Patel v. Noem
Dipakkumar Baldevbhai Patel v. Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mike Stasko, Jail Administrator, Freeborn County Jail, Minnesota
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:25-cv-03167
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 5
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.
In Patel v. Noem, Magistrate Judge Foster recommends denying an Indian citizen's petition challenging his immigration detention because federal law strips the court of jurisdiction.
Noncitizens detained by ICE who are subject to existing removal orders and who seek to challenge their detention in federal district court, particularly those who attempt to combine habeas petitions with other civil claims such as mandamus or declaratory relief, or who argue their detention is unlawful due to a pending immigration benefit application.
What happened
In Patel v. Noem (Case No. 25-cv-3167), Dipakkumar Baldevbhai Patel, a citizen of India, filed a combined petition seeking release from immigration detention at the Freeborn County Jail in Minnesota, an order forcing U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to decide his pending U-Visa application, and a declaration that the government's actions were unlawful. Mr. Patel had unlawfully entered the United States in 2010, was ordered removed that same day, had his asylum claim denied, was released on bond in 2011, and then failed to appear for deportation in 2012. He was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in July 2025 and is being held while the government awaits a travel document to deport him to India.
The court identified two main problems with Mr. Patel's filing. First, he improperly combined a request for court-ordered release (a habeas petition) with other civil claims — such as the request to force action on his U-Visa and a declaratory judgment — in a single filing. Courts in this district and elsewhere have rejected this kind of combined pleading because the different types of claims operate under different and incompatible procedural rules. Second, and more decisively, the court found it lacked the legal authority — called subject matter jurisdiction — to hear his request for release at all.
Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster concluded that a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), bars federal district courts from reviewing claims that arise from the government's decision to execute a removal order, which is exactly what Mr. Patel's detention stems from. The court rejected Mr. Patel's argument that his case was really about unlawful arrest rather than a removal order, finding that distinction to be purely semantic since his detention directly results from the decision to carry out his removal. The court also noted that Mr. Patel's attempt to voluntarily dismiss the case on the same day was ineffective because the government had already filed its response. The court recommends that the entire petition be denied. Because this is a magistrate judge's recommendation rather than a final order, Mr. Patel may file written objections within 14 days.
The detailed version
- Patel v. Noem · No. 0:25-cv-03167
- Eric Tostrud
- Sept. 12, 2025
Background
Dipakkumar Baldevbhai Patel is a native and citizen of India who unlawfully entered the United States near El Cenizo, Texas on or about November 24, 2010. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol apprehended him the same day and issued an expedited removal order. Mr. Patel immediately applied for asylum, but an Asylum Officer denied the application and an Immigration Judge affirmed that denial.
Mr. Patel was released from custody on April 19, 2011 after posting bond while Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) awaited a travel document from India. ICE received a travel document on July 20, 2012 and ordered Mr. Patel to appear for deportation on August 16, 2012, but he failed to appear. He again failed to appear after a second notice. ICE cancelled his bond on March 2, 2013. Eleven years later, Mr. Patel applied for a U-Visa — a visa available to noncitizens who have suffered substantial abuse as crime victims and have assisted or are likely to assist law enforcement. That application, filed in April 2024, remained pending, although the court noted in a footnote that a request for deferred action under the U-Visa program was denied because Mr. Patel failed to submit required forms.
ICE located Mr. Patel in Hudson, Wisconsin and arrested him on July 30, 2025. He is currently detained at the Freeborn County Jail in Albert Lea, Minnesota while ICE awaits a new travel document to deport him to India. An ICE Deportation Officer declared that ICE believes removal in the foreseeable future is significantly likely and that ICE has conducted removals to India within the past month.
The Petition
Mr. Patel filed a self-styled combined petition seeking three forms of relief against Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and Mike Stasko, administrator of the Freeborn County Jail:
- A writ of habeas corpus — a court order requiring the government to justify a person's detention and, here, compelling his release;
- A writ of mandamus — a court order compelling a government agency (here, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) to act on his pending U-Visa application; and
- A declaratory judgment that Respondents' actions are unlawful.
Mr. Patel argued his detention was unlawful because it was contrary to his pending U-Visa application, and characterized his case as challenging unlawful conduct by the Department of Homeland Security rather than as a challenge to a removal order.
On September 12, 2025 — the same day the Report and Recommendation was issued — Mr. Patel also filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), which allows a plaintiff to dismiss a case without a court order before the opposing party has served an answer or motion for summary judgment.
Analysis
Problem One: Improper Combination of Habeas and Non-Habeas Claims
The court identified the filing as an improperly aggregated pleading — combining a habeas petition with non-habeas civil claims (mandamus and declaratory relief) in a single action. Courts in this district and the Third Circuit have rejected this approach because it unduly expands the narrow scope of habeas corpus and combines proceedings that operate under different and incompatible procedural rules. The court cited Canada v. Olmstead County Community of Corrections and Burnam v. Marberry in support. The court concluded that the requests for mandamus and declaratory relief were not properly presented in this action and that Mr. Patel would need to pursue them in a separate action, while noting — in a footnote — that its subject matter jurisdiction concerns would likely apply equally to any such separate action.
Problem Two: Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Habeas Claim
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's legal authority to hear and decide a particular type of case. Federal courts cannot rule on the merits of a claim without first confirming they possess subject matter jurisdiction. The Constitution allows Congress to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts through statutes.
The court found that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) — a provision of federal immigration law — strips federal district courts of jurisdiction over "any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security] to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien." Because Mr. Patel is detained for the purpose of executing a removal order, the court found this statute directly applies. The court cited the Supreme Court's observation in Carlson v. Landon that detention is necessarily part of the deportation process.
The court squarely rejected Mr. Patel's argument that his case was not really a challenge to a removal order but rather a challenge to unlawful arrest and detention. The court called this distinction "purely a semantic one," finding that his detention directly results from the decision to execute a removal order. The court cited Silva v. United States (8th Circuit, 2017) and Rodriguez-Sosa v. Whitaker (District of Minnesota, 2018) for the proposition that claims directly connected to the execution of a removal order fall within Section 1252(g)'s bar, even if the petitioner frames them differently. The court also cited Mendoza Mendez v. Shea, a recent District of Minnesota case, noting that other petitioners in similar postures had raised the same argument and failed.
The Attempted Voluntary Dismissal
The court addressed Mr. Patel's same-day Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. Although Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows a party to voluntarily dismiss a case without a court order before the opposing party has served an answer or a motion for summary judgment (a procedural device to end a case on the merits), the court found the notice was improper here because Respondents had already filed their Response on August 27, 2025 — which the court treated as an answer. Accordingly, the voluntary dismissal had no effect.
Disposition
Magistrate Judge Foster recommends that the entire Petition be DENIED.
This is a Report and Recommendation, not a final order. It is not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), any party may file specific written objections within 14 days of being served a copy. Responses to objections may be filed within 14 days thereafter. The presiding district judge (identified in the case number as Judge ECT) will review any objections before a final ruling issues.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.