SQIP, LLC v. Cambria Company LLC

Background

SQIP, LLC ('SQIP') owns two patents related to the manufacture of engineered quartz surface products (e.g., countertops and tiles): U.S. Patent No. 9,511,516 (the ''516 Patent') and U.S. Patent No. 10,376,912 (the ''912 Patent'). SQIP sued Cambria Company LLC ('Cambria'), which manufactures and sells quartz surface products, alleging infringement of both patents. Cambria is also the owner of U.S. Patent No. 9,186,819 (the ''819 Patent'), an earlier-filed patent covering similar quartz manufacturing technology that played a role in the prosecution history of SQIP's '516 Patent.

This order resolves claim construction — the court's interpretation of the meaning and scope of disputed technical terms in the asserted patent claims. Claim construction is a question of law decided by the judge, not the jury. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The Federal Circuit's law governs because it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.

Procedural Note: SQIP's Disclosure Violations

As a threshold matter, Cambria argued that SQIP introduced new proposed constructions and undisclosed expert testimony in its responsive brief that had not been identified in the parties' Joint Claim Construction Statement as required by the pretrial scheduling order. The court agreed that SQIP violated the scheduling order but declined to exclude the late-disclosed materials. The court found the violation harmless because: (1) the briefing schedule already allowed Cambria a reply brief; (2) Cambria was able to address SQIP's new arguments in its reply and at the hearing; and (3) SQIP's new constructions were largely responsive to Cambria's opening brief rather than a wholly new theory. The court issued a warning that future noncompliance with court orders will be 'closely scrutinized and at SQIP's peril.'

Legal Framework

Claim Construction Generally Claim terms are given their 'ordinary and customary meaning' as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art ('POSITA') at the time of the invention. Courts look to intrinsic evidence (the claim language itself, the specification, and the prosecution history — the record of proceedings before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, or PTO) and, secondarily, extrinsic evidence (expert testimony, dictionaries, etc.).

Indefiniteness A patent claim is invalid for indefiniteness if it fails to give a POSITA 'reasonable certainty' about the scope of the claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014). The party challenging validity must prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence.

Means-Plus-Function / Step-Plus-Function Claims Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), a claim element may be written as a 'means for' performing a function, in which case the claim is limited to the specific structures disclosed in the specification. However, there is a presumption that § 112(f) does not apply when a claim does not use the word 'means' (for apparatus claims) or 'steps for' (for method claims). This presumption can be rebutted if the challenger shows the term does not convey sufficiently definite structure to a POSITA.

Prosecution Disclaimer If a patent applicant unequivocally disavows a claim scope during prosecution to overcome a PTO rejection, that scope is disclaimed and the claim is construed more narrowly.

Disputed Claim Terms and Constructions

1. 'First Device' — '516 Patent, Claim 1

Both parties agreed 'first device' is a means-plus-function limitation subject to § 112(f). They also agreed on the three functions it must perform: supplying a quartz-resin mixture to a mold through one region of the mold's opening but not another, then switching regions. The dispute was which structures in the specification 'correspond' to those functions.

'A system of one or more hoppers in combination with any of, or a plurality of any of, (a) one or more funnels with a motor and, optionally, one or more valves, or (b) one or more belts and rollers with a motor and, optionally, one or more valves; and further comprising a driving mechanism with a motor which provides a force resulting in relative motion between the mold and the one or more hoppers.'

2. 'Computer Processor' — '516 Patent, Claim 1 (Apparatus Claim)

Cambria argued 'computer processor' is a 'nonce word' (a term with no commonly understood structural meaning) that should be treated as a means-plus-function limitation under § 112(f), and that the specification fails to disclose sufficient structure, rendering the claim indefinite.

The court found that § 112(f) does not apply. Because claim 1 does not use the word 'means,' there is a presumption against means-plus-function treatment. Cambria did not rebut that presumption. The court found that a POSITA would understand 'computer processor' as referring to a well-known class of structures — synonymous with 'microprocessor' or 'CPU' — that has been widely used in manufacturing for decades. The specification further links the computer processor to specific functions (controlling motors and valves), providing sufficient structural context. The PTO examiner's failure to flag the term as a means-plus-function limitation was treated as instructive (though not binding). Because Cambria's indefiniteness argument depended entirely on § 112(f) applying, the indefiniteness argument also failed.

Cambria's alternative construction — limiting 'computer processor' to 'a computer-controlled motor' — was also rejected because the specification treats the computer processor and motors as separate components.

3. 'Computer Processor' — '516 Patent, Claim 14 (Method Claim)

Cambria argued the 'using a computer processor' language in claim 14 invokes step-plus-function treatment under § 112(f) because it recites a function without specifying acts. The court disagreed. Claim 14 does not use 'steps for,' triggering the presumption against step-plus-function treatment. The court found that 'using a computer processor to controllably supply' material is an act (describing how the overall function — producing veins in quartz slabs — is accomplished), not merely a statement of function. As with claim 1, Cambria's indefiniteness argument depended on § 112(f) applying, so it also failed.

4. 'A Second Material Having a Color' and 'The Color of the Second Material' — '912 Patent, Claim 3

Cambria argued these phrases are indefinite because it is unclear whether the second material's color must differ from the first material's color (recited in independent claim 1 from which claim 3 depends).

The court rejected SQIP's argument that a plain reading requires the colors to be different. The specification's use of 'could be different' language is permissive, not mandatory, suggesting the colors may be the same or different. However, the court found this breadth does not render the claim indefinite. Breadth alone is not indefiniteness. A POSITA would understand the scope of the claim with reasonable certainty: a second crack is filled with a second material that has some color, whatever it may be.

5. 'A Material Having a Color' and 'A Color of a Deposited Material' — '912 Patent, Claim 5

The court acknowledged claim 5 is more broadly drafted than claim 3 — it does not specify whether the 'material' deposited into a plurality of further cracks is the same as the 'first material' in claim 1. Cambria argued this ambiguity is fatal. The court found the question significantly closer than it was for claim 3, but ultimately declined to find the claim indefinite at this stage, given the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and the PTO examiner's apparent lack of concern. However, the court rejected Cambria's indefiniteness argument without prejudice, expressly allowing Cambria to renew it after additional expert discovery.

Summary Table of Constructions