Jennifer W. v. Bisignano
- Dulce Foster
- 0:24-cv-04127
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 18
In Jennifer W. v. Bisignano, Judge Foster vacated the Social Security Administration's denial of disability benefits and remanded for a new hearing because the Appeals Council improperly excluded a detailed psychological report and the vocational expert's testimony was self-contradictory and relied on an unexplained job-counting method.
People who have been denied Social Security disability insurance benefits and have submitted new psychological or medical evidence to the Appeals Council after an ALJ's decision, or whose cases relied on vocational expert testimony about available jobs without a clear, reliable methodology. This ruling may be relevant to claimants whose post-decision evidence was rejected as untimely or non-material, and to those challenging the reliability of job-number estimates offered by vocational experts.
What happened
In Jennifer W. v. Bisignano (No. 24-cv-4127), a Minnesota federal court reviewed a Social Security Administration decision denying disability insurance benefits to Jennifer W., who applied based on conditions including PTSD, depression, and anxiety. The administrative law judge (ALJ) had found her not disabled at step five of the agency's five-step evaluation process, relying on a vocational expert's testimony that she could perform jobs such as hand packager, inspector, and warehouse worker. Jennifer W. then asked the Appeals Council to review the decision and submitted new evidence, including a detailed psychological evaluation by a licensed psychologist, Thomas K. Richardson. The Appeals Council refused to consider that evidence and denied review.
The court identified two independent reasons to send the case back for further proceedings. First, it found the Appeals Council was wrong to exclude the Richardson psychological report. The report — which included objective testing, a detailed clinical history, and a conclusion that Jennifer W. 'likely would be viewed as not suitable for competitive employment' — was the most detailed mental health opinion in the record, was not merely a repeat of existing evidence, and related to her condition before the ALJ's decision even though it was completed about six weeks afterward. Second, the court found the vocational expert's testimony was self-contradictory: the expert said Jennifer W. could perform jobs requiring workers to carry out 'detailed' instructions, yet also testified that her limitation to simple, routine, repetitive tasks 'precludes the ability to carry out detailed, written and oral instructions.' The court also found the expert's estimates of available jobs unreliable because he described his method only as his own 'homemade way' of counting information on government websites, while a well-accepted employment database suggested his numbers were dramatically inflated for at least two of the three jobs identified.
Judge Dulce J. Foster granted Jennifer W.'s request for relief in part and denied it in part, denied the Commissioner's request to affirm the decision, and vacated the ALJ's decision, remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. On remand, the ALJ must consider whether the Richardson evidence changes the five-step analysis and must recall a vocational expert to provide job-number estimates based on reliable sources and a well-accepted methodology.
The detailed version
- Jennifer W. v. Bisignano · No. 0:24-cv-04127
- Dulce J. Foster
- Nov. 14, 2025
Background
Jennifer W. applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits (DIB) on November 15, 2021, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2020. She was 30 years old at the time of application, held a GED, and had prior work experience as a bartender/server, dispatcher, customer service representative, long-term caregiver, and security guard. Her alleged disabling conditions included complex PTSD, depression, anxiety, abnormal heartbeat, heart palpitations, social anxiety, and low back problems.
Administrative Proceedings
The Commissioner denied Jennifer W.'s application initially and on reconsideration. An ALJ held a hearing on October 3, 2023, at which Jennifer W. and a vocational expert (VE) testified. The ALJ issued his decision on December 14, 2023.
Working through the agency's five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ found: (step 1) Jennifer W.'s dog-walking activity did not constitute substantial gainful activity; (step 2) she had severe impairments of major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and PTSD, and non-severe impairments of asthma, stimulant use disorder, supraventricular tachycardia, obesity, and low back pain; (step 3) her impairments did not meet or equal any listed impairment. The ALJ then assessed her residual functional capacity (RFC) — the most a claimant can do despite her limitations — finding she could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks not at a fast production-rate pace, occasional and superficial interactions with supervisors and co-workers, no public interaction, and occasional changes in a predictable setting. At step 4, the ALJ found she could not perform her past relevant work as a dispatcher or customer service representative. At step 5, relying on the VE's testimony, the ALJ found she could perform the jobs of hand packager (~90,000 jobs nationally), inspector (~80,000 jobs), and warehouse worker (~120,000 jobs), and therefore was not disabled.
Jennifer W. timely sought Appeals Council review and submitted two categories of new evidence: (1) 17 pages of Allina Health Systems records dated September–October 2023; and (2) a 10-page psychological evaluation report and 5-page mental functioning questionnaire (collectively, the "Richardson Evidence") prepared by licensed psychologist Thomas K. Richardson, M.A., L.P., L.S.P., following his evaluation of Jennifer W. on January 25, 2024. The Appeals Council declined to consider either submission and denied review. It found the Allina records did not show a reasonable probability of changing the outcome, and found the Richardson Evidence did not relate to the period at issue because it post-dated the ALJ's decision. Jennifer W. then filed this lawsuit.
Legal Standards
Appeals Council review of new evidence
The Appeals Council must grant review when new evidence (1) is new, material, and relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision; (2) creates a reasonable probability of changing the outcome; and (3) is accompanied by good cause for late submission. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5), (b). Courts review de novo whether evidence is new, material, and temporally relevant. Evidence is "new" if it is more than merely cumulative; it is "material" if relevant to the claimant's condition during the period benefits were denied. The exact timing of new evidence is not dispositive of materiality.
ALJ's step-five analysis
The ALJ's decision is reviewed for whether it is supported by "substantial evidence" — more than a scintilla, meaning such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. When there is a conflict between a VE's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), the ALJ has an affirmative duty to resolve the conflict before relying on the VE's evidence, and to explain the resolution. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 00-4P. This duty is not satisfied merely because the VE says his testimony is consistent with the DOT.
Analysis
I. The Appeals Council's Exclusion of the Richardson Evidence
The court found the Appeals Council erred in refusing to consider the Richardson Evidence.
Newness
The Richardson Evidence was the most detailed mental health opinion in the record — far more comprehensive than any prior opinion — including objective test results, a clinical history, interpretations, diagnoses, treatment recommendations, and a mental functioning questionnaire informed by Mr. Richardson's 25 years of experience as an evaluator for Minnesota's Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. The Commissioner argued it was merely cumulative of existing diagnoses, treatment history, and a prior two-page checkbox-style medical opinion. The court disagreed, finding nothing in the record comparable in detail or analytical depth.
Materiality and temporal relevance
The court found the Richardson Evidence related to Jennifer W.'s condition before the ALJ's December 2023 decision. Although the evaluation occurred approximately one and a half months after that decision, the court found no evidence of significant deterioration during that brief interval. Mr. Richardson's report relied substantially on Jennifer W.'s reported history predating the decision — including childhood trauma, domestic abuse, self-harm dating to middle school, substance addiction, and multiple hospitalizations. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that a newly identified diagnosis of "unspecified neurocognitive disorder" demonstrated an after-acquired condition, calling that argument premised on the "meritless notion that a medical condition cannot exist unless it is diagnosed."
Good cause
The court found good cause for the late production. Jennifer W. was referred for neuropsychological testing on June 8, 2023 — approximately four months before the ALJ hearing — and the delay appeared attributable to systemic scheduling backlogs rather than any lack of diligence. The parties did not meaningfully dispute this.
Scope of review
The court declined to accept the Commissioner's invitation to weigh whether the Richardson Evidence would change the ultimate outcome, explaining that under Eighth Circuit precedent, a court conducts that weighing only when the Appeals Council actually considered the new evidence. Because the Council did not consider it here, the sole question was whether it should have.
II. The VE's Testimony
Internal inconsistency
The VE testified that Jennifer W. could perform hand packager and warehouse worker jobs — occupations the DOT classifies as requiring level 2 reasoning, meaning the ability to carry out "detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions." The VE also testified, however, that Jennifer W.'s limitation to simple, routine, repetitive tasks "precludes the ability to carry out detailed, written and oral instructions." The court found this testimony internally self-contradictory. The court distinguished the Commissioner's reliance on cases holding that a limitation to simple tasks is not categorically inconsistent with level 2 DOT reasoning, noting that the issue here was not a conflict between the VE's testimony and the DOT, but an internal conflict within the VE's own testimony. The ALJ was required to resolve this inconsistency before relying on it.
(The court separately found no inconsistency between Jennifer W.'s RFC and the hand packager job's duty to regulate conveyor speed, because nothing in the DOT's description of that occupation imposed a specific pace or rate requirement inconsistent with her RFC.)
Unreliable job-number estimates
The VE offered estimates of approximately 90,000 hand packager, 80,000 inspector, and 120,000 warehouse worker jobs nationally. On cross-examination, the VE described his methodology as his own "homemade way," involving a vague "count" of unspecified information on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website and the Occupational Outlook handbook. Jennifer W.'s counsel introduced data from Job Browser Pro — a database described in Seventh Circuit precedent as "well-accepted" — showing the inspector occupation (DOT 589.686-038) had approximately 15 jobs nationally (vs. the VE's 80,000), the warehouse worker occupation had approximately 4,109 (vs. 120,000), and the hand packager occupation had approximately 72,297 (vs. 90,000). The ALJ overruled Jennifer W.'s objection solely on the basis of the VE's experience.
The court rejected this rationale. Citing Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019), and Seventh Circuit authority, the court held that experience alone does not suffice when a claimant challenges job-number methodology — the VE must provide a reasoned and principled explanation of his method. The VE's vague description identified no methodology, much less a well-accepted one. Combined with the highly suspect estimates revealed by the Job Browser Pro data, the VE's testimony lacked the "modicum of confidence" in reliability necessary to constitute substantial evidence supporting the step-five finding.
Disposition
Judge Foster granted Jennifer W.'s request for relief in part and denied it in part, denied the Commissioner's request for relief, and vacated the ALJ's decision, remanding the case for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On remand, the ALJ must: (1) consider whether the Richardson Evidence alters the five-step sequential analysis; and (2) recall a vocational expert to provide job-number estimates based on reliable sources and a well-accepted methodology, and to resolve the internal inconsistency in prior VE testimony regarding detailed instructions.
Read the full 18-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.