Daniel Maher and Colin’s Place LLC v. White Bear Township

Background

In May 2022, Plaintiff Daniel Maher purchased a single-family home in White Bear Township, Minnesota, to operate as a sober house — a shared residence for people in recovery from substance use — through his company, Plaintiff Colin's Place LLC. The property is located in an "R-1 Suburban Residential" zoning district, which limits occupancy to one single-family dwelling per lot. The Township's zoning code permits up to five unrelated individuals to maintain a common household. Maher obtained a rental license in May 2022, which allowed him to operate the property as a sober home for five or fewer unrelated individuals.

In December 2022, Maher applied for an amendment to the zoning ordinance to allow up to ten occupants. The Township Board held an open hearing in March 2023. Maher testified that larger numbers create a stronger recovery community. Two witnesses affiliated with the Minnesota Association of Sober Homes spoke in his favor, though one of those witnesses noted he personally operates a sober house with only four individuals — testimony the Board construed as supporting the adequacy of five or fewer residents. The Board ultimately denied the amendment, concluding the sober house could achieve its purpose with five residents, and suggested that converting the property into a duplex could allow five residents in each unit.

Plaintiffs then filed suit, asserting claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) et seq. People in recovery from substance use disorders are protected as individuals with disabilities under both statutes. The Township moved for summary judgment and also moved to strike Plaintiffs' "Statement of Material Facts in Dispute."

Legal Standards

Summary judgment — a ruling by the court without a trial — is appropriate when there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). The court must view all evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party (here, Plaintiffs). The party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on bare allegations; it must cite specific record evidence showing a genuine dispute.

Motion to Strike

The Township moved to strike Plaintiffs' "Statement of Material Facts in Dispute" and unsupported factual representations in Plaintiffs' response brief. The court denied the motion to strike as moot, noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) only permits striking pleadings, and Plaintiffs' document was not a pleading. However, the court noted that Plaintiffs' repeated failure to cite the record to support their factual assertions independently justified granting summary judgment under Rule 56(e)(3).

FHA and ADA Claims — Framework

Both the FHA and ADA prohibit municipalities from discriminating against individuals with disabilities in housing and public programs. The FHA makes it unlawful to make unavailable or deny a dwelling because of a handicap; the ADA prohibits exclusion from or denial of benefits of a public entity's programs because of a disability. These protections apply to municipal zoning decisions. The court analyzed Plaintiffs' FHA and ADA claims together because the statutes are substantially similar.

Plaintiffs pursued two theories: (1) disparate treatment — intentional discrimination based on disability — and (2) failure to reasonably accommodate — the Township's refusal to bend its rules to allow disabled individuals to have an equal opportunity to use housing. Plaintiffs clarified at oral argument that they were not advancing a disparate-impact theory (which would not require proving intentional discrimination).

Disparate Treatment

A disparate treatment claim requires proof of discriminatory purpose. Courts conduct a fact-sensitive inquiry into both direct and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. The court found Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claim failed because:

- Plaintiffs offered no evidence of discriminatory statements or other direct evidence of discriminatory motive. - The Township's zoning code affirmatively allows sober homes with up to five residents, and Plaintiffs hold a license to operate one. - Plaintiffs argued that merely having to apply for an amendment was itself evidence of disparate treatment, but offered no legal authority for this position. - Plaintiffs referenced, without record citations, alleged out-of-context statements by Township staff, but did not show those comments were shared with or influenced the Board. - Plaintiffs alleged Board Chair Prudhon made problematic comments, but provided no evidentiary support. The court further noted that even if such a remark were made, Prudhon held only one vote, and a single board member's impermissible motive cannot create liability for a collective decision made without such a purpose by the remainder of the body. - The record showed the Board's deliberations and decision were focused solely on the number of residents, not their disability status.

Reasonable Accommodation

A reasonable accommodation claim arises from a government entity's failure to make an exception to a generally applicable rule when necessary to give a disabled person equal opportunity. To succeed, Plaintiffs must show the requested accommodation was both reasonable and necessary. The court found Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence on either element:

- Plaintiffs offered no record evidence that allowing ten residents was reasonable or necessary to afford equal housing opportunity. - Plaintiffs argued it was unreasonable to require them to apply for an amendment that was unlikely to succeed. The court rejected this, noting the Board treated the application as a reasonable accommodation request and was open to alternatives, including suggesting a conditional use permit and duplex conversion. - Plaintiffs raised a "futility" argument — that they should not have been required to apply for an accommodation because it was doomed to fail. The court rejected this because Plaintiffs actually did file for an accommodation, negating their own futility argument.

Disposition

Judge Magnuson granted White Bear Township's Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the Motion to Strike as moot, and dismissed the case with prejudice.