Wills v. City of Monterey

Background

This final pretrial conference order governs the scheduled jury trial in Cynthia S. Wills’s case against Montage Health. Jury selection was set for October 15, 2025, with trial scheduled for October 15–17 and October 20. Each side will have five hours for opening statements, examinations, and closing arguments. The court also required advance notice of proposed witnesses, exhibits, and demonstratives and established procedures for resolving objections before each trial day.

Motions in Limine by Ms. Wills

The court denied Ms. Wills’s Motion in Limine No. 1, which sought to exclude evidence of alleged suicidal ideation during her March 25, 2019 emergency-department treatment. The court found that the circumstances of her arrival, the reasons for placing and lifting a 5150 hold, and what she told Montage staff were relevant to disputes about individualized assessment, separating her from her dog, the reasonableness of that separation, and credibility. The court recognized that the subject could unfairly stigmatize her, but concluded that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

The court denied Ms. Wills’s Motion in Limine No. 2, which sought to exclude evidence that her dog died in 2020 and that she had not obtained another service dog. The court found that this evidence could bear on whether she was disabled in 2019, whether the dog was needed and functioned as a trained service animal, and the weight of her assertion that she could not be separated from the dog to receive care. The court stated that Montage may not argue that her current lack of a dog automatically defeats liability and indicated that it could give a limiting instruction directing the jury to focus on the March 2019 events.

The court granted in part and denied in part Ms. Wills’s Motion in Limine No. 3 concerning transient ischemic attacks, or TIAs. Because neither side served expert disclosures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2), expert testimony could not be presented. Ms. Wills could testify under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 about her own perceptions and experiences, including symptoms and her dog’s responses, but she could not give medical conclusions that she had TIAs, that a TIA is a “mini-stroke,” or that TIAs medically caused her symptoms. She could testify that health professionals had told her that her symptoms were consistent with TIAs. Montage’s clinicians could describe what they observed, what Ms. Wills reported, and the basis for their clinical decisions, but they could not offer undisclosed expert opinions about TIAs generally or service dogs’ ability to detect TIAs.

Motions in Limine by Montage Health

The court denied Montage’s Motion in Limine No. 1, which sought to exclude evidence that Ms. Wills suffered from TIAs. The court also denied Montage’s Motion in Limine No. 2, which sought to exclude evidence that Ms. Wills’s dog was a service animal. The court stated that a formal medical diagnosis or medical expert was not required to prove disability for Ms. Wills’s Unruh Act claim and that whether the dog was a service animal that performed disability-related tasks was for the jury. Ms. Wills could present lay testimony about her symptoms, the tasks she trained the dog to perform, and tasks she personally observed the dog complete.

Written Discovery

The court allowed the parties to use the disputed responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 22, with redactions corresponding to stricken text. The court found the responses relevant, sufficiently detailed, and not protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. The court also noted that Montage did not object to Ms. Wills’s proposed use of certain other discovery responses and that Ms. Wills did not object to Montage’s proposed use of her supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 6.

Exhibits

The court overruled Montage’s objection to Ms. Wills’s Exhibit 8, a 2022 policy concerning reasonable modifications for people with disabilities. Although the policy postdated the events, the court found it could shed light on Montage’s policies, practices, and training.

The court overruled Montage’s objections to Ms. Wills’s medical-record exhibits at that stage, but limited their use. Without a foundation establishing them as business records, the records could be used to show Ms. Wills’s understanding and state of mind, but not to prove that she actually suffered TIAs or other medical conditions or that she was disabled at the time of the incident. The records could also be used to show that she sought care from other facilities after the incident because she was allegedly deterred by Montage’s conduct. The court directed the parties to meet and confer about presenting this evidence efficiently.

For exhibits concerning accommodations obtained elsewhere, the court stated that hotel invoices and reservation confirmations would require a business-record foundation. Ms. Wills could testify that she had represented to businesses that her dog was a service dog and had been accommodated, and could use the documents in rebuttal if her credibility on that point were challenged. The court sustained Montage’s objection to Exhibit 14, a generic hotel amenities webpage, because relevance had not been shown. The court also stated that Exhibit 36, a card stating “I’m a Service Animal,” would be relevant only if Ms. Wills showed that a relevant Montage staff member had viewed it; otherwise, Montage’s objection would be sustained.

The court overruled Ms. Wills’s objections to Montage’s Exhibits 125–130 except to the extent they contained statements by non-Montage personnel who had no business duty to accurately transmit information to Montage. The exhibits and statements by Montage staff were conditionally admissible as business records, and Ms. Wills’s own statements could also be admissible under the rules for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment and opposing-party statements. Remaining disputes were to be addressed before trial.

Courtroom Sealing and Trial Management

The court denied Ms. Wills’s request to seal the courtroom during portions of trial involving her medical conditions, disability, and related allegations. The court found the request overbroad and concluded that she had not shown compelling reasons overcoming the public’s strong right of access, particularly because her medical condition and what was said about it were central issues at trial.

The court authorized each side to conduct 20 minutes of questioning directed at possible juror bias during jury selection. It stated that jury instructions and the verdict form would be addressed in a separate order. This order manages evidence and trial procedure; it does not resolve the underlying claims on their merits.