C.H. Robinson Worldwide v. Tech
C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Traffic Tech, Inc., James Antobenedetto, Spencer Buckley, Wade Dossey, Brian Peacock, and Dario Aguíñiga
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:19-cv-00902
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 11
In C.H. Robinson v. Traffic Tech, Judge Menendez granted in part defendant Brian Peacock's motion for attorney fees, awarding him $250,000 under California's reciprocal fee statute.
Employers who bring non-compete or non-solicitation lawsuits against former employees under contracts governed by California law may be ordered to pay the employee's attorney fees if the employee prevails, even if the fee clause in the contract only named the employer as the party entitled to fees. Former employees in multi-defendant litigation should be aware that courts may apportion fee awards to reflect only the work reasonably attributable to their individual defense.
What happened
In C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Traffic Tech, Inc., C.H. Robinson sued Traffic Tech and five individual former employees, including Brian Peacock, over employment agreements containing non-compete and non-solicitation provisions. After years of litigation—including a trip to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and a second round of summary judgment—the court determined that California law governed Peacock's employment agreement and again ruled in his favor. Peacock then moved for an award of attorney fees from C.H. Robinson.
Peacock sought fees on three grounds: a California statute that makes one-sided attorney fee clauses in contracts reciprocal, another California statute protecting employees from having out-of-state law forced on them, and the court's general power to award fees. The court focused on the first ground—the California reciprocal fee statute—finding that Peacock's employment agreement contained a fee clause that benefited only C.H. Robinson, that Peacock won the lawsuit, and that C.H. Robinson would have been entitled to fees if it had won instead. The court rejected C.H. Robinson's arguments that the fee issue should be governed by Minnesota law rather than California law, and that the voiding of the non-compete provisions eliminated any right to fees.
The main dispute was over how much to award. Peacock requested $329,748, while C.H. Robinson argued no more than $96,935.90 was appropriate, contending that Peacock was improperly seeking fees for work done on behalf of his co-defendants. Judge Menendez reviewed the billing records carefully and concluded that C.H. Robinson's proposed reduction was too steep for the early phase of the case—because the defense issues overlapped significantly among all defendants—but that Peacock's request was too high for the later phase, when the issues were more specific to each defendant. Balancing these considerations, Judge Menendez granted the motion in part and ordered C.H. Robinson to pay Peacock $250,000 in fees and costs.
The detailed version
- C.H. Robinson Worldwide v. Tech · No. 0:19-cv-00902
- Katherine Menendez
- Oct. 23, 2025
Background
C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. ("CHR") brought contract and tort claims against Traffic Tech, Inc. and five individual defendants—James Antobenedetto, Spencer Buckley, Wade Dossey, Brian Peacock, and Dario Aguíñiga—arising from their employment agreements, which included non-compete and non-solicitation provisions.
In September 2021, Judge Michael J. Davis granted summary judgment for all defendants, applying California law to each individual defendant's employment agreement and finding the restrictive covenants unenforceable under California law. Judge Davis also awarded attorney fees to the defendants under California law.
The Eighth Circuit partially reversed, holding that Minnesota law—not California law—governed the employment agreements of Antobenedetto, Buckley, Dossey, and Aguíñiga. As to Peacock, whose agreement contained unique choice-of-law language, the Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to determine in the first instance whether CHR's claims against Peacock arose in California, and then to decide which state's law governed. On remand, Judge Menendez again granted summary judgment to all defendants. She applied Minnesota law to four of the individual defendants and California law to Peacock's agreement. The court declined to simply reinstate Judge Davis's earlier fee award, explaining it had been nullified by the Eighth Circuit's reversal and that the remand produced a different legal analysis. CHR appealed most aspects of the remand ruling. Peacock then filed the pending motion for fees.
Peacock's Three Grounds for Fees
Peacock sought fees on three independent grounds:
- Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a) — a California statute that converts one-sided contractual attorney fee clauses into reciprocal ones, entitling any prevailing party to fees even if only one side was designated in the contract.
- Cal. Lab. Code § 925 — a California statute providing fees to an employee who defeats an employer's attempt to apply another state's law to the employment relationship.
- The court's inherent authority to award fees.
Analysis: Entitlement to Fees Under § 1717
The court focused on § 1717(a), agreeing with Judge Davis's prior analysis. Under § 1717, a party must show: (1) it was sued on a contract containing an attorney fee provision; (2) it prevailed on the contract claims; and (3) the opposing party would have been entitled to fees had it prevailed instead. The court found all three elements satisfied without serious dispute. Peacock's employment agreement contained a fee clause benefiting CHR exclusively, Peacock prevailed, and CHR would have had access to fees under the clause if it had won.
CHR's Arguments Rejected
Void contract argument
CHR argued that because portions of the employment agreement were voided under California law, Peacock could not rely on the fee provision. The court rejected this, noting it voided only the specific restrictive covenant provisions—not the entire agreement—and that even if the whole agreement were void, California courts have established that § 1717 still permits a prevailing party to recover fees when the opposing party would have been entitled to them.
Procedural vs. substantive argument
CHR contended that fee awards are procedural, so Minnesota law should govern even if California law controls the rest of the contract. The court disagreed, finding the fee issue here substantive because it involves interpreting a fee provision in a contract governed by California law. The court cited authority establishing that when a contract is governed by a particular state's law, questions about contractual fee provisions are substantive matters controlled by that same law.
Conflict-of-laws argument
CHR cited a non-binding Minnesota district court case (Bannister) applying Minnesota law to a fee question despite an out-of-state choice-of-law clause. The court declined to follow Bannister, concluding that once the court determined California law governs Peacock's agreement as a whole, it governs the fee provision as well.
Analysis: Reasonableness of Fees (Lodestar)
The court applied federal law—not California law—to the question of how to calculate the fee amount. The parties agreed the lodestar method (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) was appropriate, and CHR did not dispute the hourly rates sought. The dispute centered on the number of hours attributable to Peacock's defense, given that he was one of six defendants.
Peacock divided his request into two parts: - Part 1 (March 2019–November 2021): Peacock proposed a 20% discount off total defense fees to account for the other defendants. - Part 2 (November 2021–present): Peacock proposed a 30% discount.
Peacock's total request: $329,748 in fees and costs.
CHR proposed a much steeper reduction, arguing that Peacock should only recover fees directly attributable to his own defense, not work done for co-defendants. CHR's proposed award: $96,935.90.
The Court's Reasoning on Amount
The court found CHR's proposed 80% reduction of Part 1 fees excessive. During the initial phase, the claims and defenses of all individual defendants were closely intertwined—arguments about California law applying, lack of consideration, overbreadth of restrictive covenants, and absence of damages would have been raised by Peacock even if he had been the only defendant. However, the court acknowledged that fees would not have been as high if Peacock had been the sole defendant.
For Part 2 (post-appeal), the court found that the issues were less intertwined across defendants, and that Peacock's proposed apportionment would compensate him for work focused on his co-defendants and Traffic Tech—approximately $21,600 in billing entries the court found should not be attributed to Peacock's defense.
Balancing these findings, the court awarded $250,000 in fees and costs as a reasonable amount reflecting the different phases of the litigation.
Disposition
Peacock's Motion for Fees (ECF 288) was granted in part. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. is ordered to pay Brian Peacock $250,000 in fees and costs.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.