K. v. Daniel F. Martuscello
S.K. v. Daniel F. Martuscello, III; Dr. Carol Moores; Eileen Gonzalez-Russell; Melinda Samualson
- Cathy Seibel
- 7:24-cv-05390
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 2
In S.K. v. Martuscello, Judge Seibel granted reconsideration but kept her ruling that medical-care claims seeking relief short of release must proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
S.K.; the ruling determines the procedural vehicle for her claim about allegedly inadequate medical care while in custody and does not decide whether that claim is meritorious.
What happened
In S.K. v. Daniel F. Martuscello, III, S.K. asked the court to reconsider earlier rulings requiring her claim about medical care in custody to proceed under a civil-rights statute rather than the laws used to challenge custody directly. She relied on a newer Second Circuit decision, Diaz v. Kopp.
The court explained that habeas petitions can address unconstitutional conditions when the conditions cannot be fixed unless the person is released. But S.K. alleged that the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision had failed to provide needed medical care, not that providing constitutionally adequate care was impossible. The court said an injunction or money damages could remedy the alleged violation, so release was not the only possible remedy.
Judge Cathy Seibel granted reconsideration but adhered to her earlier decisions. She ruled that S.K.’s claim must be presented under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The detailed version
- K. v. Daniel F. Martuscello · No. 7:24-cv-05390
- Cathy Seibel
- Sept. 2, 2025
Background
S.K. asked the court to reconsider earlier rulings requiring her claim to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute, rather than under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2254, statutes used to challenge custody through habeas proceedings. She relied on the Second Circuit’s 2025 decision in Diaz v. Kopp.
Court’s reasoning
The court discussed Diaz, in which the Second Circuit held that a claim about unconstitutional conditions of confinement can be raised through habeas when the alleged conditions cannot be remedied except by releasing the person from custody. The court also noted Diaz’s distinction that, when the complained-of conditions can be prevented or corrected without release, the proper remedy is a § 1983 action.
The court found S.K.’s claim different from the claim in Diaz. S.K. did not allege that the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision was incapable of providing the medical care she needed. Instead, she alleged that the care had not been provided. The court said that, if S.K. proved an Eighth Amendment violation, an injunction requiring appropriate treatment and/or money damages could remedy it. Release from custody was therefore not the only available relief.
Ruling
Judge Cathy Seibel granted reconsideration but adhered to her previous decisions. The court ruled that S.K.’s claim must be presented under § 1983. The opinion does not state that the court decided the underlying Eighth Amendment medical-care claim on its merits.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.