Salcido v. City of Mountain View

Background

Felix Salcido worked as a tow truck driver for Ed’s Tow & Cradle, which had a contract to assist with towing unauthorized vehicles in California. On April 12, 2023, Salcido towed three vehicles from reserved parking spaces, including a vehicle belonging to City Council member Ellen Kamei.

Kamei complained about the tow to Mountain View Police Department Chief Max Bosel. Bosel directed Sgt. Christopher Goff to investigate Salcido and the towing company for unlawful towing. Goff investigated and prepared a police report. A records specialist submitted the report as part of an application for an arrest warrant. A district attorney charged Salcido with a California felony involving the taking or unauthorized use of a vehicle with intent temporarily to deprive the owner of possession. The charge was later dismissed.

Salcido filed a federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Goff and Kamei individually and in their official capacities, and against the City. He alleged that Goff and Kamei engaged in malicious prosecution in retaliation for towing Kamei’s vehicle, causing his detention, arrest, and criminal charge in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also asserted a municipal-liability claim against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court had previously dismissed two earlier complaints with permission to amend. The third amended complaint was the fourth complaint Salcido had filed, and the parties had engaged in discovery.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. For this motion, the court accepted factual allegations as true but did not accept conclusory statements, unsupported factual deductions, or unreasonable inferences.

To state a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a government official charged him without probable cause, causing an unreasonable seizure of his person. The plaintiff must also show that the charge ended favorably. A person may be liable for malicious prosecution if the person wrongfully caused charges to be filed through conduct such as fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other bad-faith conduct. An investigator may also be liable for deliberately or recklessly submitting false or materially incomplete information in a warrant application.

Claims against Goff

The court had previously found that Salcido failed to plausibly allege that omissions from Goff’s police report were material to the probable-cause decision. In the third amended complaint, Salcido again alleged that Goff omitted facts showing that the tows were legal and omitted Kamei’s involvement in starting the investigation.

Salcido newly alleged that Goff knew Kamei’s vehicle and the Tesla had blocked an entrance or exit, and therefore knew the vehicles could legally be towed. The court found these allegations conclusory. The complaint described Goff’s conversations with a property manager and the Tesla owner but did not plausibly explain how Goff knew that the Tesla specifically had blocked the entrance. The court also found that Salcido’s allegation that Goff knew the tows were legal was undermined by the allegation that Goff described the legality of the tows as a “grey area.”

The court also found speculative Salcido’s allegations that Goff knew Kamei had initiated the investigation through communications designed to avoid a paper trail. Even if Kamei’s involvement had been omitted, Salcido did not adequately explain how including it would have changed the probable-cause decision. The court therefore held that Salcido had not plausibly alleged either that he was charged without probable cause or that Goff’s alleged omissions were material to probable cause.

Claims against Kamei and the City

The court had previously found that Salcido plausibly alleged Kamei acted under state authority when she reported the tow to Chief Bosel. But the court again held that Salcido had not plausibly alleged that Kamei’s complaint caused him to be charged without probable cause or that her actions were material to the probable-cause decision. The claim against Kamei therefore failed for the same reason as the claim against Goff.

The court held that Salcido’s claim against the City also failed. A Monell claim against a municipality depends on an underlying constitutional violation by a municipal officer, and the court had found that Salcido failed to state a claim against Goff or Kamei.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the third amended complaint. Because Salcido had filed four complaints and had engaged in discovery, the court found that further amendment would be futile. It dismissed the third amended complaint without leave to amend. The court stated that it therefore did not need to decide the parties’ remaining arguments, including qualified immunity.