Torres v. Employment Development Department
- Thompson
- 3:25-cv-08964
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 6
In Julian Torres v. Employment Development Department, Judge Thompson granted a fee waiver, dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and denied a temporary restraining order.
Julian Torres, whose complaint against the Employment Development Department was dismissed with prejudice; the case was terminated.
What happened
In Julian Torres v. Employment Development Department, Julian Torres filed claims involving disability discrimination, retaliation, rehabilitation protections, California law, and due process against the Employment Development Department. He also requested a temporary restraining order.
The court granted Torres permission to proceed without paying filing fees. After screening the complaint, it dismissed it with prejudice because the complaint did not provide enough facts to support any of its five claims. The court also denied the request for a temporary restraining order.
Judge Trina L. Thompson concluded that allowing an amended complaint would be futile and ordered the case terminated.
The detailed version
- Torres v. Employment Development Department · No. 3:25-cv-08964
- Thompson
- Oct. 17, 2025
Background
Julian Torres filed a complaint and a motion for a temporary restraining order against the Employment Development Department (EDD). He asserted five claims: violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794, violation of California Government Code § 11135, retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 12203, and violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including procedures complying with the Americans with Disabilities Act, acceptance of a certification under protest, protection against retaliation, preservation and production of records, and other relief.
Torres also applied to proceed without paying the filing fee. The court stated that his listed assets and income were insufficient to pay and granted that application, subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Screening and Claims
Under the screening statute, the court must dismiss an action that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. The court explained that a complaint must allege facts making the defendant’s liability plausible, while allegations by a self-represented plaintiff are read liberally.
The court found that Torres’s complaint contained only broad statements about a whistleblower disclosure and requested disability accommodations, without facts or argument supporting the five causes of action.
For the Title II disability claim, the court found that Torres did not provide factual allegations showing that he was a qualified person with a disability, that he was excluded from or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services or discriminated against, or that any such action occurred because of his disability.
For the Rehabilitation Act claim under 29 U.S.C. § 794, the court found that Torres did not allege facts showing an intent to discriminate or that the defendant acted because of his disability. For the California Government Code § 11135 claim, the court found that he did not allege that state agencies themselves were liable under that provision or provide sufficient facts about his disability and alleged discrimination.
For the ADA retaliation claim, the court found that Torres did not plausibly allege that he engaged in protected activity related to a qualifying disability or identify particular policies that discriminated against him. For the due process claim, the court found that he did not allege a substantive due process right or a protected liberty or property interest that the government deprived him of without adequate process.
Disposition
The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). It concluded that allowing Torres to amend would be futile because the complaint consisted of only a few short statements and no argument. The court therefore did not grant leave to amend.
Because the complaint was dismissed as deficient, the court denied Torres’s motion for a temporary restraining order. The court dismissed the case with prejudice, denied the temporary restraining order, ordered the clerk to terminate the case, and stated that the order resolved the two docket entries identified as ECF 1 and ECF 2.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.