Ollestad v. City of Mora

Background

Thomas Richard Ollestad had a prolonged history of conflict with the Kanabec County court system, which he attributed to what he described as the unlawful removal of his two children. In November 2023, the Kanabec County courts issued an administrative order restricting his courthouse access after finding him repeatedly abusive and threatening toward court staff. After Ollestad continued his conduct, the court issued a second, more restrictive administrative order on March 20, 2024, prohibiting him from entering certain areas of the courthouse, including the law library and public access terminals.

On March 21, 2024, Ollestad entered the courthouse law library in violation of this order and began using computers to print files related to his child custody case. Deputies Russell Coleman, Jake Kleszky, and Dylan VanGorden approached him and, over the course of several minutes, repeatedly told him he needed to leave — at least ten times. Ollestad refused each time and responded with profanity, including saying "I don't give a fuck" when told he was not allowed in the building. The deputies then physically took him to the ground, handcuffed him in a prone position, and arrested him for disorderly conduct. During the arrest, Ollestad complained that his shoulder was broken; he contradicted himself about which shoulder was injured. After he was placed in handcuffs, the deputies used his uninjured left arm to lift him and lead him from the courthouse. The entire interaction lasted approximately six minutes. A medical screening after the arrest noted shoulder pain, depression, and anxiety, but found no immediate need for medical care.

Ollestad filed his complaint on January 2, 2025, asserting seven claims and seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, and a written apology. Defendants filed a joint answer and a motion to dismiss. Ollestad did not file a response to the motion to dismiss but filed a motion to strike the defendants' answer.

Legal Standards

The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard for a motion to dismiss — the standard requiring a complaint to contain enough factual matter to state a claim that is "plausible on its face" (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). The court accepted facts in the complaint as true but disregarded allegations that were "blatantly contradicted" by the video and audio recording of the incident (Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 2019)).

Rulings on Each Claim

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine (Challenge to Administrative Order)

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from reviewing and rejecting state court judgments in cases brought by state court losers. The court found that Ollestad's claim that the March 2024 administrative order was "illegal" and "void on its face" invited exactly this kind of review. To the extent his complaint sought a declaration that the order was illegal or void, those claims were barred.

Claim 1 — Excessive Force (Fourth Amendment / 42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue state or local officials for violations of constitutional rights. To overcome qualified immunity — a legal protection that shields government officials from lawsuits unless they violated a clearly established right — Ollestad needed to allege both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time.

The court found the deputies' force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Key factors: the deputies gave Ollestad at least ten warnings before using any force; he explicitly refused to comply; the force used was limited to bringing him to the ground and handcuffing him; the deputies did not strike him. Regarding his shoulder injury, the court found Ollestad had not told the deputies about any injury before the arrest began, and that when an officer uses reasonable force that aggravates a pre-existing injury the officer did not know about, that does not constitute excessive force (citing Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2010)). Claim 1 was dismissed.

Claim 2 — Deliberate Indifference to Medical Need (Fourteenth Amendment)

The court analyzed this claim under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment, because Ollestad was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged failure. Deliberate indifference requires showing both an objectively serious medical need and that the defendants knew of and disregarded it — a standard requiring more than even gross negligence.

The court found Ollestad could not plausibly allege the deputies knew of his conditions. He never mentioned his shoulder before the arrest; he then contradicted himself about which shoulder was hurt; and he stopped complaining shortly after handcuffing. He alleged no facts showing the deputies knew of his mental health issues at all. Claim 2 was dismissed.

Claim 3 — Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

To succeed on an ADA Title II claim, a plaintiff must show he is a qualified individual with a disability who was denied access to a public program or service because of that disability, and that the denial was intentional or caused by deliberate indifference. The court found the deputies had little or no notice of Ollestad's physical or mental disabilities, and Ollestad never requested an accommodation.

Ollestad also argued a "wrongful arrest" theory — that officers can be liable under the ADA if they unreasonably mistake innocent, disability-related behavior for criminal conduct. The court found this theory has never been formally adopted by the Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit. Even setting that aside, the court found the theory did not apply: Ollestad did not allege his disability caused him to violate the administrative order or to respond with profanity; the record showed he was arrested for disorderly conduct based on his loud, profane responses to the deputies. Claim 3 was dismissed.

Claim 4 — Rehabilitation Act

The Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits disability discrimination in federally funded programs, requires the same showing of intent or deliberate indifference as the ADA. The court noted that it was unclear whether the City of Mora was even responsible for training Kanabec County Sheriff's Deputies (as the deputies appeared to be county, not city, employees). Regardless, Ollestad made virtually no factual showing that the city provided insufficient training or did so with deliberate indifference to people with disabilities. Claim 4 was dismissed.

Claims 5 and 6 — Failure to Train, Failure to Supervise, and Monell Municipal Liability (§ 1983)

The court analyzed these together. A supervisory officer can be held liable under § 1983 only if there is both an underlying constitutional violation and deliberate indifference to — or tacit authorization of — deficient training or supervision. Because the court found no underlying constitutional violation, the failure-to-train claim against the individual deputies (Claim 5) failed.

A Monell claim — a claim that a local government itself caused a constitutional violation through official policy, unofficial custom, or deliberate indifference to training failures — likewise requires an underlying constitutional violation by a city employee. Because none was found, the court dismissed Claim 6 as well.

Claim 7 — Substantive Due Process (Fourteenth Amendment / § 1983)

Substantive due process — the constitutional protection against government conduct that "shocks the conscience" or is "truly egregious and extraordinary" — protects personal security as a fundamental liberty interest. The court found that viewing everything in the light most favorable to Ollestad, the deputies used only the force reasonable under the circumstances to arrest him for disorderly conduct while he was violating a court order and refusing to cooperate. The conduct was not egregious or extraordinary. Claim 7 was dismissed.

Disposition

Judge Menendez granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed Ollestad's complaint with prejudice, finding amendment would be futile. Ollestad's motion to strike the defendants' answer was denied as moot, because dismissal of the complaint rendered the answer a nullity.