Shopek v. City of Minneapolis

Background

Brian Jeffrey Shopek, proceeding without a lawyer (pro se), sued the City of Minneapolis and three individual City employees — Gina Filigenzi (his direct supervisor, Director of ServiceDesk), Paul Cameron (Chief Information Officer), and Destiny Xiong (HR Manager and ADA Coordinator) — after his employment as Supervisor of IT Deskside Services ended in September 2023. Shopek has diagnosed anxiety, depression, and ADHD. His claims stem from a protracted dispute beginning around 2021 over his requests to work fully remotely, primarily to avoid in-person contact with Filigenzi, whose presence caused him severe anxiety reactions including hyperventilation.

The factual record accepted for purposes of the motion showed that Shopek worked remotely through much of 2021 due to COVID-19 concerns, was placed on a hybrid schedule starting in January 2022, repeatedly sought full-time remote work as an ADA accommodation, was denied full-time remote work multiple times on the ground that in-person supervision of his on-site team was an essential function of his position, used intermittent FMLA leave on days Filigenzi came into the office, was placed on a continuous FMLA leave of absence in August 2023 when the City determined he could not perform essential job functions, and was deemed to have resigned pursuant to City Civil Service Rule 13.06 when he did not return to work on September 18, 2023, after exhausting his twelve-week FMLA entitlement.

Shopek had filed a charge of discrimination through the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights (MDCR) in June 2023 and an amended charge in October 2023. The MDCR found no probable cause; an independent review panel affirmed that finding; and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on December 4, 2024. Shopek filed his initial complaint in November 2024 and an amended complaint in May 2025 asserting twelve counts.

Claims and Disposition

ADA Claims (Counts I–IV)

Individual Defendants — dismissed. The ADA does not impose personal liability on individual employees. Shopek argued his claims against Filigenzi, Cameron, and Xiong should be construed as official-capacity claims, but the court held that official-capacity claims against municipal employees are simply another way of suing the entity itself, making them duplicative of the claims against the City. The ADA claims against the Individual Defendants were dismissed on that basis.

Improper Medical Inquiries (Count IV) — dismissed for failure to exhaust. Before suing under the ADA, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC (or an equivalent agency) covering the same allegations — a requirement called administrative exhaustion. The court found that neither Shopek's Charge nor his Amended Charge contained any allegation about improper medical inquiries by the City, so that claim was unexhausted and could not proceed.

Disability Discrimination (Count I) — dismissed for failure to state a claim. To make out a disability discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show he was a "qualified individual" — meaning he could perform the essential functions of his job with or without a reasonable accommodation. The court found that Shopek's requested accommodations (full-time remote work, virtual-only meetings, a fully enclosed workspace, and additional FMLA leave beyond his statutory entitlement) would have eliminated the essential function of in-person supervision of his on-site team rather than enabling him to perform it. Because an accommodation is legally unreasonable if it requires eliminating an essential function, none of Shopek's requested accommodations qualified as reasonable, and he therefore failed to plausibly allege he was a qualified individual.

Failure to Accommodate (Count III) — dismissed. Because a failure-to-accommodate claim requires first establishing a prima facie disability discrimination case — which Shopek could not do for the reasons above — this count also failed.

ADA Retaliation (Count II) — dismissed. An ADA retaliation claim requires showing a causal connection (specifically a "but-for" cause) between the plaintiff's protected activity and an adverse employment action. The court found no such connection: the City revoked accommodations because Shopek's medical documentation had expired and he refused to provide updated documentation; his continuous FMLA leave was imposed because he could not perform essential job functions; and his separation was triggered by his own decision not to return to work after exhausting FMLA leave, consistent with a pre-existing City rule. The court noted the City had worked with Shopek for over two years attempting to find accommodations, and that does not constitute retaliation.

Section 1983 / Due Process (Count VIII)

42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows individuals to sue state or local officials for violations of constitutional or federal rights committed under color of state law. Shopek alleged Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by classifying his departure as a resignation under Civil Service Rule 13.06, thereby preventing him from appealing his separation.

Claims against Individual Defendants — dismissed. The court found no factual allegations linking Filigenzi, Cameron, or Xiong to the denial of any appeal process. The officials who told Shopek he could not appeal were other City personnel not named as defendants. Shopek's allegation that the Individual Defendants deliberately categorized his separation as a resignation to prevent an appeal was deemed conclusory and unsupported.

Claims against the City — dismissed. Municipal (Monell) liability under § 1983 requires both an official policy or custom and an underlying constitutional violation by a City employee. Because Shopek failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation by any individual, the City could not be liable either.

FMLA Claims (Counts IX–X)

FMLA Interference (Count IX) — dismissed. Shopek alleged interference in three ways: (1) Filigenzi required him to work while on FMLA leave; (2) he was forced to take FMLA leave; and (3) the City placed him on continuous leave using his FMLA time. The court rejected all three. On the first, the email Filigenzi sent — which expressly supported Shopek's FMLA use while asking him to plan for coverage of his responsibilities — did not constitute interference. On the second, Shopek voluntarily chose to use FMLA leave to avoid being in the office with Filigenzi on numerous occasions. On the third, the City placed him on continuous leave only after he demonstrated he could not work on site when Filigenzi was present, meaning he could not perform an essential function of his job — not FMLA interference under controlling precedent.

FMLA Retaliation (Count X) — dismissed. Shopek claimed the City retaliated against him for using FMLA by, among other things, failing to reinstate him properly. The court found no plausible causal link between his FMLA use and his separation: the City offered him a return to work within one week of his August 2023 leave, Shopek declined the conditions offered, his FMLA entitlement was exhausted, he failed to return as instructed, and Civil Service Rule 13.06 deemed that a resignation. No reasonable inference of retaliation arose from those facts.

State-Law Claims (Counts V–VII, XI–XII)

The remaining claims — disability discrimination and retaliation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), wrongful discharge under Minnesota common law, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Minnesota common law, and a claim under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA) — all arise under state, not federal, law. Federal courts may exercise "supplemental jurisdiction" over state claims that are part of the same case, but once all federal claims are dismissed before trial, courts typically decline to retain jurisdiction over purely state-law matters. The court exercised its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed these claims so they may be pursued, if at all, in Minnesota state court. The motion to dismiss as to these claims was denied as moot.

Summary of Disposition

- Federal-law claims (Counts I–IV, VIII–X): motion to dismiss granted; claims dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). - State-law claims (Counts V–VII, XI–XII): motion to dismiss denied as moot; claims dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.