Steward v. Napoli

Background

Anthony Steward filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his New York conviction and sentence. The opinion states that a jury convicted him on November 28, 2017, of attempted assault in the first degree, assault in the third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, intimidating a witness, and contempt of court in the second degree. He received an aggregate sentence of eighteen and a half years in prison and five years of post-release supervision.

Steward’s state appeal was pending before the First Department of the Appellate Division. The appeal had been delayed, including by turnover among appointed appellate counsel, and was scheduled to be heard during the October 2025 term. Steward filed his federal habeas petition on July 22, 2024. The petition raised claims concerning his arrest, speedy trial rights, counsel, judicial and prosecutorial conduct, actual innocence, the indictment, jury instructions, the verdict, consolidation of charges, evidence and testimony, jury composition, discovery violations, a search warrant, exhaustion of state remedies, and fair process.

Motions and Exhaustion

The court treated Steward’s letter seeking to “amend” his petition as a motion to amend because he was representing himself. It granted that motion. The amendment added claims and expanded other claims, including a claim involving ineffective assistance by appellate counsel.

The respondent moved to dismiss claims one through four without prejudice because Steward had not exhausted available state remedies. Exhaustion generally requires a person seeking federal habeas relief from a state conviction to present the federal claims through the state appellate process before seeking relief in federal court. Steward admitted that all of his claims were unexhausted, but argued that the delay in his state appeal excused that requirement.

The court found claims one through four unexhausted. It treated the claims as record-based claims requiring review of materials such as police reports, case files, and pretrial and trial transcripts. It also found claims five through fifteen unexhausted and considered those claims even though the respondent’s motion did not discuss them. The court said Steward had received an opportunity to address exhaustion because his arguments covered all of his claims.

The court applied the factors used to assess whether substantial delay in a state appeal excuses exhaustion. It found that the length of the delay and the role of appellate-counsel turnover favored Steward. But it found that the factor concerning his assertion of his appellate rights and the factor concerning prejudice favored the respondent. The court also gave substantial weight to the interest in allowing the state appellate court to address the record-based claims first, particularly because the state appeal was scheduled for the October 2025 term. The court concluded that the delay was not enough to excuse exhaustion.

Release and Bail

Steward also sought immediate release or bail based on the appellate delay. The court concluded that he had not shown the prejudice required for release based on delay. For bail, the court stated that he had to show substantial claims and extraordinary circumstances making bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective. It recommended denying the motion for release and bail because Steward had not made that showing.

Recommendation and Procedural Status

The report granted Steward’s motion to amend. It recommended granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss claims one through four without prejudice, recommended dismissing claims five through fifteen without prejudice on the court’s own review, and recommended denying Steward’s motion for release and bail. The dismissal recommendations were based on failure to exhaust state remedies, not on a decision that Steward’s underlying claims were legally or factually correct or incorrect. The document is a report and recommendation by Magistrate Judge Jennifer E. Willis to Judge Ronnie Abrams, rather than a stated final ruling by the district judge. The report gave the parties fourteen days after service to file objections and stated that failing to object would waive objections and prevent appellate review.