Tagliaferri v. Palomar Specialty Insurance Company
- Kandis Westmore
- 4:25-cv-02148
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 13
In Mary Tagliaferri v. Palomar Specialty Insurance Company, Judge Westmore granted dismissal and striking motions, ending some claims while allowing amendment and others to proceed.
Mary Tagliaferri’s claims against Sedgwick and several claims against Palomar were dismissed, mostly with prejudice. Her intentional-misrepresentation claim may be amended, her contract and implied-good-faith claims against Palomar proceed, and her punitive-damages request was struck with prejudice.
What happened
Mary Tagliaferri sued Palomar Specialty Insurance Company and Sedgwick Claims Management Services, alleging that they failed to pay the full amount owed for storm-related property damage under a flood insurance policy. She brought contract, insurance bad-faith, emotional-distress, and misrepresentation claims.
The court dismissed some claims against Sedgwick and dismissed several claims against the defendants, while leaving Tagliaferri’s contract and implied-good-faith claims against Palomar to proceed. The court also struck the request for punitive damages and allowed Tagliaferri to amend her intentional-misrepresentation claim.
Judge Kandis Westmore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion to strike. The court dismissed the claims against Sedgwick for breach of contract and breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, the bad-faith investigation claim, both emotional-distress claims, and the negligent-misrepresentation claim with prejudice; the intentional-misrepresentation claim was dismissed with leave to amend.
The detailed version
- Tagliaferri v. Palomar Specialty Insurance Company · No. 4:25-cv-02148
- Kandis Westmore
- Dec. 1, 2025
Background
Mary Tagliaferri alleged that she owned property in San Anselmo, California, covered by a flood insurance policy issued by Palomar Specialty Insurance Company. Sedgwick Claims Management Services administered claims under the policy. After a January 2023 rainstorm caused water damage, Tagliaferri submitted repair estimates totaling $189,070.25 and requested $50,000 for loss of use. The defendants paid $86,423.06 and denied the remainder, determining that the disputed repairs were improvements not covered by the policy. Tagliaferri alleged that the repairs were necessary to stop water intrusion.
Her first amended complaint asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, bad faith based on failure to properly investigate, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. She also requested punitive damages.
Motions and failure to oppose
The defendants moved to dismiss the first amended complaint and to strike the punitive-damages request. Tagliaferri initially did not oppose either motion. After the court issued an order requiring an explanation, she filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss but did not oppose the motion to strike. The court therefore reviewed the dismissal motion on its merits and granted the motion to strike the punitive-damages request as unopposed. The court struck that request with prejudice.
The court also criticized multiple citations and quotations in Tagliaferri’s opposition that did not appear in the cited cases. Her counsel acknowledged using artificial intelligence to prepare the filings. The court did not impose sanctions but warned that similar conduct could lead to sanctions in the future.
Rulings on the claims
Claims against Sedgwick. The court dismissed with prejudice the breach-of-contract and breach-of-the-implied-covenant claims against Sedgwick. Under the California law discussed by the court, only a party to an insurance contract may be liable for breaching the contract or the implied covenant. Tagliaferri did not dispute that Sedgwick acted as Palomar’s disclosed agent, and she did not allege that Sedgwick was a party to the policy. The court also found that her arguments about agency, ratification, and conduct exceeding authority did not establish liability on these contract-based claims.
The court noted that an insurance agent may potentially be liable for independently wrongful tortious conduct, so it considered the remaining claims separately rather than dismissing Sedgwick solely because of its agency relationship.
Bad-faith investigation claim. The court dismissed with prejudice the separate claim alleging bad faith based on failure to properly investigate. Tagliaferri acknowledged that an insurer’s failure to properly investigate can support a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because the first amended complaint already included the same failure-to-investigate allegations within the implied-covenant claim, the court found the separate claim unnecessarily duplicative. The court stated that Tagliaferri could still use those allegations to support her implied-covenant claim.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court dismissed this claim with prejudice. Even assuming Tagliaferri adequately alleged severe emotional distress, the court found that changing claims adjusters and allegedly delaying payment did not amount to the extreme and outrageous conduct required for this claim.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress. Tagliaferri agreed to dismiss this claim, and the court dismissed it with prejudice.
Misrepresentation claims. The court found that Tagliaferri did not plead her intentional or negligent misrepresentation claims with the specificity required for fraud-based allegations. She did not identify who made the alleged promise that the claim would be fully paid or when the statement was made. The court also treated the alleged promise of future payment as a possible false promise, which would require specific allegations that the promisor did not intend to perform when making the promise and intended to induce reliance. The court found Tagliaferri’s allegations on those points conclusory.
The intentional-misrepresentation claim was dismissed with leave to amend because the court did not find amendment clearly futile. The negligent-misrepresentation claim was dismissed with prejudice because, as pleaded, it rested solely on a promise of future performance, which the court held could not support negligent misrepresentation.
Final disposition
Judge Kandis Westmore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion to strike. The contract and implied-good-faith claims against Palomar were not dismissed because the defendants had not moved to dismiss those claims as to Palomar; those claims will proceed. The other dispositions were as stated above. Tagliaferri may file an amended complaint within 30 days of the order.
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.