Daramola v. Dungarvin Minnesota LLC
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:24-cv-00761
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 4
In Daramola v. Dungarvin Minnesota LLC, Judge Menendez denied Dungarvin's motion to strike Daramola's late jury demand, excusing the waiver because no prejudice was shown.
Employees and pro se or unrepresented plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases who miss the 14-day deadline to demand a jury trial under FRCP 38, and employers facing late jury demands in such cases. Also relevant to practitioners managing pretrial deadlines in the District of Minnesota.
What happened
In Daramola v. Dungarvin Minnesota LLC (No. 24-cv-761), Femi Daramola sued his employer, Dungarvin Minnesota LLC, for employment discrimination. Although Daramola did not request a jury trial in his original March 2024 complaint, he filed a jury demand in July 2025 — well after the 14-day deadline set by federal court rules. Dungarvin moved to strike that demand, arguing Daramola had legally given up his right to a jury trial by missing the deadline.
The court agreed that Daramola's jury demand was technically too late under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, which requires a jury demand within 14 days of the last pleading in the case. In this case, that deadline had passed in March 2025, roughly 14 days after Dungarvin filed its answer to the complaint. Daramola's argument that his demand was timely because it came before the deadline for amending his complaint did not satisfy the court on the timeliness question, though it was considered in the broader analysis.
Nevertheless, Judge Menendez denied Dungarvin's motion to strike. Under a separate federal rule — Rule 39 — courts have broad discretion to allow a late jury demand when doing so does not unfairly harm the other party. The court found that Dungarvin showed no real prejudice, that there was still enough time before trial to adjust, that employment discrimination cases are routinely tried before juries, and that the case was not close to trial. Balancing all these factors, Judge Menendez excused Daramola's waiver and allowed his jury demand to stand.
The detailed version
- Daramola v. Dungarvin Minnesota LLC · No. 0:24-cv-00761
- Katherine Menendez
- Oct. 17, 2025
Background
Plaintiff Femi Daramola filed an employment discrimination complaint against Defendant Dungarvin Minnesota LLC on March 4, 2024. He did not include a jury demand in his original complaint. On July 8, 2025, Daramola filed a notice of jury demand — approximately 14 days after Dungarvin filed its answer on March 11, 2025, which meant the 14-day deadline under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 38(b) had expired on approximately March 25, 2025. Daramola's jury demand and a motion to amend his complaint were filed together; the motion to amend remained pending as of the date of this order.
The Motion
Dungarvin moved to strike Daramola's jury demand under FRCP Rules 38 and 39, arguing it was untimely and therefore constituted a waiver of the right to jury trial. Daramola opposed the motion, arguing the demand was timely because it preceded the scheduling order's deadline for amending the complaint. The court treated Daramola's opposition and renewed jury request as functionally equivalent to a Rule 39(b) motion asking the court to exercise its discretion to permit a late jury demand — even though Daramola had not formally styled it as such.
Legal Framework
FRCP 38(b) requires a party to serve a written jury demand within 14 days of serving the last pleading directed at the issues to be tried by jury, and then file it with the court. Failure to comply constitutes waiver under FRCP 38(d). However, FRCP 39(b) grants district courts broad discretion to order a jury trial even when the right has been waived. Courts in the Eighth Circuit apply a five-factor balancing test (drawn from Seow v. Miyabi Inc., D. Minn. 2020, citing Eichten v. KMART Corp., D. Minn. 2007):
- Whether the issues are best resolved by a jury
- Whether granting the motion would disrupt the court's schedule
- The degree of prejudice to the opposing party from the late demand
- The length of the delay
- The reason for the movant's tardiness
The Eighth Circuit has instructed courts to approach Rule 39(b) requests with an open mind and to grant jury trials liberally when no prejudice results.
Analysis and Ruling
The court first found Daramola's jury demand untimely under Rule 38. The "last pleading" for Rule 38 purposes was Dungarvin's answer, filed March 11, 2025, making the deadline March 25, 2025 — months before Daramola's July 2025 demand. The court rejected Daramola's argument that the scheduling order's amendment deadline reset the 14-day clock, citing authority holding that an amended pleading does not revive the jury-demand window unless it raises genuinely new claims. The court noted in a footnote that any new claims in a proposed amended complaint would allow a timely jury demand as to those claims, and observed that it would make little practical sense to bifurcate a jury trial on new claims from a bench trial on original claims.
Despite the untimeliness finding, the court applied the Rule 39(b) factors and denied Dungarvin's motion to strike:
- Prejudice (Factor 3): Dungarvin showed no prejudice. The court found there was ample time remaining before trial to adjust litigation strategy. - Nature of the issues (Factor 1): Employment discrimination cases are regularly and appropriately tried to juries. - Schedule disruption (Factor 2): The demand was not filed on the eve of trial. Dispositive motion deadlines had not yet passed and no trial order had been issued. - Length of delay and reasons (Factors 4 and 5): The court found that neither the length of delay nor the reasons for it warranted denying Daramola a jury trial on triable issues.
Accordingly, Judge Menendez denied Dungarvin's Motion to Strike Jury Demand.
Procedural Note
Daramola's motion to amend his complaint remained pending as of the date of the order. The court's ruling on the jury demand does not resolve that motion.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.