Pietosi v. HP
- Vince Chhabria
- 3:22-cv-04273
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 5
In Taran Pietosi v. HP, Inc., Judge Chhabria granted HP summary judgment on some claims, denied it on others, and denied plaintiffs’ motion.
The ruling affects Taran Pietosi and the other plaintiffs, HP, Inc., the plaintiffs’ experts, and non-party AMD. The implied-warranty claims and causation issues remain for further proceedings, while the fraud-based, unjust-enrichment, and security-issue claims were resolved in HP’s favor.
What happened
Taran Pietosi and other plaintiffs sued HP, Inc., alleging that an fTPM-related computer problem caused stuttering and supported claims including fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of implied warranty. HP argued that the plaintiffs lacked enough evidence of causation and that their computers might not have had fTPM enabled.
The court found that a reasonable jury could decide that fTPM caused the stuttering, although the plaintiffs would still need to prove at trial that fTPM was enabled on their computers. The court also found insufficient evidence for claims based on security issues, fraud-based claims, and unjust enrichment, but allowed the implied-warranty claims to continue.
Judge Vince Chhabria granted HP’s summary-judgment motion in part and denied it in part, denied the plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion, denied HP’s expert-exclusion motions, granted AMD’s sealing motion, and denied two other sealing motions.
The detailed version
- Pietosi v. HP · No. 3:22-cv-04273
- Vince Chhabria
- Oct. 30, 2025
Background
The plaintiffs alleged that an fTPM-related defect caused stuttering on computers sold by HP. The opinion addresses claims involving causation, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under the California commercial code, and alleged security issues.
Causation
Both sides sought summary judgment on causation. The court denied both motions. HP argued that the plaintiffs had offered only self-serving statements and that neither their counsel nor their experts had physically examined the plaintiffs’ computers to rule out other causes of the stuttering.
The court held that, at the summary-judgment stage, the plaintiffs did not have to rule out every other possible cause. They needed evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the fTPM caused the stuttering. The plaintiffs pointed to expert testimony that replicated stuttering when the fTPM was artificially stressed and to AMD documents concerning processors used in HP computers. The court found this evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find causation.
The court nevertheless denied the plaintiffs’ request for summary judgment because their evidence did not conclusively establish causation. HP’s expert testified that the fTPM-related stuttering reported to HP in 2022 was so brief and infrequent that most people would be unlikely to notice it. A jury could find that this evidence did not match the stuttering described by the plaintiffs.
The court also noted uncertainty about whether the specific HP computer models owned by the plaintiffs had fTPM enabled by default. The plaintiffs presented some evidence suggesting that it was enabled, but the court found that evidence far from conclusive. At trial, the plaintiffs will need to persuade a jury that fTPM was enabled on their computers before the jury could decide whether it caused the stuttering.
The court granted HP summary judgment on claims based on alleged security issues, finding that the plaintiffs had not presented enough evidence to make those claims actionable.
Fraud-based claims
The court granted HP summary judgment on the fraud-based claims. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs had to prove HP knew about an fTPM-related stuttering problem before the plaintiffs purchased their computers.
The plaintiffs relied primarily on emails produced in a prior related proceeding. The court considered those emails but found that they did not support a reasonable jury finding that HP knew in 2017 about a stuttering problem that it withheld from consumers. The emails showed AMD engineers discussing a stuttering problem and suggested that AMD might have known about a continuing issue. But, as to HP, the emails showed only that HP had at some point indicated to AMD that it was satisfied with AMD’s troubleshooting.
The court also considered two other email threads. One concerned testing related to audio distortion and reported a “PASS” result; the court found that it did not show HP knew of an ongoing stuttering issue that it should have disclosed. The other concerned audio drivers and appeared to involve units that did not detect plugged-in headphones; the court found it difficult to connect that thread to the alleged fTPM defect.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that additional targeted discovery was required before ruling for HP on the fraud claims.
Implied-warranty claims
The court denied HP summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ implied-warranty claims. HP argued that the plaintiffs lacked the required contractual relationship, or privity, because they bought their computers from retailers such as Walmart and Amazon.com rather than directly from HP.
The court noted that, as discussed in a prior related proceeding, an exception for third-party beneficiaries appeared to cover the plaintiffs. Because HP did not address that issue, the court could not conclude that HP was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merchantability claim.
The court also noted that HP had not properly moved for summary judgment on whether the stuttering, even if caused by the fTPM, qualified as a defect under California law. A brief request in HP’s reply, based on another party’s motion, was inadequate.
Unjust enrichment
The court granted HP summary judgment on the unjust-enrichment claim. The plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged that it would be unjust for HP to retain profits obtained through falsehoods and misrepresentations. The court found no evidence connecting HP’s profits to misrepresentations made to the plaintiffs.
The court also explained that, even if the claim were treated as a claim for restitution under a quasi-contract theory, it could proceed only if the plaintiffs showed that they lacked an adequate legal remedy. The court found that the plaintiffs had made no such showing and that the claim therefore failed as a matter of law.
Expert-evidence motions
The court denied HP’s motions under the rule governing expert evidence, known as Daubert, to exclude the plaintiffs’ experts for lack of reliability and relevance. HP argued that the experts’ opinions were speculative and did not properly fit this case because they had not inspected or tested the plaintiffs’ computers.
The court did not decide whether every part of the experts’ opinions would be admissible at trial, but found no basis to exclude the plaintiffs’ technical analysis as a whole. The court denied HP’s motions concerning the scope of the experts’ testimony without prejudice to raising those issues again before trial.
Sealing and disposition
The court granted non-party AMD’s motion to seal. It denied the administrative motions asking the court to decide whether another party’s materials should be sealed. The plaintiffs were ordered to refile the materials associated with Docket No. 296 using the limited redactions described in AMD’s motion within seven days.
The order granted HP’s summary-judgment motion in part and denied it in part, denied the plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion, denied HP’s Daubert motions, granted AMD’s sealing motion, and denied the two other sealing motions.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.