Plain v. Eischen
- Laura Provinzino
- 0:25-cv-03154
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 7
In Plain v. Eischen, Judge Provinzino dismissed Darrell Plain's petition challenging his ineligibility for sentence-reduction credits under the First Step Act.
Federal prisoners who have been convicted of drug offenses involving fentanyl and are seeking to earn time credits under the First Step Act to shorten their sentences. This ruling clarifies that the absence of an explicit citation to the specific penalty subsection in criminal case documents does not, by itself, mean a prisoner avoids disqualification from earning those credits.
What happened
In Plain v. Eischen (No. 25-cv-3154), federal prisoner Darrell Plain filed a petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons' decision that he was ineligible to earn 'earned time credits' (FTCs) — credits that can shorten a federal sentence — under the First Step Act of 2018. The Bureau of Prisons found Plain ineligible because his conviction for distributing 40 grams or more of fentanyl fell under a list of disqualifying offenses. Plain argued that because his indictment, plea agreement, and sentencing judgment only cited 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) — the general drug distribution statute — and never explicitly cited the specific penalty subsection (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi)) that triggers the FTC disqualification, he could not be deemed convicted of that disqualifying offense.
The court rejected Plain's argument. Judge Laura M. Provinzino reviewed the underlying criminal case documents and found that, although the specific penalty subsection was never cited by number, the indictment described almost word-for-word the conduct defined in that subsection, and the plea agreement's sentencing ranges, fines, and supervised release terms matched exactly what that subsection prescribes. The court also examined a Fourth Circuit case Plain relied on — Valladares v. Ray — and concluded it actually supported the opposite of Plain's position: what matters is whether the documents provide sufficient evidence of the disqualifying conviction, not whether they explicitly cite the exact subsection number.
Judge Provinzino overruled Plain's objections, adopted the Magistrate Judge's earlier report and recommendation, and dismissed the petition without prejudice.
The detailed version
- Plain v. Eischen · No. 0:25-cv-03154
- Laura M. Provinzino
- Oct. 10, 2025
Background
Darrell Plain is a federal prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in Duluth, Minnesota. He was indicted in the Northern District of Illinois in June 2023 on narcotics offenses. In February 2024, he pleaded guilty to Count 3 of the indictment, which charged him with knowingly and intentionally distributing 40 grams or more of a mixture containing fentanyl (chemically identified as N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in June 2024.
The Dispute Over Earned Time Credits
The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4), allows eligible federal prisoners to earn 'earned time credits' (FTCs) — credits that can be applied to reduce the length of their incarceration or accelerate placement in pre-release custody. However, the FSA expressly excludes prisoners 'serving a sentence for' certain enumerated offenses from earning FTCs. Among the disqualifying offenses is a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi), which covers distribution of 40 grams or more of fentanyl and carries a mandatory minimum of five years and a maximum of forty years.
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) determined that Plain was ineligible for FTCs because his conviction constituted a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi). Plain challenged this determination, arguing that his indictment, plea agreement, and sentencing judgment cited only 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) — the provision defining the general act of distributing a controlled substance — and never referenced § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi) by number. He therefore contended that he could not properly be deemed convicted of or sentenced for the disqualifying subsection.
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
United States Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on September 9, 2025, recommending dismissal of Plain's petition. The R&R concluded that despite the absence of an explicit citation to § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi), the criminal case documents made clear that Plain was convicted of and sentenced for that offense. Plain timely objected, arguing the R&R impermissibly read intent into the sentencing judge's mind and effectively resentenced him for a different offense than the one cited in his documents.
The Court's Analysis
Judge Provinzino conducted a de novo (independent, from the start) review of the issues Plain challenged in his objections, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3).
The court acknowledged that § 841(a)(1) defines the criminal act and § 841(b)(1) sets the punishment based on drug type and quantity, noting that Plain's confusion about the two subsections was understandable. However, the court found the criminal case documents overwhelmingly established that Plain was convicted under § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi):
- The indictment's Count 3 charged distribution of '40 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl (N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide)' — language that is essentially a verbatim recitation of the conduct defined in § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi). - The plea agreement acknowledged a mandatory minimum of five years and a maximum of forty years, a maximum fine of $5,000,000, and a mandatory supervised release term of at least four years — all of which correspond precisely to the penalties prescribed by § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi). - Plain offered no legal authority for the proposition that an explicit subsection citation is required, and the court found none.
Treatment of Plain's Authority: Valladares v. Ray
Plain relied on Valladares v. Ray, 130 F.4th 74 (4th Cir. 2025), a Fourth Circuit (federal appeals court covering Virginia, Maryland, and neighboring states) decision in which a prisoner was found eligible for FTCs because the evidence did not support a finding that he had been convicted of a death-resulting drug offense that would have triggered a disqualifying sentencing enhancement. Judge Provinzino distinguished the cases: in Valladares, the plea agreement did not mention any death resulting from the offense, the judgment did not reflect the applicable mandatory minimum for such an enhancement, and a post-judgment opinion explicitly stated that the count of conviction did not charge the victim's death. Here, by contrast, every relevant document affirmatively aligned with the elements and penalties of § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi). The court concluded that Valladares stands only for the unremarkable principle that sufficient evidence must exist to show a prisoner is 'serving a sentence for a conviction' listed in § 3632(d)(4)(D) — a standard Plain's documents easily satisfied.
Disposition
Judge Provinzino overruled Plain's objections, adopted Magistrate Judge Schultz's R&R, and dismissed Plain's habeas petition without prejudice. The court directed the Clerk to send copies of the order to Plain at both his current address at the Federal Prison Camp in Duluth and at FCI Cumberland in Maryland.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.