Scodtt v. The City of New York

Background

Kiannaa Scodtt, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the City of New York under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging religious employment discrimination. The court also construed her amended complaint as asserting claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Scodtt alleged that she refused to receive a COVID-19 vaccine because she believed the vaccine was developed using fetal cell lines from aborted babies and that abortion conflicted with her religious beliefs. She alleged that she requested a religious accommodation, that the request and a later appeal were denied, and that she was placed on unpaid leave from June 2022 until June 2023 pending termination. She later received an email saying she could return to work, but alleged that she did not receive back pay and missed bonuses.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a Notice of Right to Sue dated September 14, 2023. Scodtt alleged that she did not receive, open, or download the notice until December 21, 2023, and filed the original complaint on March 20, 2024.

Rulings on Timeliness

The City argued that the Title VII claims were untimely because federal suit generally must be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right-to-sue notice. The court explained that notices are ordinarily presumed to have been received about three days after the date shown on the notice. Under that presumption, the filing would have been late.

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, however, the court had to accept Scodtt’s allegation that she did not receive the notice until December 21, 2023. Based on that alleged receipt date, the court held that the original complaint was timely at this stage and declined to dismiss the action as untimely. The court noted that the allegation could later be proven false.

Title VII Failure-to-Accommodate Claim

A failure-to-accommodate claim concerns an employer’s alleged failure to reasonably adjust a work requirement for an employee’s religious practice, unless doing so would cause an undue hardship. The court found that Scodtt had adequately alleged the required initial facts: she alleged a genuine religious belief conflicting with the vaccination requirement, informed the City of that belief through an accommodation request, and suffered unpaid leave for failing to comply.

The court found that Scodtt’s allegations about abortion, fetal cell lines, and the Old Testament were enough at the pleading stage to allege that her belief was religious in nature. Whether her belief was sincerely held was a factual question that generally could be considered later, at summary judgment or trial. The court also rejected the City’s argument that unpaid leave or termination for failing to meet a work requirement could not count as discipline for this type of claim.

Because the City’s motion addressed only whether Scodtt had adequately alleged the initial elements, and did not argue that an accommodation was impossible or would create an undue hardship, the court allowed the Title VII failure-to-accommodate claim to proceed.

Title VII Disparate-Treatment Claim

The court separately interpreted Scodtt’s allegations about different employment terms and treatment as asserting a Title VII disparate-treatment claim. At this stage, she did not need to prove a full discrimination case, but she did need to allege facts supporting a plausible inference that the City took adverse action at least partly because of her religion.

The court concluded that she had not done so. Her allegations that the City discriminated because of her religion were conclusory and were not supported by factual details. The employee she identified as receiving more favorable treatment belonged to the same religious congregation, which weakened rather than supported an inference that the City treated Scodtt adversely because of her religion. Scodtt also did not allege religiously degrading criticism, hostile comments about members of her religious group, or other facts supporting discriminatory motivation.

The court therefore dismissed the Title VII disparate-treatment claim with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because Scodtt had already amended her complaint after receiving an opportunity to address the City’s arguments, and she did not request another opportunity to amend, the court found that further amendment would be futile.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the City’s motion to dismiss. The Title VII disparate-treatment claim was dismissed with prejudice. The Title VII failure-to-accommodate claim could proceed. The claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law also remained viable because the City had not moved to dismiss them.

The court ordered the parties to file a joint proposed case-management plan, scheduling order, and joint letter by October 29, 2025. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-waiver status for any such appeal.