Litvinova v. The City and County of San Francisco

Background

Tatyana Litvinova brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act on behalf of “dual status” nurses. She alleged that the City and County of San Francisco deprived the nurses of time-and-a-half pay. The court initially granted summary judgment to the City, but the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, leading to a new period of discovery.

The City sought sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The court previously found that Litvinova’s counsel had made meritless objections to some interrogatories, failed to respond to other discovery requests, and violated court-imposed deadlines. The sanctions order established certain key facts against the Litvinova plaintiffs and dismissed three class members whom counsel had failed to produce for depositions. The order did not formally terminate the case.

Motion and Legal Standard

Litvinova’s counsel moved for reconsideration, purportedly under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The court explained that Rule 59(e) applies to motions to alter or amend a judgment, not to an interlocutory order such as the sanctions order. The court also rejected the City’s position that Civil Local Rule 7-9 supplied the controlling standard, because that rule applies when a party seeks permission to file a reconsideration motion and permission had already been granted.

The court held that a district court has inherent procedural authority to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for sufficient cause while it retains jurisdiction over the case.

Reasons for Denial

Counsel argued that newly presented facts showed that his discovery failures were not willful because he had a serious illness. He described coughing up blood and suffering a constant cough beginning as far back as April 2025, followed by two emergency surgeries in August 2025. He also stated that his doctor required him to remain out of work until November 1, 2025.

The court concluded that this information was not legally new. The prior sanctions order had already recognized a medically verified emergency and a doctor’s note stating that counsel should not work between August 22 and October 6, 2025. The court found that counsel still had not reconciled that emergency with evidence that he actively participated in other cases, including filing a motion for a new trial in another case three days after the claimed period of medical unavailability began.

The court further stated that information is not legally new merely because counsel chose not to fully present it during the original sanctions proceeding. It observed that counsel had previously attributed his failures to other professional obligations, his mother’s illness, personal travel, and his medical condition. The court stated that if those earlier representations had obscured the true reason for his conduct, that would support sanctions rather than undermine them. The court also found that the medical explanation did not address conduct before April 2025, including meritless objections to discovery requests made in December 2024 and January 2025 and failure to meet a discovery deadline in mid-April 2025.

Counsel also argued that dismissing the plaintiffs who were not deposed was disproportionate. The court rejected that argument because it depended on the already-rejected medical explanation. The court also rejected counsel’s promise to improve future compliance, reasoning that future remedial steps did not cure the prior harm to the City’s ability to litigate fairly and efficiently. The court noted that the proposed new support staff and attorneys had not entered appearances in the case, and declarations submitted by the City stated that they did not intend to do so. As a result, counsel would continue to bear the case’s responsibilities.

Disposition

Judge Richard Seeborg concluded that Litvinova had not offered sufficient evidence to disturb the prior sanctions decision. The court denied the motion for reconsideration.