Dottin v. United States of America
- Vincent Briccetti
- 7:24-cv-07034
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 9
In Lance Dottin v. United States, Judge Briccetti denied Dottin’s sentence challenge and dismissed his petition because Taylor did not apply.
Lance Dottin’s federal conviction and sentence, including his consecutive 84-month firearm sentence, remain undisturbed. The United States prevailed on the Section 2255 motion.
What happened
In Lance Dottin v. United States, Lance Dottin asked the court to vacate his sentence under Section 2255, arguing that United States v. Taylor invalidated his firearm conviction and that his lawyer was ineffective. Dottin represented himself.
The court ruled that the filing was late because Dottin filed it more than one year after his conviction became final, and he did not show grounds for extending the deadline. The court also considered the arguments on their merits and held that Taylor applies to attempted Hobbs Act robbery, not the completed robbery that served as the basis for Dottin’s firearm conviction. The court rejected his ineffective-assistance claim for the same reason.
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti denied the Section 2255 motion and dismissed the petition. The court also declined to issue a certificate allowing an appeal and denied permission to appeal without paying the filing fees.
The detailed version
- Dottin v. United States of America · No. 7:24-cv-07034
- Vincent Briccetti
- Sept. 17, 2025
Background
Lance Dottin moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a law allowing a federal defendant to challenge a sentence, conviction, or custody. He sought to vacate his conviction on Count Three and also claimed that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance.
The case arose from two gunpoint robberies on July 27 and July 28, 2021. Dottin pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, completed Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of the completed robbery. The court sentenced him to 84 months and one day: one day on each of the first two counts, to run concurrently, and 84 months on the firearm count, to run consecutively.
Dottin relied on United States v. Taylor, in which the Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He argued that his firearm conviction was invalid under Taylor and that his lawyer should have challenged that count and should not have advised him to plead guilty.
Timeliness
The court held that the motion was untimely. Dottin’s conviction became final on March 9, 2023, when the period for filing a direct appeal expired. Under the ordinary one-year deadline in Section 2255, he had until March 9, 2024, to file his motion. He first sought to challenge the conviction on September 16, 2024.
The court also concluded that none of the other statutory deadlines applied. It rejected any extension based on equitable tolling, which can excuse a late filing only when a petitioner pursued his rights diligently and an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. The court found that Dottin identified no such circumstance.
Merits
The court separately held that Dottin’s Taylor argument failed on the merits. The firearm count expressly identified the completed Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count Two as the predicate crime. The court relied on Dottin’s guilty plea, during which he admitted participating in the two robberies and acknowledged that a coconspirator brandished a firearm during and in furtherance of them.
The court explained that Taylor applies to attempted Hobbs Act robbery, while the Second Circuit has held that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a crime of violence that can support a Section 924(c) conviction. Because Dottin pleaded guilty to a firearm offense based on completed Hobbs Act robbery, the court held that Taylor did not invalidate Count Three.
The court also rejected Dottin’s ineffective-assistance claim under the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington. The court held that counsel did not act unreasonably by advising Dottin to plead guilty or by not seeking dismissal of Count Three under Taylor, because such a challenge would have failed. The court further held that Dottin could not show prejudice.
Disposition
The court denied Dottin’s motion under Section 2255 and dismissed the petition. It also stated that no certificate of appealability would issue because Dottin had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees. The clerk was instructed to close the civil case.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.