Stacey A. v. Bisignano
- Dulce Foster
- 0:24-cv-01310
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 2
In Stacey A. v. Bisignano, Judge Foster awarded $10,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiff under the Equal Access to Justice Act after a Social Security remand.
Social Security claimants who have successfully obtained a remand of their case and are seeking reimbursement of attorney's fees from the federal government under the Equal Access to Justice Act, as well as their attorneys who may receive fee payments subject to Treasury offset rules.
What happened
In Stacey A. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security (Case No. 24-cv-01310), a plaintiff who successfully obtained a remand of her Social Security case back to the agency for further review then asked the court to award her attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), a federal law that allows certain prevailing parties to recover legal costs from the government. The plaintiff initially sought $10,975.00 in fees, but she and the government later agreed — through a joint stipulation — to a reduced amount of $10,000.
The court approved that agreement and ordered the government to pay $10,000 in attorney's fees. However, the court noted that under a 2010 U.S. Supreme Court ruling (Astrue v. Ratliff), those fees may first be used to offset any debt the plaintiff owes to the federal government through the Treasury Offset Program before any remaining amount is paid out.
United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster granted the fee motion in part and approved the stipulation, directing that any payment checks — whether made out to the plaintiff or her attorney — be delivered to her attorney, Paul McGrath, at his office in Roseville, Minnesota.
The detailed version
- Stacey A. v. Bisignano · No. 0:24-cv-01310
- Dulce J. Foster
- Dec. 8, 2025
Background
This fee-petition matter arises from a Social Security disability appeal. The plaintiff, identified only as Stacey A. pursuant to the District of Minnesota's privacy policy, previously obtained a remand of her case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further administrative proceedings (ECF No. 23). Following that remand — which constitutes a qualifying "prevailing party" outcome under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) — the plaintiff filed a motion seeking attorney's fees from the government.
The Fee Motion and Stipulation
The plaintiff's Fee Motion (ECF No. 30), filed under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), initially sought $10,975.00 in attorney's fees. The EAJA generally allows a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil action against the United States when the government's position was not "substantially justified." After the motion was filed, the parties entered into a Joint Stipulation for EAJA Fees (ECF No. 34) reducing the agreed-upon amount to $10,000.
The Court's Ruling
Judge Foster granted the Fee Motion in part and approved the Joint Stipulation, ordering the government to pay $10,000.00 in attorney's fees. The court noted that, consistent with Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010), the EAJA fee award is payable to the plaintiff (not automatically to her attorney) and may be subject to offset if the plaintiff has a preexisting debt owed to the United States under the Treasury Offset Program.
Specifically, if the Commissioner determines the plaintiff owes no such debt and agrees to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, the fee check may be made out directly to the plaintiff's attorney. If a debt does exist under the Treasury Offset Program, the Commissioner cannot waive the Anti-Assignment Act, and any remaining fees after offset will be paid by check made out to the plaintiff. In either case, the check is to be delivered to the plaintiff's attorney, Paul McGrath, at 2579 Hamline Ave. N., Suite C, Roseville, MN 55113.
Key Statute
The Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), authorizes fee awards against the federal government in civil cases where the plaintiff prevails and the government's litigation position was not substantially justified. The opinion does not separately address whether the government's position was substantially justified; the parties resolved that question through stipulation.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.