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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Procedural orderFiled Dec. 5, 2025

White v. Amazon Web Services

Judge
Katherine Menendez
Docket
0:24-cv-03693
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
8

Counsel of record
PLAINTIFF
Halunen Law3 attorneys
Christopher Lee Empson, Joshua A. Newville, Pamela Johnson
DEFENDANT
Dorsey & Whitney
Grace Jacobson
Littler Mendelson, PC
Marko J. Mrkonich

Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.

EmploymentCivil ProcedureMotion to DismissCivil Rights
In one sentence

In White v. Amazon Web Services, Judge Menendez upheld a magistrate judge's order allowing plaintiff Barbara White to add a retaliation claim under Minnesota's Human Rights Act.

Who this affects

Employees who bring retaliation or reprisal claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and seek to amend their complaints after the scheduling order deadline; litigants in the District of Minnesota regarding the standards for amending pleadings and the scope of the futility analysis.

What happened

In White v. Amazon Web Services, Inc., No. 24-cv-3693, plaintiff Barbara White sued her former employer, Amazon Web Services, Inc. (AWS), and later sought to add a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) — the state law that prohibits employers from punishing workers who complain about discrimination. Magistrate Judge Elsa M. Bullard granted White's request to amend her complaint, finding she had been diligent enough to justify the late filing, that AWS would not be unfairly harmed, and that the new claim was legally sufficient to survive early dismissal. AWS objected, arguing White was not diligent and that the new retaliation claim was legally deficient.

The district court reviewed the diligence finding under a highly deferential standard — overturning only if clearly wrong — and the legal sufficiency finding from scratch (called de novo review). On diligence, the court found Magistrate Judge Bullard had carefully weighed the evidence and concluded, for example, that even if White had started discovery earlier, the amendment deadline would still have been unworkable. The court also rejected AWS's argument that the futility of White's new claim should be evaluated using evidence gathered during discovery rather than just the words of the complaint itself, finding no legal support for that position.

Judge Katherine Menendez denied AWS's partial motion for judgment on the pleadings, overruled AWS's objections, and affirmed Magistrate Judge Bullard's October 10, 2025 order in full. The case will proceed with White's amended complaint, which now includes the MHRA retaliation claim.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
White v. Amazon Web Services · No. 0:24-cv-03693
Judge
Katherine Menendez
Date
Dec. 5, 2025

Background

Plaintiff Barbara White brought suit against her former employer, Amazon Web Services, Inc. (AWS). After filing her original complaint, White moved for leave to amend her complaint to add a reprisal (retaliation) claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. ch. 363A, which prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who engage in protected activity such as complaining about discrimination.

Magistrate Judge Elsa M. Bullard granted White's motion to amend in an order dated October 10, 2025. Judge Bullard made three key findings: (1) White was sufficiently diligent to establish good cause for the late amendment request; (2) AWS would not be prejudiced by the addition of the reprisal claim; and (3) the proposed amended complaint stated a plausible reprisal claim and was therefore not futile under the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires a complaint to allege enough facts to state a legally cognizable claim.

AWS's Objections

AWS filed objections to Magistrate Judge Bullard's order and, in the alternative, a partial motion for judgment on the pleadings (a procedural mechanism asking the court to rule in a party's favor based solely on the pleadings). AWS raised two principal objections:

1. Diligence: AWS argued White impeded her own ability to obtain information timely by delaying written discovery by two months, waiting nearly a year to take her first deposition, stipulating to a revised scheduling order without setting a new amendment deadline, and having prior awareness of the facts underlying the reprisal claim.

2. Adequacy of Pleading (Futility): AWS argued the MHRA reprisal claim was futile — meaning it could not survive a motion to dismiss — because White lived outside Minnesota for nearly two years before her termination (raising a question about MHRA applicability) and because the claim was time-barred under the MHRA's one-year statute of limitations. AWS also argued that because White based her amendment on facts uncovered during discovery, the futility analysis should be conducted under the summary judgment standard of Rule 56, not the motion-to-dismiss standard of Rule 12(b)(6), which would have allowed AWS to introduce evidence beyond the complaint.

Standard of Review

The court applied two different standards depending on the issue:

- Diligence (nondispositive ruling): Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) and Local Rule 72.2(a)(3), the court reviews a magistrate judge's ruling on a nondispositive (non-case-ending) motion under a highly deferential standard, overturning only where the ruling is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." A finding is clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Even if the district court would have weighed evidence differently, that alone does not justify reversal.

- Futility / Adequacy of Pleading (dispositive legal question): The court reviewed de novo — meaning independently, without deference — whether the proposed amended complaint stated a plausible claim, applying the same Rule 12(b)(6) standard the magistrate judge used.

Analysis: Diligence

The court affirmed Magistrate Judge Bullard's diligence finding. The court noted that Bullard had directly addressed each of AWS's arguments and found them unpersuasive with specific reasoning. Notably, Bullard found that even if White had served written discovery immediately after the scheduling order issued, the amendment deadline would have been unworkable for even the most diligent litigant. Bullard also distinguished this case from others where courts found a lack of diligence, observing that White did not sit idle during discovery but actively served written discovery, followed up on document production, and timely noticed and took depositions.

The court found that White's prior awareness of certain retaliation-related facts did not defeat diligence, because it was not until depositions were completed that she had "a more concrete factual foundation" to file a reprisal claim in federal court — noting the differing standards between Minnesota administrative proceedings and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3), which requires a reasonable evidentiary basis for factual contentions in court filings.

The court rejected AWS's argument that Bullard erred by accepting White's representations without more discussion, citing Rule 52(a)(3), which does not require courts to state detailed findings when ruling on most motions. AWS's reliance on the court's prior decision in Reichel Foods, Inc. v. Proseal America, Inc., No. 0:19-cv-2604, 2021 WL 1712547 (D. Minn. Apr. 30, 2021), was also rejected as factually distinguishable.

Analysis: Futility of the Reprisal Claim

The court conducted a de novo review of whether White's proposed MHRA reprisal claim was futile. The three elements of an MHRA reprisal claim are: (1) the plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the two. See Carter v. Dayton Rogers Mfg. Co., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1034 (D. Minn. 2008).

The court agreed with Magistrate Judge Bullard's analysis and found White's claim not futile, declining to restate Bullard's reasoning at length. The court also addressed AWS's novel argument that the futility inquiry should proceed under a summary judgment standard because White had drawn on discovery evidence to support her amendment request. The court rejected this argument on two grounds: (1) it was unclear where Bullard had actually relied on facts outside the amended complaint — her order shows she assessed only the face of the amended complaint and declined AWS's own invitation to look beyond the pleadings; and (2) settled caselaw in this district is clear that futility is assessed under the Rule 12(b)(6) motion-to-dismiss standard, not the Rule 56 summary judgment standard. The court cited multiple district decisions to that effect.

Disposition

The court:

  1. Denied AWS's Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 54).
  2. Overruled AWS's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Order (Dkt. 56).
  3. Affirmed Magistrate Judge Bullard's October 10, 2025 Order (Dkt. 50).

The case will proceed with White's amended complaint, which includes the MHRA reprisal claim.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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