Archibald v. David C. Banks

Background

Keisha Archibald sued David C. Banks, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, and the Department of Education. She brought the case individually and as parent and guardian of N.A., a minor child with a disability. The case challenged a state review officer’s decision concerning the 2023–2024 extended school year.

The Department of Education’s March 2023 individualized education program recommended a specialized-school placement, a full-time individual paraprofessional, and school-nurse services daily as needed. Archibald disagreed and re-enrolled N.A. at iBRAIN, a private school, while seeking public funding. An impartial hearing officer initially found that the Department had offered N.A. a free appropriate public education. On appeal, the state review officer found that the Department had not offered a free appropriate public education and that iBRAIN was an appropriate unilateral placement. The state review officer awarded direct funding for part of N.A.’s base tuition and contracted transportation, but denied funding for supplemental related services and one-to-one nursing.

Issue and governing standard

Archibald asked the court to order direct funding for one-to-one nursing services. Under the three-part Burlington/Carter framework, reimbursement or direct funding generally depends on whether the public-school program violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, whether the private placement was appropriate, and whether equitable considerations support the requested relief.

The court independently reviewed the administrative record and considered the evidence under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The court explained that it owed substantial respect to administrative findings involving educational policy, but independently evaluated the equitable question of whether funding for the claimed nursing services was appropriate.

Court’s analysis

The court concluded that Archibald had not proved that full-time one-to-one nursing was necessary for N.A. to receive a free appropriate public education. The iBRAIN report and education plan did not state that N.A. needed full-time one-to-one nursing. Instead, they described a need for assistance from a paraprofessional, teacher, and family with mobility, transfers, safety awareness, hygiene, and daily activities, and recommended access to the school nurse.

The court also agreed with the administrative findings that the record did not show N.A. actually received one-to-one nursing at iBRAIN during the relevant school year. The court cited a classroom observation that did not identify a one-to-one nurse, Archibald’s affidavit—which referred to a full-time one-to-one paraprofessional but not a nurse—and testimony from iBRAIN’s deputy director that did not establish the need for a full-time nurse. The court found weaknesses and inconsistencies in Archibald’s and the deputy director’s testimony, including the deputy director’s limited knowledge of nursing services.

The medical evidence also did not establish the need for a full-time nurse. The record stated that N.A.’s last documented seizure occurred in 2018, described N.A. as medically stable, and called for a paraprofessional to prevent falls and protect the brain shunt. The court found that a nursing-services contract did not establish necessity because the record did not show that Archibald had paid, or was required to pay, for the services.

Disposition

The court held that Archibald had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested nursing services were appropriate to N.A.’s needs. It therefore denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. The Clerk was directed to close the two motion docket entries. The opinion separately states that the parties did not address Archibald’s second cause of action for attorney’s fees.