Samuel v. Bondi

Background

Ebenezer Olaniyi Samuel, a Nigerian national, entered the United States in October 2016 on a B1 non-immigrant (visitor/business) visa. He married Daphene Abraham, a U.S. citizen, in May 2017, and was granted lawful permanent residency (a "green card") on July 26, 2019. He applied for naturalization (U.S. citizenship) on July 1, 2024.

USCIS denied his application on November 25, 2024, based on an investigation it had conducted from 2019 to 2020 and Samuel's naturalization interview. USCIS concluded that Samuel had entered a sham marriage with Abraham solely to obtain immigration benefits, meaning he was never lawfully admitted for permanent residence — a prerequisite for naturalization. Samuel sought reconsideration, which USCIS also denied on April 21, 2025.

On May 16, 2025, Samuel filed a petition in federal district court under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), which authorizes de novo (fresh, independent) judicial review of a denied naturalization application. Samuel disputes the sham-marriage finding and asks the court to grant his naturalization application. He is representing himself without an attorney (pro se).

On June 24, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal (deportation) proceedings against Samuel by serving him a Notice to Appear (Form I-862), charging removability on the basis of the alleged sham marriage. Those proceedings remained pending at the time of this order.

The Government's Motion to Dismiss

The government moved to dismiss Samuel's petition under two provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

- Rule 12(b)(1): Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction — the court has no authority to hear the case. - Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted — even if the court has jurisdiction, the petition does not describe a legally cognizable claim.

The government's primary theory was mootness: the initiation of removal proceedings against Samuel allegedly stripped the court of jurisdiction. The government relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1429, which states that "no application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General" if "there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest." The government also cited the Eighth Circuit's holding in Akpovi v. Douglas, 43 F.4th 832 (8th Cir. 2022), that pending removal proceedings — whether initiated before or after a § 1421(c) petition — prevent a district court from ordering the Attorney General to naturalize a noncitizen. Finally, the government pointed to DHS's own regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 318.1, which expressly equates a Notice to Appear with a "warrant of arrest" for purposes of § 1429.

The government's Rule 12(b)(6) argument was derivative: if § 1429 bars the Attorney General from naturalizing Samuel, any declaratory relief the court might grant would be legally futile.

Procedural Note: Samuel's Late Filing

Samuel filed his opposition brief two weeks after the deadline and after the motion had been taken under advisement. The court noted that failing to timely respond may result in motions being summarily granted, but elected to consider the motion on the merits given Samuel's pro se status and continued participation in the litigation. However, the court declined to consider the arguments in Samuel's untimely brief itself, and directed him to comply with Local Rule 7.1 going forward.

The Core Legal Question: Is a Notice to Appear a "Warrant of Arrest" Under § 1429?

The court identified a circuit split on whether a Notice to Appear constitutes a "warrant of arrest" for purposes of § 1429 — a question the Eighth Circuit had not yet resolved. Akpovi was decided on facts where it was undisputed that a warrant of arrest had issued, so the Eighth Circuit expressly left the question open.

The Court's Reasoning

Judge Provinzino sided with the Ninth Circuit's approach for three main reasons:

1. Plain Language The ordinary meaning of "warrant of arrest" — as defined in Black's Law Dictionary — is a document issued by a disinterested magistrate upon a showing of probable cause, directing law enforcement to arrest and take a person into custody. A Notice to Appear does none of those things; it is more like a summons providing information about removal proceedings. It does not direct custodial arrest.

2. Regulatory Distinction Other DHS regulations themselves distinguish between a Notice to Appear and a warrant of arrest. For example, 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) provides that "the notice to appear, and the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be served" in a specified manner — treating them as separate, not identical, documents. DHS uses a separate physical form (Form I-200, "Warrant of Arrest") distinct from Form I-862 ("Notice to Appear"). The court applied the canon that different language in related provisions is presumed to convey different meanings.

3. Surplusage Canon Removal proceedings are always initiated by a Notice to Appear under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). If "warrant of arrest" meant the same thing as "Notice to Appear," the phrase "pursuant to a warrant of arrest" in § 1429 would add nothing — every removal proceeding would automatically qualify, and the phrase would be superfluous. Courts must interpret statutes to give effect to every word, not render provisions meaningless. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009).

4. Effect of Loper Bright The prior cases deciding this issue — including Klene, Yith, Sanga, Adegbesote, and Gardener — all operated under the Chevron doctrine, which required courts to defer to a federal agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. In 2024, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), requiring courts to exercise independent judgment in construing statutes. Applying that independent judgment, the court concluded that the DHS regulation equating a Notice to Appear with a "warrant of arrest" is inconsistent with the statute's plain language and cannot be sustained.

5. Rejection of Klene and Gardener The court found Klene unpersuasive because it employed no standard tools of statutory interpretation and its assertion that all other circuits agree was unsupported by citations. The court found Gardener v. Barr (E.D. Mo. 2019) unpersuasive because it characterized the Ninth Circuit's plain-language approach as "unworkable" — but the court noted that conducting a plain-language statutory analysis is exactly what courts are supposed to do. Policy concerns about prioritizing removal over naturalization cannot override the best reading of the statutory text.

Rulings

The court held that § 1429 only moots a § 1421(c) petition when removal proceedings are pending "pursuant to a warrant of arrest" — not merely pursuant to a Notice to Appear. Because Samuel's removal proceedings were initiated solely by a Notice to Appear, § 1429 does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

The Rule 12(b)(6) motion was also denied, because the government's only argument for dismissal on that ground rested on the same § 1429 theory the court had just rejected.

The court also denied as moot Samuel's earlier motion to stay proceedings (pending an Illinois state-court declaratory-judgment action about his marriage's validity) and his later "motion to continue proceedings," because Samuel himself reported that the Illinois action had been dismissed and he no longer sought a stay. Denying both motions as moot has the practical effect of allowing these proceedings to continue.

Summary of Dispositions

- Government's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9): DENIED - Samuel's Motion to Stay Proceedings (ECF No. 16): DENIED as moot - Samuel's Motion to Continue Proceedings (ECF No. 23): DENIED as moot