Glydways, Inc. v. Glyd, Inc.

Background

This trademark dispute involved Glydways, Inc. and Glyd, Inc. Glydways develops fully automated mass-transit systems using driverless vehicles and dedicated travel lanes. Glyd described its business as connecting travelers with local residents through an app, website, social media, and word of mouth.

Glydways used the “GLYDWAYS” mark in advertising and on its website. The United States Patent and Trademark Office denied Glydways’s application to register that mark, citing Glyd’s registered “GLYD” mark as a conflict. Glydways then began proceedings seeking cancellation of Glyd’s registration. Glyd responded with a cease-and-desist letter, and Glydways filed this action.

Glydways sought declarations that it had not infringed or falsely designated the origin of Glyd’s mark, a declaration concerning unfair competition, and cancellation of Glyd’s registration based on nonuse or fraud. Glyd asserted counterclaims for federal and state trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and federal and state trademark dilution and injury to business reputation.

Motion to File a Late Opposition

Glydways filed its summary-judgment motion on May 30, 2025. Glyd’s opposition was due June 13, 2025, but Glyd did not file one. On August 21, 2025, Glyd asked for permission to file an opposition roughly ten weeks late.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), a court may extend an expired deadline when the failure to act resulted from excusable neglect. The court considered the danger of prejudice, the length and effect of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether the party acted in good faith.

The court found Glyd’s failure to file on time inexcusable. Glyd said it had waited because of an unresolved issue concerning admissions that were treated as established facts. The court concluded that Glyd should have asked to pause the briefing schedule or otherwise notified the court, and that Glyd gave no adequate explanation for waiting more than six additional weeks after the discovery issue was resolved. The court also found that the delay would prejudice Glydways and further delay the case. It therefore denied Glyd’s motion for leave to file a late opposition.

Summary-Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is available when the record shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Trademark Infringement, False Designation, and Unfair Competition

The court explained that the claims at issue generally required a likelihood that consumers would be confused about the source of goods or services. It applied the eight-factor Sleekcraft test, which considers the strength and similarity of the marks, the relatedness of the parties’ goods or services, actual confusion, marketing channels, customer care, intent, and possible expansion of the businesses.

The court found that nearly all factors favored Glydways. It found the GLYD mark commercially weak because Glyd admitted that it did not offer goods or services or market its services anywhere in the United States. The evidence also showed little revenue and no evidence of significant marketing reach. The court found the parties’ services unrelated: Glydways’s mass-transit system did not compete with Glyd’s peer-to-peer marketplace platform.

The court could not decide as a matter of law that the marks were dissimilar because both sometimes appeared in all-capital white lettering on a blue background. But it found no evidence of actual customer confusion in the United States. The four potentially confusing emails identified in the record came from people in India. The parties also used different marketing channels, their customers exercised substantial care, there was no evidence that Glydways intended to benefit from Glyd’s goodwill, and there was no evidence that either party was likely to expand into competition with the other.

The court therefore granted Glydways’s motion for summary judgment on its claims for declaratory relief that it did not infringe or falsely designate the origin of the GLYD mark under the federal trademark statute. It also granted judgment on Glyd’s counterclaims for common-law trademark infringement, California unfair competition, and unfair and deceptive trade practices based on alleged federal trademark violations and California’s Unfair Competition Law.

Trademark Dilution

Federal and California dilution claims require proof that the mark is famous—meaning widely recognized by the general consuming public in the United States as identifying the owner’s goods or services. The court found no evidence that the GLYD mark was famous. It noted little to no sales, no evidence of actual recognition, and testimony that the mark was not a household name.

The court granted Glydways’s motion for summary judgment on Glyd’s counterclaims for federal trademark dilution and for state trademark dilution and injury to business reputation.

Cancellation of Glyd’s Registration

Glydways also sought cancellation of Glyd’s registration based on nonuse or fraud. For fraud, the court explained that Glydways needed to prove a materially false statement, Glyd’s knowledge or belief that the statement was false, an intent to induce reliance, actual reliance, and resulting damages.

The record showed that Glyd first applied under an “intent to use” classification, stating that it had not yet used “GLYD.” Glyd later represented to the United States Patent and Trademark Office that it first used the designation in commerce on April 13, 2015. Glydways produced no evidence that Glyd provided services under the designation on that date. The court said those facts could support the first fraud element—a false material statement—but did not establish the other required elements as a matter of law.

The court therefore denied Glydways’s motion for judgment on its cancellation claim.

Other Motions and Disposition

Because the court granted judgment on Glyd’s counterclaims, it found Glydways’s motion to exclude Glyd’s expert, Michael Malkiewicz, irrelevant to the case and found the motion to strike Glyd’s jury demand moot. The court terminated as moot both the motion to exclude the expert and the motion to strike the jury demand.

In its conclusion, the court denied Glyd’s motion for leave; granted in part and denied in part Glydways’s motion for summary judgment; and terminated as moot Glydways’s motions to strike the jury demand and exclude Glyd’s expert. The court set a trial-setting conference for December 4, 2025.