Asemota v. City of New York and New York City Department of Social Services…

Background

Benson Asemota alleged that he worked for the New York City Department of Social Services (DSS) Human Resources Administration (HRA) for more than 25 years. He claimed that he was repeatedly denied promotions and hiring opportunities despite his experience, education, civil-service qualifications, and applications for management and supervisory positions. He alleged discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment based on race and national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). He also referred to defamation or negligence, malicious prosecution, fraud, and breach-of-contract theories under New York Civil Service Law § 75.

The City of New York and DSS moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. Asemota did not oppose the motion. The court stated that the lack of a response did not automatically require dismissal and considered the sufficiency of the complaint.

Rulings on the Claims

The court first ruled that DSS, as a New York City agency, was not a suable entity. It dismissed all claims against DSS and considered the claims against the City.

The court held that most of the alleged employment actions were too old to support the claims. For Title VII, employment practices occurring more than 300 days before Asemota filed his charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission were time-barred. The court treated failures to promote and refusals to hire as separate acts rather than one continuing violation. For the NYSHRL and § 1983 claims, the court applied a three-year limitations period and treated conduct before October 14, 2021, as time-barred.

As to Title VII disparate-treatment discrimination, the court accepted that Asemota adequately alleged that he belonged to a protected class, was qualified, and experienced adverse employment actions through alleged failures to promote. But it found that he did not allege facts creating even a minimal inference that the decisions were motivated by discrimination. His allegations about another employee’s promotion did not show that the employee was similarly situated, outside his protected class, or competing for the same position. His allegations about approximately 40 applications also lacked details about the positions and comparators.

The court dismissed the Title VII hostile-work-environment claim because the complaint offered only conclusory statements and no supporting factual allegations. It also dismissed the Title VII retaliation claim. Although the court found that Asemota plausibly alleged protected activity based on his 2022 complaints, it found that he did not plausibly allege that the City knew those complaints concerned unlawful discrimination rather than only his lack of promotion.

The court dismissed the § 1983 claims, which it said encompassed Asemota’s § 1981 claims against the municipal defendants. A municipal claim under § 1983 requires facts showing that an official policy or custom caused the deprivation of a constitutional right. The court found that Asemota’s general references to a policy or practice of discrimination and retaliation did not identify or support a specific city policy, custom, or practice.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to decide related state-law claims in a case that also includes federal claims—over the NYSHRL claims. It cited the dismissal of the federal claims, the early stage of the case, and unsettled questions concerning the NYSHRL’s pleading standards. The NYSHRL claims were therefore dismissed without prejudice, meaning the ruling did not bar them from being brought again in an appropriate setting.

In its conclusion, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII and § 1983 claims with prejudice. It also granted the motion with prejudice as to the additional defamation or negligence, malicious-prosecution, fraud, and breach-of-contract claims mentioned in the complaint’s introduction. It granted the motion as to the NYSHRL claims without prejudice. The clerk was directed to close the case.