Avila v. Bondi

Background

Joaquin Herrera Avila is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection in 2006 and again near Hidalgo, Texas, on or about October 10, 2016, without admission or parole. On August 29, 2025, ICE officers encountered him during a traffic stop in Minneapolis. He identified himself and admitted he lacked legal status. He was arrested and issued a Notice to Appear, which charged him under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (present in the U.S. without admission or parole) and § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (not in possession of valid entry documents). Critically, the Notice to Appear checked the box stating 'You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled' but did NOT check the box marked 'You are an arriving alien.'

Herrera Avila filed a Verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (a court order challenging the lawfulness of his imprisonment) and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking both a bond hearing before an immigration judge and an order preventing his transfer out of the District of Minnesota. The parties agreed at a status conference on October 2, 2025, to have the court decide the merits of the habeas petition.

Statutory Framework

Two federal statutes govern detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings:

- 8 U.S.C. § 1225 applies to 'applicants for admission'—aliens present in the U.S. who have not been admitted, or who arrive in the U.S. Section 1225(b)(2)(A), the provision at issue, requires detention of any alien 'seeking admission' who an immigration officer determines is not 'clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.'

- 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to aliens already present in the country who are subject to removal proceedings. Under § 1226(a), the Attorney General may detain the alien, release on bond (minimum $1,500), or release on conditional parole—a discretionary framework that entitles the alien to a bond hearing. Section 1226(c) carves out mandatory detention for certain criminal aliens; the 2025 Laken Riley Act expanded § 1226(c)(1)(E) to cover inadmissible aliens arrested for, charged with, or convicted of enumerated crimes. Herrera Avila has not committed any such crime, so § 1226(c) mandatory detention does not apply to him.

Jurisdiction

The government argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) stripped the court of jurisdiction. That statute bars courts from reviewing decisions by the Attorney General 'to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.' The court rejected this argument, holding that § 1252(g) is narrow (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999), and Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)) and applies only to those three specific actions. Herrera Avila's challenge to his detention without a bond hearing is 'independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal process,' not a challenge to the commencement of proceedings or execution of a removal order. The court also noted that even if § 1252(g) were otherwise applicable, the Eighth Circuit recognizes an exception for 'pure questions of law,' and the statutory question here—which detention statute applies—is exactly that.

Merits: Which Detention Statute Applies?

The government argued that § 1225(b)(2) mandates Herrera Avila's detention because he is an 'applicant for admission' (defined as any alien present in the U.S. who has not been admitted). The court rejected this interpretation for three independent reasons.

1. Plain Text of § 1225(b)(2)

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to all 'applicants for admission'; it applies specifically to an alien 'seeking admission'—a phrase that implies a current, ongoing action, most logically occurring at a border upon inspection. Herrera Avila has lived in the U.S. for years without seeking any lawful status (naturalization, asylum, permanent residency, etc.). Adopting the government's reading would render the 'seeking admission' language meaningless. The court cited the Supreme Court's statement in Jennings that § 1225(b) applies to 'aliens seeking admission into the country' while § 1226(a) applies to 'certain aliens already in the country.' The court also disagreed with the Board of Immigration Appeals' recent contrary holding in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), noting that under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), courts must exercise independent legal judgment and may not simply defer to an agency's statutory interpretation.

2. The Laken Riley Act Would Be Rendered Superfluous

The statutory-construction canon against superfluity (giving effect to all provisions) independently defeats the government's reading. The 2025 Laken Riley Act amended § 1226(c)(1)(E) to mandate detention for inadmissible aliens—including those inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present without admission—who have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of enumerated crimes. If § 1225(b)(2) already mandated detention of every alien present in the U.S. without admission, the Laken Riley Act's expansion of § 1226(c) would be entirely unnecessary and meaningless. The court declined to interpret § 1225(b)(2) so broadly as to render § 1226(c)(1)(E) superfluous.

3. The Notice to Appear

The government's own paperwork supports applying § 1226. Herrera Avila's Notice to Appear checked the box for 'alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled' and did not check the box for 'arriving alien.' Consistent with the District of Minnesota's earlier decision in Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-3142 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025), the court found that the plain text of the Notice to Appear confirms § 1226 governs.

Ruling and Orders

The court granted the habeas petition in part, issuing the following orders:

1. Samuel Olson (Director, St. Paul Field Office, ICE) was added as a Respondent on the court's own initiative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, as he was inadvertently omitted from the original petition.

2. Habeas petition granted: Herrera Avila is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is instead subject to the discretionary detention framework of § 1226(a). Respondents must provide him a bond hearing within 7 days of the order, at which evidence and argument about danger to the community and flight risk may be presented. If no bond hearing is held within that time, Herrera Avila must be immediately released.

3. Transfer enjoined: Respondents are enjoined (court-ordered to refrain) from removing, transferring, or facilitating the removal of Herrera Avila from the District of Minnesota before the bond hearing. Any emergency transfer request must be submitted to the court with an explanation and proposed destination.

4. TRO denied as moot: Because the habeas petition was granted and provides the relief sought, the separate motion for a Temporary Restraining Order is denied as moot.

5. Status update: The parties must file a status update with the court within 10 days reporting the results of the bond hearing or advising on Herrera Avila's release.

The court declined to dismiss DHS, ICE, EOIR, and Sirce Owen as respondents, finding it unclear on the record who would be responsible for complying with the order.