Sternberg v. Hendrickson
- Martinez-Olguin
- 3:24-cv-04271
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Sternberg v. Hendrickson, Judge Martinez-Olguin denied alternative email service because efforts to locate and serve two defendants were not reasonably diligent.
Michael C. Sternberg, Sherry Diamond, and the Santa Clara County Bar Association. Sternberg’s request to serve Diamond and the organization by email was denied, but the court extended his deadline to serve them to December 19, 2025.
What happened
Michael C. Sternberg, proceeding without a lawyer and suing on behalf of himself and his two children, asked to serve Sherry Diamond and the Santa Clara County Bar Association by email in a case arising from a child custody dispute.
The court assumed, without deciding, that email to Diamond’s email address could give both defendants actual notice. It nevertheless found that Sternberg had not shown reasonable diligence because he made only one attempt at personal service, at a vacant address during a weekday lunch hour, and did not make other efforts to find Diamond or determine how to serve the organization.
Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin denied the motion for alternative service. The court extended the service deadline for Diamond and the Santa Clara County Bar Association to December 19, 2025, required Sternberg to file proof of service by December 31, 2025, and warned that failure to serve them could result in dismissal as to those defendants without prejudice.
The detailed version
- Sternberg v. Hendrickson · No. 3:24-cv-04271
- Martinez-Olguin
- Nov. 17, 2025
Background
Michael C. Sternberg, proceeding without an attorney and on behalf of himself and his two children, E.W. and N.W., sued dozens of defendants based on their alleged roles in a child custody dispute involving E.W. and N.W. The motion addressed service on Sherry Diamond and the Santa Clara County Bar Association, which Sternberg called the SCCBA.
Sternberg asked for permission to serve Diamond and the SCCBA by email to Diamond’s SCCBA email address. He stated that Diamond had not responded to a request to waive service or follow-up emails, and that a process server had been unable to serve her during one attempt at noon on a weekday at her last known address, which appeared vacant. He also asserted that Diamond had evaded service in earlier litigation, although she was eventually served personally in that matter.
Analysis
The court explained that alternative service by email may be allowed when a plaintiff has shown reasonable diligence and email is reasonably calculated to give the defendants actual notice. The court assumed, without deciding, that use of Diamond’s SCCBA email address would reasonably provide actual notice to both Diamond and the organization.
The court nevertheless found that Sternberg’s efforts did not demonstrate reasonable diligence. Although he sent one email requesting a waiver of service and two follow-up emails, the process server made only one attempt at a vacant address. Sternberg made no additional attempts beyond email and that single failed personal-service attempt to determine Diamond’s current address. He also made no effort to obtain information, other than Diamond’s address, that might have allowed proper service on the SCCBA. The court concluded that these efforts did not amount to the thorough, systematic investigation needed to authorize email service.
Ruling
Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin denied Sternberg’s motion for alternative service.
The court noted that it had previously extended the deadline for service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) to December 13, 2024, and then to January 31,
- Sternberg did not file the alternative-service motion until May 8,
- Because he was proceeding without an attorney, the court extended the deadline to serve Diamond and the SCCBA to December 19,
- It ordered Sternberg to file, by December 31, 2025, a certificate showing service of the summons and complaint by that deadline. The court stated that failure to serve could result in dismissal of the action as to those defendants without prejudice under Rule 4(m). The court also deferred setting a deadline for Sternberg’s second amended complaint until the defendants were properly served and any motion to dismiss was resolved, or they were dismissed without prejudice under Rule 4(m).
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.