Daniels v. Wireless

Background

Judge Susan Illston previously allowed Brandon Daniels to proceed without paying the filing fee, screened his original complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed that complaint for failure to state a claim, and denied his request for a temporary restraining order. She identified several deficiencies and allowed Daniels to amend. Daniels filed an amended complaint on October 14, 2025. Judge Illston then recused herself, and the case was randomly reassigned to Judge William H. Orrick.

Daniels sued Verizon Wireless and “Verizon Executive Relations.” He alleged violations of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1431, the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, Uniform Commercial Code § 3-603, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The alleged conduct was Verizon’s rejection of a “lawful tender of payment and remittance coupon” for his past-due account and the resulting disconnection of his phone. He sought damages, an order preventing collection of the account, and correction of debt information provided to consumer reporting agencies. Daniels also acknowledged that he had filed a complaint about the conduct with the Federal Communications Commission.

Motion to Vacate Reassignment

Daniels moved to vacate the reassignment and requested assignment to another judge. He argued that reassignment to Judge Orrick was improper because, in a previous case, he had filed an affidavit of judicial bias and a motion seeking Orrick’s recusal. The court denied the motion.

The court explained that if the two cases involved substantially the same parties and subject matter, the new case could appropriately be assigned to Orrick as a related case under the District’s local rules. It also held that the prior recusal motion did not establish a basis for disqualification. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, the relevant question is whether a reasonable person who knew the facts would question the judge’s impartiality. The court stated that alleged prejudice must come from an outside source and that a judge’s prior adverse ruling is not enough. It found that the only asserted basis for bias was Orrick’s earlier denial of Daniels’s recusal motion.

Screening of the Amended Complaint

Because Daniels was proceeding without paying the filing fee, the court screened the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute permits dismissal if an action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks money from an immune defendant.

The amended complaint corrected one problem identified in the earlier order: it made clear that Daniels was suing on his own behalf. The court held, however, that the remaining problems persisted. It again dismissed the Section 1983 claim because Verizon was not a state actor and therefore could not have acted under color of state law. It also held that the alleged facts did not support a securities-fraud claim.

The court rejected the additional theories for these reasons:

- The Federal Reserve Act concerns the Federal Reserve Bank, and Daniels alleged no factual or legal connection between Verizon and the Federal Reserve. - 12 U.S.C. § 1431 concerns the powers and duties of federally governed banks, and Daniels alleged no connection between Verizon and banks. - The Bills of Exchange Act 1882 is a British law and did not provide a cause of action against Verizon. - The Uniform Commercial Code § 3-603 theory failed, even if treated as a claim under California Uniform Commercial Code section 3606, because Daniels did not provide evidence that he attempted to pay the full debt. The court noted that he alleged submitting a remittance coupon but did not show that he sent a check, money order, or another full payment method. - The alleged failure to accept payment did not support an unjust-enrichment claim. - Because Daniels had filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission concerning Verizon’s refusal to accept payment and termination of his phone plan, the court held that he could not also seek relief in federal court for that conduct.

Disposition

Judge Orrick denied the motion to vacate the reassignment. He dismissed the amended complaint again under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim, dismissed the case with prejudice, and directed the clerk to enter judgment.