve whether its conduct was retaliatory or whether the delayed reinstatement was an adverse employment action under California law. The court concluded that the claims did not raise questions about the agreement’s scope, meaning, or application. It therefore held that removal was not warranted under section 301.

Garmon Doctrine

The Garmon doctrine generally prevents states from regulating conduct that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits. The court held, however, that state-law claims asserted to be preempted under the NLRA are not removable to federal court on that basis. The state court must determine any Garmon-preemption issue in the first instance. Removal therefore was not warranted under this theory either.

Disposition

The court concluded that Reynoso’s state-law claims were not preempted under section 301, were not subject to removal under the Garmon doctrine, and that the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Judge Thomas S. Hixson granted Reynoso’s motion to remand. The opinion does not decide the merits of Reynoso’s underlying employment claims. It also denied Recology’s request for judicial notice.