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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 8, 2025

Garo v. Tenaglia & Hunt

Judge
Subramanian
Docket
1:24-cv-09812
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
3
DiscoveryCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Rosa Garo v. Tenaglia & Hunt, P.A., Judge Subramanian addressed discovery disputes, but the supplied text does not clearly state the motion’s outcome.

Who this affects

Rosa Garo and Tenaglia & Hunt, P.A.; the excerpt concerns their discovery dispute in the underlying action.

What happened

Rosa Garo asked the court to intervene in discovery disputes with Tenaglia & Hunt, P.A. The requested discovery concerned the firm’s debt-collection practices, attorney involvement, releases, revenue, and its relationship with TrakAmerica.

Garo’s underlying claims allege violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, New York General Business Law § 349, and New York Judiciary Law § 487. She argued that the requested information was relevant to claims involving an allegedly invalid debt, meaningful attorney review, investigation procedures, and a release the firm allegedly sought.

The excerpt states that Judge Subramanian directed the Clerk to terminate the motion at ECF No. 27, but it does not clearly state whether the discovery motion was granted, denied, or granted in part and denied in part.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Garo v. Tenaglia & Hunt · No. 1:24-cv-09812
Judge
Subramanian
Date
Sept. 8, 2025

Nature of the dispute

The supplied opinion text concerns Garo’s letter-motion requesting a discovery conference and an order compelling Tenaglia & Hunt, P.A. to provide responses to specified discovery requests. The motion followed several meet-and-confer sessions in which the parties reportedly reached an impasse.

The underlying action alleges that the defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, New York General Business Law § 349, and New York Judiciary Law § 487. According to the motion, the allegations include suing Garo for a debt she did not owe, continuing to litigate after the creditor determined the charges were fraudulent, and attempting to condition discontinuance of the collection case on Garo’s agreement to a release, confidentiality clause, non-disparagement clause, and W-9 requirement. The claims also concern alleged misrepresentations about meaningful attorney involvement and reasonable investigation.

Requested discovery

Garo sought responses to First Document Demands 8 through 11. Those requests concerned the number of debt-collection cases filed against consumers, the number of New York-licensed attorneys employed by the defendant, the number of cases involving a consumer release, and the percentage of the defendant’s revenue derived from debt collection.

Garo also sought responses to Second Document Demands 2, 6, and 7. Those requests sought agreements between the defendant and TrakAmerica, templates used to create demand letters and complaints, and manuals or documentation concerning collection-management programs.

Garo argued that this material was relevant to whether the defendant conducted a reasonable investigation, whether attorneys meaningfully reviewed the collection case, whether templates and procedures supplied by TrakAmerica were used, and whether the defendant’s release form was sent in error. The motion states that a legal-services agreement produced by TrakAmerica required the defendant to use TrakAmerica’s templates, software, and procedures and indicated that TrakAmerica supplied case documents.

Court action and uncertainty in the supplied text

The excerpt discusses why information about the volume of collection work and the process used to screen claims could be relevant to meaningful attorney involvement and to the alleged deception claim under New York Judiciary Law § 487. It also references a prior Second Circuit decision concerning whether attorneys exercised independent judgment over collection files.

The excerpt ends by stating: “The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 27.” It does not include a clear operative statement saying that the discovery motion was granted, denied, or granted in part and denied in part. Accordingly, the precise disposition of the motion cannot be determined from the supplied text. This was a discovery and civil-procedure ruling rather than a decision on the merits of Garo’s underlying statutory claims.

The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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