Waheed v. New York Loan Company
- Laura Swain
- 1:25-cv-04787
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Sehra Waheed v. New York Loan Company, Chief Judge Swain denied all pending motions without prejudice and denied fee-free appeal status.
Sehra Waheed's requests for summonses, default judgments, electronic filing privileges, and emergency injunctive relief were denied without prejudice. Her request to appeal without paying filing fees was also denied. The order concerned claims against New York Loan Company, LLC, three private individuals, and another New York-based limited liability company identified in the pleading.
What happened
In Sehra Waheed v. New York Loan Company, Sehra Waheed alleged that the defendants auctioned her jewelry and designer handbags, continued billing her, and used misleading contracts. In her amended complaint, she brought claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and state law.
Waheed asked the court to issue summonses, enter default judgments, allow electronic filing, and provide emergency protection against the defendants. Because she was proceeding without a lawyer and without paying filing fees, the court said it first had to screen her amended complaint to determine whether it could proceed. The court also found that she had not shown the required basis for emergency protection.
Chief United States District Judge Laura Taylor Swain denied all pending motions without prejudice and directed the clerk to terminate them. The court also denied fee-free status for any appeal, certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
The detailed version
- Waheed v. New York Loan Company · No. 1:25-cv-04787
- Laura Swain
- Sept. 16, 2025
Background
Sehra Waheed, who was proceeding without a lawyer and without paying filing fees, originally asserted claims under a federal civil-rights statute, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and state law. She alleged that she entered into collateral-based loans with the defendants and that they auctioned property—including diamond and gold jewelry and designer handbags—without certified notice. She also alleged that the defendants continued billing her on expired contracts and used misleading contracts concerning the property.
Waheed later amended her complaint on her own initiative. The amended complaint asserted claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, a federal law commonly called RICO, and again asserted state-law claims. It did not reassert the earlier civil-rights or Securities Exchange Act claims.
Motions for summonses, default judgments, and electronic filing
Waheed filed several motions and other documents seeking summonses, default judgments, electronic case-filing privileges, and emergency injunctive relief. Because she was proceeding without paying filing fees, the court was required to screen the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That screening requires dismissal if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a legally sufficient claim, or seeks money from a defendant who is immune from that relief.
The court held that, while this screening was required, Waheed was not entitled at that stage to summonses, default judgments, or permission to use electronic filing. It denied those applications without prejudice to renewal at the appropriate time.
Emergency injunctive relief
Waheed sought an order stopping the defendants from engaging in the conduct underlying her claims. A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is emergency relief that requires a showing of likely irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions for litigation combined with a strongly favorable balance of hardships.
The court reviewed the amended complaint and Waheed's submissions but found that they did not establish either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions together with the required balance of hardships. It therefore denied the request for emergency injunctive relief without prejudice. The court stated that it would issue a further explanatory order later.
Disposition
Chief United States District Judge Laura Taylor Swain denied all pending motions and directed the clerk to terminate them. The court also certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith and denied Waheed fee-free status for purposes of an appeal. This order did not decide whether the defendants violated RICO or state law.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.