Sherzad v. Pettigrew

Background

Mashal Sherzad was hired in October 2023 as Program Manager of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) at the University of Minnesota's School of Public Health (SPH). The DEI office served SPH's approximately 130 faculty and nearly 1,000 students, and Sherzad was expected to work with a high degree of independence to implement anti-racism and anti-oppression programs.

About six weeks after starting, while on a pre-approved vacation in Barcelona, Sherzad attended a peaceful protest related to the Israel-Hamas conflict. Her partner photographed her standing next to an Israeli flag that had been spray-painted with two large red swastikas. She posted that photo, along with four others from the protest, to her private Instagram account with the caption "This is not a war. This is not a conflict. This is GENOCIDE." The post was automatically shared to her personal Facebook account, which had approximately 6,000 followers.

Two days later, an unknown member of the public emailed several University officials — including SPH's Interim Dean Timothy Beebe and Sherzad's supervisor — attaching a screenshot of the post and expressing concern that a DEI professional had posed next to a symbol with "genocidal implications." Sherzad removed the photo within 45 minutes of the University receiving the complaint and sent a written apology acknowledging the photo "could and did get taken out of context."

Interim Dean Beebe directed SPH's Human Resources Director Thai Nguyen to investigate. Sherzad was placed on paid administrative leave. During the investigation, Sherzad's supervisor noted that while Sherzad had been performing well before the post, she would need substantial coaching going forward. After reviewing the investigation report, newly installed Dean Melinda Pettigrew decided to terminate Sherzad's employment, concluding that the post showed a lack of judgment, sensitivity, and awareness incompatible with the DEI role. Sherzad was formally notified on January 10, 2024, and her employment ended January 24, 2024.

Claims

Sherzad sued Pettigrew, Nguyen, Beebe, University Provost Rachel Croson, the University of Minnesota, and two unnamed John Doe/Jane Roe defendants. She alleged: (1) violation of her First Amendment free speech rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (a federal civil rights statute allowing suits against state officials acting under color of law); (2) employment discrimination based on race, color, creed, religion, and national origin under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA); and (3) a § 1983 conspiracy to deprive her of constitutional rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims and also moved to exclude the testimony of Sherzad's expert, Dr. Barry Trachtenberg, a history professor at Wake Forest University.

First Amendment Claim

The court applied the three-step framework governing public employee speech.

Step 1: Speech as a Citizen on a Matter of Public Concern The parties agreed that Sherzad's post about the Israel-Hamas conflict was on a matter of public concern, and that she posted it as a private citizen on her personal account rather than in connection with her job duties. The analysis therefore proceeded.

Step 2: Actual or Reasonably Foreseeable Disruption The court found both actual disruption and reasonably foreseeable disruption. On actual disruption, Dean Pettigrew's loss of confidence in Sherzad's judgment — based on Sherzad's critical error only six weeks into a role requiring high independence and community-facing responsibilities — constituted a real disruption to the workplace. The court cited its own prior decision in Palmer v. County of Anoka for the proposition that a supervisor's loss of confidence in an employee's judgment can itself be a workplace disruption.

On reasonably foreseeable disruption, the court found it was reasonable to predict that a DEI professional posting a photo of herself posing next to a widely recognized hate symbol on a platform with 6,000 followers would undermine her credibility, erode trust among those she served, and disrupt SPH's ability to implement inclusive programs — particularly during a period of heightened tension over Israeli-Palestinian issues.

The court distinguished this case from the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in Melton v. City of Forrest City, 147 F.4th 896 (8th Cir. 2025), where a firefighter's racially ambiguous anti-abortion post did not directly relate to firefighting and produced a "tossup" on disruption. Here, the direct connection between Sherzad's speech (posing with a hate symbol) and her job (promoting inclusion and anti-discrimination) made the disruption analysis much clearer.

The court rejected Sherzad's argument that a Senior Human Resources employee's email supporting Palestine advocacy showed her post was consistent with DEI values. It was undisputed that Defendants' only concern was the specific photograph, not Sherzad's other posts about Palestine — a point Sherzad herself acknowledged in her own brief and deposition.

Step 3: Pickering Balancing The court applied the six-factor Pickering balancing test to weigh Sherzad's free speech interests against SPH's interests as an employer in the efficiency of its DEI operations.

- Factor 1 (workplace harmony): Weighed for Defendants. Sherzad's entire job was to foster an inclusive environment; the inflammatory post cut against that mission. - Factor 2 (close working relationship): Weighed for Defendants. Sherzad's role required direct interaction with faculty, staff, and students, and the post damaged the trust necessary for that relationship. - Factor 3 (time, place, manner of speech): Weighed for Defendants. Although Sherzad spoke off-duty and off-premises, posting to a 6,000-follower social media account created a substantial risk the image would reach the SPH community. - Factor 4 (context of the dispute): Weighed for Sherzad. Her speech arose in the context of a public debate, not an internal employment grievance. - Factor 5 (degree of public interest): Neutral. Sherzad had no specialized expertise or insider knowledge on the topic; she was "simply adding her views to the views of countless others." - Factor 6 (whether speech impeded ability to perform duties): Weighed strongly for Defendants. Posting a photo with a hate symbol was directly at odds with her role as a DEI professional promoting inclusion.

The court concluded the balance weighed decisively for Defendants and dismissed the First Amendment claim.

Employment Discrimination Claims

Sherzad's claims under the Equal Protection Clause (via § 1983), § 1981, and the MHRA were all analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Because Sherzad offered no direct evidence of discrimination, she had to establish a prima facie case, including showing that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were treated differently.

Sherzad pointed to University law school and liberal arts professors who posted controversial views on the Israel-Hamas conflict but were not fired. The court found these employees were not similarly situated because: (1) they were faculty, not DEI professionals; (2) they worked in different departments under different deans; and (3) there was no evidence their speech involved a hate symbol. Sherzad therefore failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Alternatively, the court found that even if she had established a prima facie case, Defendants articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination (the judgment concerns described above), and Sherzad produced no evidence that this reason was pretextual or that her race, religion, gender, or national origin contributed to the firing decision.

The court also noted in a footnote that Sherzad's § 1981 claims failed for the additional reason that direct § 1981 claims against state actors are prohibited under Eighth Circuit precedent and must be brought via § 1983, and that the University itself is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity (a constitutional bar on federal suits against states) and is not a "person" subject to § 1981 or § 1983 liability.

Conspiracy Claim

Sherzad's § 1983 conspiracy claim failed because a conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires proof of an underlying constitutional deprivation. Because the court found no constitutional violation, the conspiracy claim was also dismissed.

Qualified Immunity

The individual defendants (Pettigrew, Nguyen, Beebe, Croson, and the unnamed defendants) separately argued they were protected by qualified immunity — a doctrine shielding government officials from personal liability unless they violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Because the court found no constitutional violation at all, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims.

Disposition

The court granted summary judgment to all Defendants on all claims. The motion to exclude Dr. Trachtenberg's expert testimony was denied as moot. The Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.