Firsov v. Airlines

Background

Sergey Firsov sued Frontier Airlines, Inc. under the Montreal Convention and state law. Firsov alleged that Frontier charged baggage and pet fees for his March 24, 2025 flight from Philadelphia to Atlanta, even though he had previously paid a pet fee to Lufthansa in Warsaw and had registered baggage to San Francisco.

Firsov originally purchased a round-trip itinerary from United Airlines for travel from San Francisco through Munich, Warsaw, Frankfurt, and Philadelphia, and back to San Francisco. He later purchased a separate Frontier ticket for the Philadelphia-to-Atlanta flight and a separate United ticket for travel from Atlanta to San Francisco. The Frontier ticket was purchased on a different date, had a different confirmation number, and did not refer to the original United itinerary.

Motion to Dismiss

Frontier moved to dismiss the first amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which permits dismissal when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction—the authority to hear the case. Frontier argued that the Montreal Convention did not apply to Firsov’s one-way domestic flight from Philadelphia to Atlanta.

Firsov argued that the Philadelphia-to-Atlanta flight was part of his international trip under Articles 1(3) and 36 of the Montreal Convention. Those provisions can treat transportation by multiple successive carriers as one international carriage when the parties regarded it as a single operation.

The court explained that the key question was the parties’ intent to enter into an agreement for international carriage. Courts begin with objective evidence shown by the tickets and may consider other evidence about the ticketing circumstances and whether the airline understood the disputed flight to be part of an international journey.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Firsov’s favor, the court found no allegations supporting a reasonable inference that Frontier regarded itself as part of a single operation with United or Lufthansa. The Frontier and United tickets were purchased separately, had different confirmation numbers, and did not refer to one another. The itineraries also showed that Firsov was scheduled to arrive in Philadelphia more than 15 hours before departing for Atlanta. The court found no evidence that Frontier knew about Firsov’s United itinerary or that Frontier participated in an interline agreement with United.

The court also considered Firsov’s proposed second amended complaint, which would have added the owners of a ticketing system as defendants. The court concluded that the proposed amendments would be futile because Firsov’s allegations still showed that he had separate contracts of carriage and that Frontier could not view or know about his Lufthansa and United itinerary. The amendments therefore would not establish that the Frontier flight was part of Firsov’s international travel.

Disposition

The court held that the first amended complaint did not plausibly allege that the Montreal Convention applied to the fees charged for the domestic Philadelphia-to-Atlanta flight. Because the Montreal Convention claim was the only federal claim and the sole asserted basis for federal jurisdiction, the court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.

The court GRANTED Frontier’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. The federal claim for violation of the Montreal Convention was DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, and the court DECLINED TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION over the state-law claims. The court DENIED Frontier’s request for sanctions, including sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the court’s inherent authority.

The court also DENIED Firsov’s motion for reconsideration because he had not obtained the required permission to file it and had not shown a basis for reconsideration. All other pending motions were TERMINATED, and the clerk was directed to close the file.