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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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MixedFiled Dec. 4, 2025

Myers v. Itasca County HRA

Full caption

Tricia Marie Myers v. Itasca County HRA, Diane Larson, Carrie Schmitz, and Kenda Roddenberg

Judge
John Tunheim
Docket
0:24-cv-01395
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
6
Civil RightsCivil ProcedurePro SeMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Myers v. Itasca County HRA, Judge Tunheim denied Myers' motion to vacate summary judgment but granted her extra time to appeal and permission to appeal without paying fees.

Who this affects

Recipients of housing vouchers administered by local housing authorities who face termination of those benefits, and pro se (self-represented) litigants navigating post-judgment procedural rules, particularly those who are unhoused or otherwise face difficulties receiving timely court notices.

What happened

In Myers v. Itasca County HRA, Diane Larson, Carrie Schmitz, and Kenda Roddenberg, Tricia Marie Myers — a pro se (self-represented) plaintiff — previously lost her housing vouchers after the Itasca County Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA) found she had engaged in illegal drug use. The court had already granted summary judgment (a ruling in the defendants' favor without a full trial) on August 19, 2025, finding that the HRA gave Myers proper notice and a chance to contest the termination, which she waived. Myers then filed several post-judgment motions seeking to undo that ruling and to pursue an appeal.

The court denied Myers' motion to vacate the summary judgment for two independent reasons: it was filed more than 28 days after judgment was entered, making it untimely under the applicable federal rule; and the motion was really a request for the court to reconsider its earlier ruling, which under local court rules requires the court's prior permission and a showing of 'compelling circumstances' — neither of which Myers obtained or demonstrated.

Judge Tunheim granted Myers' motion for extra time to file her notice of appeal, finding that her excuses — being unhoused and thus hard to reach, and being unfamiliar with complex post-judgment procedural rules as a self-represented litigant — were credible and constituted good cause. The court extended the appeal deadline to October 18, 2025, making Myers' October 15, 2025 notice of appeal timely. The court also granted Myers' application to proceed without paying the appellate filing fee, finding she could not afford it and that her appeal, while unlikely to succeed in the court's view, was made in good faith.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Myers v. Itasca County HRA · No. 0:24-cv-01395
Judge
John Tunheim
Date
Dec. 4, 2025

Background

Tricia Marie Myers, a pro se (self-represented) plaintiff, brought a federal civil rights lawsuit against the Itasca County Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA) and three of its employees — Diane Larson, Carrie Schmitz, and Kenda Roddenberg — after the HRA terminated her housing vouchers upon finding she had engaged in illicit drug use. Myers alleged violations of her due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution.

On August 19, 2025, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment — a pretrial ruling that resolves a case when there are no genuine factual disputes and one side is entitled to win as a matter of law. The court found that HRA had provided Myers and her family with the notice and opportunity to be heard required by applicable regulations and the Constitution, including offering Myers an informal hearing to contest the HRA's findings, which Myers waived. Judgment was entered on August 20, 2025.

Post-Judgment Motions

Myers filed three post-judgment motions at issue in this opinion:

  1. A Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment (filed September 23, 2025)
  2. A Motion to Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal (filed October 15, 2025)
  3. An Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) — meaning without paying the appellate filing fee — on Appeal (filed October 16, 2025)

Myers also filed a Notice of Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on October 15, 2025.

Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment — Denied

The court denied Myers' Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment on two independent grounds.

First — Untimeliness

Myers brought the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which allows a party to move to alter or amend a judgment. Such a motion must be filed within 28 days of entry of judgment. Because Myers filed her motion on September 23, 2025 — more than 28 days after judgment was entered on August 20, 2025 — the motion was untimely, and that alone was sufficient reason to deny it.

Second — Improper Motion to Reconsider

Even setting aside timeliness, the court found the motion was substantively improper. Although Myers labeled it as a Rule 59(e) motion, her supporting memorandum did not seek to alter or amend the judgment in the technical sense; it asked the court to reconsider its prior ruling and issue a new one in her favor. Under Rule 59(e), a motion cannot be used to re-litigate old issues or give a party a second chance to argue the same points. When a purported Rule 59(e) motion seeks essentially the same relief already denied, courts treat it as a motion to reconsider. Under District of Minnesota Local Rule 7.1(j), a party cannot file a motion to reconsider without first obtaining the court's permission and demonstrating 'compelling circumstances.' Myers neither sought nor received such permission and did not show compelling circumstances, so the motion was denied on this basis as well.

Motion to Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal — Granted

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A), a notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Judgment was entered August 20, 2025, making the deadline September 19, 2025. Myers did not file her notice of appeal until October 15, 2025 — outside that window.

However, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), a district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if: (1) the motion for extension is filed within 30 days after the original deadline expired; and (2) the moving party shows excusable neglect or good cause.

The court found both requirements satisfied. On the first requirement, Myers' motion was filed October 15, 2025 — within 30 days of the September 19, 2025 deadline. On the second, the court applied an equitable balancing test, considering potential prejudice to other parties, the length of the delay, and the good faith of the moving party, with the most critical factor being the reason for the delay.

Myers offered two reasons: she was not immediately aware that judgment had been entered, and she found post-judgment procedural rules complex as a self-represented litigant. The court noted that Myers only decided to appeal after the defendants' memorandum pointed out her motion to vacate was untimely. Nevertheless, the court found both excuses credible, specifically noting that Myers has frequently been unhoused, which makes timely notice — even by electronic means — more difficult, and that pro se litigants are not held to the same standard of familiarity with court rules as attorneys. The court found good cause and extended the appeal deadline to October 18, 2025, rendering Myers' October 15, 2025 Notice of Appeal timely.

Application to Proceed IFP on Appeal — Granted

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a party may apply to be excused from paying the appellate filing fee by demonstrating financial inability to pay. Even if indigency is shown, IFP status must be denied if the court finds the appeal is not taken in good faith.

The court granted Myers' application on both grounds. Her financial affidavit demonstrated she could not pay the full filing fee (the court also noted the transmittal of appeal indicated the fee had been waived because IFP was granted at the start of the case). As to good faith, while the court stated it believes Myers' appeal is 'unlikely to be successful' for the reasons set forth in its summary judgment opinion, it concluded that the appeal is made in good faith and that Myers has the right to be heard on appeal.

Disposition

  1. Myers' Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment is denied.
  2. Myers' Motion to Extend Time to File Notice of Appeal is granted; the deadline is extended to October 18,
  3. 3. Myers' Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal is granted.
The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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