Medina v. AAM 15 Management LLC
- Kenneth Karas
- 7:21-cv-07492
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 14
In Christina Medina v. AAM 15 Management LLC, Judge Karas denied requests for partial judgment and immediate appeal of a dismissed retaliation claim.
The ruling directly affected Christina Medina’s requests for partial final judgment and immediate appellate review. AAM 15 Management LLC opposed those requests. The opinion states that other claims remained in the case, but it does not describe their ultimate outcome.
What happened
In Christina Medina v. AAM 15 Management LLC, Christina Medina sued AAM 15 Management LLC under federal and New York antidiscrimination laws, alleging pregnancy discrimination while working at two hotels. The court had previously dismissed her New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claim.
Medina asked the court to enter a partial final judgment so she could appeal immediately, or alternatively to certify the issue for an immediate appeal. The issue concerned whether requesting a workplace accommodation is protected activity under the New York law. She argued that the issue was separate from her remaining claims and that an early appeal could avoid additional litigation costs. AAM 15 Management opposed the motion.
Judge Kenneth M. Karas denied both requests. He concluded that Medina had not shown the unusual hardship required for partial judgment under Rule 54(b). Although the court found conflicting authority supporting a substantial difference of opinion on the legal issue, it concluded that an immediate appeal would likely delay rather than advance the end of the case. The court therefore denied the motion and directed the clerk to terminate it.
The detailed version
- Medina v. AAM 15 Management LLC · No. 7:21-cv-07492
- Kenneth Karas
- Sept. 17, 2025
Background
Christina Medina brought claims against AAM 15 Management LLC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law. She alleged, among other things, that AAM discriminated against her because she was pregnant while she worked as a front desk agent at two hotels. The court previously dismissed Medina’s New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claim.
Medina moved for entry of partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), or, alternatively, for certification of an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Her proposed appeal concerned whether a request for a reasonable accommodation is protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim under the New York State Human Rights Law.
Rule 54(b) Motion
Rule 54(b) allows a court to enter final judgment on fewer than all claims only when multiple claims or parties are involved, at least one claim or party’s rights and liabilities have been finally determined, and the court expressly finds no just reason for delaying judgment. The court found that the first two requirements were satisfied because the case involved multiple claims and the New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claim had been dismissed.
The court nevertheless denied partial judgment. It explained that Rule 54(b) certification is reserved for situations involving an unusual hardship or injustice that immediate appellate review would alleviate. Medina argued that an appeal could prevent duplicative discovery and trial proceedings and would help resolve an important legal question. The court ruled that the possibility of additional discovery and trial costs was not enough and that Medina had not identified the required unusual hardship or injustice.
Interlocutory-Appeal Certification
Section 1292(b) permits a district court to certify an otherwise nonfinal order for immediate appeal if the order involves a controlling question of law, there is substantial ground for disagreement about that question, and an immediate appeal may materially advance the end of the litigation. The party seeking certification must establish all three requirements, and the court retains discretion to deny certification even when the requirements are met.
The court found that the requirement concerning a substantial ground for disagreement favored certification because New York intermediate appellate courts had held that an initial request for a reasonable accommodation is not protected activity under the New York State Human Rights Law, while some federal district court decisions had reached the opposite conclusion in pregnancy-accommodation cases.
The court concluded, however, that the other requirements weighed against certification. It reasoned that an appeal to the Second Circuit, followed by possible certification to New York’s highest court and further proceedings in the district court, could take more than a year and prolong the litigation. The court determined that allowing the case to proceed to judgment, followed by any appeal from an adverse final outcome, would be more efficient. Because Medina had not satisfied all three requirements, the court denied her Section 1292(b) motion.
Disposition
The court denied Medina’s motion for partial judgment under Rule 54(b) and denied her motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b). It directed the clerk to terminate the pending motion.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.