M.C. v. Albarran

Background

J.A.M.C. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order. He was represented by counsel. The respondents were Sergio Albarran, Todd M. Lyons, Kristi Noem, and Pam Bondi, in the capacities listed in the opinion.

The evidence before the court stated that J.A.M.C. arrived in the United States in 1991, when he was three years old, and had lived in the United States since then except for a brief absence in 2008. He has three United States citizen children, two of whom were diagnosed with autism, and he works as a barber.

The Department of Homeland Security detained J.A.M.C. on February 5, 2025, for violating section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. An immigration judge later ordered him released on a $10,000 bond with an ankle-monitoring device. The Department of Homeland Security waived its right to appeal that decision.

On November 7, 2025, J.A.M.C. went to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement field office in San Francisco for a scheduled check-in. ICE detained him there, alleging that he violated the GPS-monitoring terms by visiting Stinson Beach on Labor Day. J.A.M.C. alleged that his monitoring officer had given him permission for the trip. He was being held at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco, California.

Legal standard

A temporary restraining order is short-term emergency relief intended to preserve the existing situation and prevent irreparable harm until a hearing on a preliminary injunction. The court applied the familiar four-factor test: likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, the balance of the equities, and the public interest. Because the opposing parties were government officials, the court treated the last two factors together.

The court also considered the standard for an ex parte order, meaning an order issued without advance notice to the opposing party. The court found that counsel’s affidavit showed immediate and irreparable harm from continued detention and that counsel had attempted to contact the United States Attorney’s Office.

Analysis

The court found that J.A.M.C. was likely to succeed on his procedural due-process claim under the Fifth Amendment. It held that a person conditionally released into the United States has a significant liberty interest in remaining outside immigration custody and on bond. Because J.A.M.C. had lived in the United States for more than thirty years, the court concluded that the Fifth Amendment entitled him to due-process protections for that interest.

The court reasoned that the procedures potentially available to J.A.M.C. did not adequately protect him from being wrongly detained before a hearing. The record suggested that he was not a flight risk or danger to the public, and an immigration judge had earlier made that determination when granting bond. The alleged trip to Stinson Beach occurred months earlier, and the court noted that J.A.M.C. had not violated other bond conditions during the intervening period and had appeared for his scheduled hearing.

The court also found likely irreparable harm because continued detention could amount to an unconstitutional loss of physical liberty. It found that the balance of equities and public interest favored relief because the government’s potential harm from delaying detention until it made the required showing was minimal, while J.A.M.C. was suffering ongoing detention. The court further concluded that immediate release was needed to restore the status quo—the parties’ situation before the challenged detention.

Order

The court granted J.A.M.C.’s motion for a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo pending further briefing. It ordered the defendants to release him and enjoined them from re-detaining him without first providing a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. At that hearing, the government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that revoking his previously granted bond is appropriate because detention is necessary to prevent flight or protect the public. If the defendants hold such a hearing, they must provide reasonable advance notice of its time and place.

The order was to remain effective until November 21, 2025. The court also dispensed with the security bond that can sometimes be required for an injunction, ordered the defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, and set a hearing for November 18, 2025. The opinion did not decide the underlying habeas petition on its merits.

Disposition

The temporary restraining order was granted. The classification is procedural because this order addressed temporary injunctive relief rather than finally deciding the habeas petition’s underlying claims.