Hoel v. Prouse
Robert Brooks Hoel v. Alexander Prouse, Deputy – ID #5368 – sued in both his individual and official capacities; Joseph Carter, Officer – ID #121 – sued in both his individual and official capacities; Doe 1; City of Proctor; St. Louis County
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:25-cv-02342
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 19
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.
In Hoel v. Prouse, Judge Tostrud partially denied dismissal motions, allowing Fourth Amendment seizure, excessive force, conversion, and malicious prosecution claims to proceed while dismissing First Amendment retaliation, property search, conspiracy, and municipal liability claims without prejudice.
People who believe they were unlawfully stopped, searched, or had property taken or damaged by police officers; pro se litigants suing government officers under federal civil rights law; individuals seeking to understand how courts evaluate qualified immunity, municipal liability, and state tort claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
What happened
In Hoel v. Prouse (No. 25-cv-2342), pro se plaintiff Robert Brooks Hoel sued two officers — St. Louis County Deputy Alexander Prouse and City of Proctor Officer Joseph Carter — along with their municipal employers and an unnamed officer, claiming that on March 10, 2022, the officers unlawfully seized him at a public well, used excessive force, retaliated against him for recording them, searched his vehicle without a warrant, and damaged or took his phones and other belongings. Hoel brought ten claims under federal civil rights law and Minnesota state law, seeking money damages, return of his property, and orders requiring the cities to improve officer training and discipline.
The court refused to let the defendants use the police report attached to the complaint to contradict Hoel's own account. Because the report conflicted with Hoel's allegations — for example, the report described him as uncooperative while his complaint said he fully complied — the court ruled it could only consider the complaint's allegations when deciding whether to dismiss the case at this early stage.
Judge Tostrud granted the dismissal motions in part and denied them in part. The court allowed four claims to move forward: unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, conversion (taking or damaging property) under Minnesota law, and malicious prosecution under Minnesota law. Six claims were dismissed without prejudice — meaning Hoel may attempt to refile them with better factual detail: First Amendment retaliation, illegal search and property destruction, civil-rights conspiracy, failure to prevent a civil-rights conspiracy, municipal liability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (the last one also time-barred).
The detailed version
- Hoel v. Prouse · No. 0:25-cv-02342
- Eric Tostrud
- Oct. 30, 2025
Background
Pro se (self-represented) plaintiff Robert Brooks Hoel alleges that on March 10, 2022, around 10:30 p.m., he was lawfully filling water jugs at a public well in Midway Township, Minnesota, when St. Louis County Sheriff's Deputy Alexander Prouse approached and demanded identification. Hoel declined further interaction because it was freezing cold and he needed to warm up, then entered a vehicle and began recording on his phone. Prouse and City of Proctor Police Officer Joseph Carter allegedly opened the car door without lawful cause, forcibly removed Hoel, threw his spiritual tobacco bag and ceremonial supplies to the ground, and threw Hoel against the vehicle causing physical pain, despite his full compliance. The officers seized his phone and stopped the recording. An unnamed officer (Doe 1) allegedly arrived and helped conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. Hoel was handcuffed and detained without justification. Deputy Prouse left with Hoel's phones and later returned with one phone visibly damaged and the second phone missing entirely. Hoel was cited for misdemeanor obstruction of justice under Minnesota law, but the charge was later removed from all records.
Claims Asserted
Hoel brought ten claims:
- § 1983 / Fourth Amendment — unlawful seizure and arrest
- § 1983 / Fourth Amendment — excessive force
- § 1983 / First Amendment — retaliation for recording officers
- § 1983 / Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments — illegal vehicle search and property destruction
- 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) — civil-rights conspiracy
- 42 U.S.C. § 1986 — failure to prevent a civil-rights conspiracy
- Monell municipal liability under § 1983 against St. Louis County and City of Proctor
- Minnesota common-law conversion (taking or damaging personal property)
- Minnesota intentional infliction of emotional distress
- Minnesota malicious prosecution
Hoel requested compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, return of or compensation for his property, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief requiring constitutional training and oversight.
Procedural Posture
Defendants City of Proctor and Officer Carter moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). Defendants St. Louis County and Deputy Prouse moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), which is evaluated under the same standard. Both motions asserted qualified immunity (a doctrine shielding government officials from civil liability when they do not violate clearly established law) as to the individual officers, and argued the municipal defendants could not be held liable.
Key Threshold Issue: The Police Report
The court addressed an important threshold question: Defendants relied on the police report — which Hoel attached to his complaint as an exhibit — to establish facts that contradicted his allegations. The court rejected this approach. The complaint did not incorporate the report or adopt its factual content, and Defendants sought to use it to contradict the complaint's allegations (e.g., the report called Hoel "argumentative and uncooperative" while the complaint alleged full compliance). The court held that at the Rule 12(b)(6)/12(c) stage, allegations in the complaint and reasonable inferences from them must be accepted as true, and external materials that contradict those allegations cannot be used. The motions were therefore adjudicated solely on the complaint's allegations.
Rulings on Each Claim
Claim 1: Unlawful Seizure / Arrest (§ 1983 / Fourth Amendment) — SURVIVES
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. An arrest requires probable cause; a brief investigatory stop requires reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The complaint alleged Hoel was doing nothing more than filling water jugs at a public well — a lawful activity — when officers detained him after he declined to show identification. Defendants cited no Minnesota law criminalizing a citizen's general refusal to produce identification (absent a context like driving, which the complaint did not allege). Accepting the complaint's allegations, the court found no plausible basis for the stop or arrest. The Fourth Amendment rules on arrest and investigative stops are clearly established, and qualified immunity did not bar this claim at this stage.
Claim 2: Excessive Force (§ 1983 / Fourth Amendment) — SURVIVES
The constitutional test is whether force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, balancing the nature of the intrusion against government interests (considering the severity of any crime, whether the suspect posed a threat, and whether the suspect was resisting). The complaint alleged the officers forcibly removed Hoel from the vehicle and threw him against it, causing pain, despite his full compliance and no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that using more than minimal force on someone who is not suspected of a serious crime, is not threatening anyone, and is not resisting is unreasonable. Qualified immunity was not available on the face of the complaint.
Claim 3: First Amendment Retaliation (§ 1983) — DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) protected activity, (2) an adverse action that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing the activity, and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. The court found the complaint was too vague: it did not identify which specific adverse actions were taken in retaliation for the recording, and contained no allegations linking retaliatory motive to any particular action. The claim was dismissed without prejudice.
Claim 4: Illegal Search and Property Destruction (§ 1983 / Fourth Amendment) — DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
The only search specifically alleged was a post-detention search of the vehicle, but the complaint included no facts explaining how the search was conducted or why it violated the Fourth Amendment, and did not identify what property was damaged in connection with that search. The property damaged during the initial encounter (tobacco bag, rolling machine) was not connected to any described search. The court noted the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause does not apply where, as here, a meaningful post-deprivation remedy exists. The claim was dismissed without prejudice.
Claim 5: Civil-Rights Conspiracy (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)) — DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Section 1985(3) requires allegations of (1) a conspiracy, (2) aimed at depriving persons of equal protection, (3) an act in furtherance, and (4) injury. Critically, the claim requires class-based animus — that the defendants targeted the plaintiff because of membership in a protected class. The complaint alleged neither a plausible agreement among defendants to conspire nor any class-based animus. Dismissed without prejudice.
Claim 6: Failure to Prevent Civil-Rights Conspiracy (42 U.S.C. § 1986) — DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
A § 1986 claim (failure to prevent a conspiracy to violate civil rights) is entirely dependent on a valid § 1985 claim. Because the § 1985 claim failed, the § 1986 claim necessarily failed as well. Dismissed without prejudice.
Claim 7: Municipal Liability under Monell (§ 1983) — DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a city or county cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because it employed a wrongdoer. Liability requires a direct causal link between an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom and the injury. The complaint alleged only in conclusory terms that the municipal defendants failed to train, supervise, and discipline officers. These were legal conclusions, not factual allegations plausibly showing an unconstitutional policy or custom. Dismissed without prejudice.
Claim 8: Conversion (Minnesota Law) — SURVIVES
Minnesota conversion requires that (1) the plaintiff had a property interest and (2) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of that interest through willful interference without lawful justification. The complaint alleged Deputy Prouse left with Hoel's two phones and returned with one permanently damaged and the other never returned. The court found these allegations sufficient to plausibly state a conversion claim, particularly because it could reasonably be inferred that Prouse had no legal justification to keep the phones. Notably, Deputy Prouse did not argue the merits of this claim — he argued only that the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction (the court's power to hear state law claims alongside federal ones) if all federal claims were dismissed. Because federal claims survive, the court retained jurisdiction over the state claim as well.
Claim 9: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Minnesota Law) — DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
This claim is governed by a two-year statute of limitations under Minnesota law, which begins running on the date of the tortious act. The alleged acts occurred on March 10, 2022, so the limitations period expired in March 2024. Hoel filed suit on June 4, 2025 — more than fourteen months late. The complaint alleged no basis to toll (pause) the limitations period. Dismissed without prejudice. (While the court said the dismissed claims fall into a category that might be repleaded, the time-bar issue makes successful amendment of this particular claim difficult absent a tolling theory.)
Claim 10: Malicious Prosecution (Minnesota Law) — SURVIVES
Malicious prosecution under Minnesota law requires: (1) the prosecution was brought without probable cause and without reasonable grounds; (2) it was instituted with malicious intent; and (3) it ultimately terminated in the plaintiff's favor. The complaint alleged Hoel fully complied with officers' commands, was nonetheless charged with misdemeanor obstruction, and the charge was later dismissed without explanation. Because intent may be alleged generally under the Federal Rules, and because Deputy Prouse did not address the merits of this claim in his motion, the court declined to dismiss it.
Disposition
Both the motion to dismiss (City of Proctor and Officer Carter) and the motion for judgment on the pleadings (St. Louis County and Deputy Prouse) were granted in part and denied in part. Counts III (First Amendment retaliation), IV (illegal search/property destruction), V (§ 1985 conspiracy), VI (§ 1986 failure to prevent), VII (Monell municipal liability), and IX (intentional infliction of emotional distress) were dismissed without prejudice. The remaining claims — Counts I (unlawful seizure), II (excessive force), VIII (conversion), and X (malicious prosecution) — survive. Because this is Hoel's first pleading and the dismissed claims might be repleaded with additional factual detail, dismissal was without prejudice, giving Hoel the opportunity to seek leave to file an amended complaint.
Read the full 19-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.