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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Oct. 14, 2025

Kelley C. v. Commissioner

Judge
Thomas Hixson
Docket
3:24-cv-08055
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
22
Social SecuritySummary Judgment
In one sentence

In Kelley C. v. SSA Commissioner, Judge Hixson denied Kelley C.’s motion and granted the Commissioner’s motion, upholding the disability-benefits denial.

Who this affects

Kelley C. and the SSA Commissioner; the ruling upheld the denial of Kelley C.’s disability benefits claim.

What happened

In Kelley C. v. SSA Commissioner, Kelley C. asked the court to reverse the Social Security Administration’s denial of her disability benefits. She challenged the administrative judge’s treatment of her symptom statements, the development of the record, her husband’s testimony, medical-consultant opinions, and vocational testimony.

The court found that the administrative judge gave sufficient reasons for finding Kelley C.’s reported limitations inconsistent with medical evidence, treatment history, activities, and other evidence. The court also found that the record was adequate, any error in handling her husband’s testimony was harmless, the medical findings were properly evaluated, and the vocational testimony addressed the limitations supported by the record.

Judge Hixson denied Kelley C.’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court therefore upheld the administrative decision that Kelley C. was not disabled under the Social Security Act.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Kelley C. v. Commissioner · No. 3:24-cv-08055
Judge
Thomas Hixson
Date
Oct. 14, 2025

Background

Kelley C. applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning February 19, 2021. After the claim was denied initially and on reconsideration, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing and issued an unfavorable decision. The Appeals Council denied review. Kelley C. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The ALJ found that Kelley C. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2017 and had a severe impairment involving degenerative disc disease of the lumbosacral spine with radiculopathy and a history of three spinal surgeries. The ALJ found that the impairment did not meet or equal a listed impairment. The ALJ determined that Kelley C. had the residual functional capacity for light work, with restrictions including limits on lifting, standing, walking, climbing, postural activities, workplace hazards, extreme cold, and vibration. Based on that capacity, the ALJ found that she could perform past relevant work as a leasing manager, bookkeeper, and office worker or manager. The ALJ alternatively found that she could perform several other jobs existing in the national economy.

Kelley C. raised five challenges: the ALJ’s evaluation of her subjective symptom statements; the ALJ’s alleged failure to fully and fairly develop the record; the evaluation of her husband’s testimony; the weight given to a non-examining medical consultant; and the evidentiary value of the vocational expert’s testimony.

Evaluation of Subjective Symptoms

The court held that the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting Kelley C.’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms. The court noted evidence that treatment—including physical therapy, injections, medication management, stationary-bike exercise, and pool therapy—had produced improvement or helped manage her symptoms. The medical records also reflected periods of intact strength, preserved range of motion, and improvement after treatment and surgery.

The court further relied on the ALJ’s discussion of Kelley C.’s activities. The record included evidence that she cared for her son, performed household chores, shopped, drove for more than an hour, traveled to assist her mother, attended birthday parties, performed physical-therapy exercises, power-walked, and rode a bicycle. The court stated that these activities could be considered to the extent they contradicted a claim of totally disabling limitations.

The ALJ also found that statements describing Kelley C. as a stay-at-home mother and identifying her treatment goal as becoming an active mother suggested a possible non-disability explanation for her lack of substantial gainful employment. The court declined to reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s. It concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of Kelley C.’s symptoms.

Development of the Record

The court rejected Kelley C.’s argument that the ALJ failed to develop the record fully and fairly. An ALJ has a special duty to develop the record when the evidence is ambiguous or inadequate for proper evaluation. The court found no indication that the record was inadequate. The medical records described Kelley C.’s back condition and treatment, and the ALJ discussed those matters in the decision.

The court also held that resolving conflicts between Kelley C.’s testimony and other evidence was the ALJ’s responsibility. It concluded that Kelley C.’s argument that the ALJ should have asked additional questions about particular activities sought to have the court reweigh the evidence, which the court would not do.

Husband’s Testimony

Kelley C.’s husband testified about her limited functioning after the February 2021 surgery, including difficulty using stairs, lifting or bathing their son, carrying items, and the need to lie down frequently. The ALJ described this testimony but did not state specific reasons for rejecting it.

The court held that, under the revised Social Security regulations and recent Ninth Circuit guidance, the ALJ was not required to provide specific “germane” reasons explaining the evaluation of nonmedical, or lay-witness, testimony. The court also held that, even if such reasons were required, any failure to provide them was harmless because the husband’s testimony was similar to Kelley C.’s subjective symptom statements, which the ALJ had properly discounted.

Medical-Consultant Findings

The ALJ considered findings from two state-agency medical consultants. E. Trias, M.D., found that Kelley C. could perform work at the medium exertional level. L. DeSouza, M.D., found greater restrictions consistent with light work, including standing and walking for four hours in an eight-hour workday and additional postural and hazard restrictions. The ALJ found Dr. DeSouza’s findings more persuasive because they were more consistent with Kelley C.’s reported activities.

The court held that the ALJ properly considered the required factors of supportability and consistency under the regulations governing claims filed after March 27, 2017. The court noted that the ALJ’s residual-functional-capacity finding was in some respects more restrictive than Dr. DeSouza’s findings, including limits on balancing, exposure to extreme cold and vibration, and the ability to change between sitting and standing. The court concluded that the ALJ’s evaluation was supported by substantial evidence and that Kelley C.’s alternative interpretation of the record did not establish error.

Vocational-Expert Testimony

The ALJ asked a vocational expert whether a person with the limitations included in the residual functional capacity could perform Kelley C.’s past work or other jobs. The vocational expert testified that a person with those limitations could perform certain past jobs and other work. The ALJ also asked about more restrictive standing and walking limits, and the vocational expert identified additional jobs that could be performed under some of those hypothetical limitations.

The court rejected Kelley C.’s argument that the vocational testimony had no evidentiary value because the hypothetical questions omitted limitations related to her spinal impairments. The court found that the questions included the limitations the ALJ determined were supported by substantial evidence. Because the ALJ had legally sufficient reasons for discounting Kelley C.’s additional alleged limitations, the ALJ was not required to include those limitations in the hypothetical questions.

Disposition

The court denied Kelley C.’s motion for summary judgment and granted the SSA Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court stated that the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed and directed that a separate judgment be entered, after which the Clerk would terminate the case.

The authoritative version

Read the full 22-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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