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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Procedural orderFiled Dec. 9, 2025

United HealthCare Services v. Merck & Co.

Full caption

United HealthCare Services, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc., et al.; United HealthCare Services, Inc. v. Cardinal Health, Inc., et al.

Judge
David Doty
Docket
0:20-cv-01909
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
6

Counsel of record
PLAINTIFF
Zelle LLP3 attorneys
Eric W. Buetzow, James Robertson Martin, Judith A. Zahid
Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP2 attorneys
Hamish P.M. Hume, Michael Scott Mitchell
Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason LLP
Elizabeth V. Kniffen
DEFENDANT
Kirkland & Ellis LLP5 attorneys
Devora Allon, James Hileman, Kevin M. Neylan , Jr
Maslon LLP2 attorneys
James J. Long, Keiko L. Sugisaka
Goldman Ismail Tomaselli Brennan & Baum LLP
Jennifer Greenblatt
Goldman Ismail Tomaselli Brennan and Baum
Tarek Ismail

Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate and have been consolidated across spelling variants.

AntitrustCivil ProcedureMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In United HealthCare Services v. Merck & Co., Judge Doty denied UHS's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings because it improperly used that procedural tool solely to eliminate Merck's affirmative defenses.

Who this affects

Parties involved in antitrust litigation who seek to challenge the legal sufficiency of an opposing party's affirmative defenses using a motion for judgment on the pleadings rather than a motion to strike; this ruling clarifies that such challenges must use the correct procedural vehicle (a motion to strike under Rule 12(f)) and that the deadline for doing so matters.

What happened

United HealthCare Services, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc. is an antitrust lawsuit in which United HealthCare Services (UHS) claims that Merck engaged in anticompetitive conduct related to its lipid-lowering drugs Zetia and Vytorin, causing UHS to overpay for those drugs on behalf of its insureds. After UHS filed an amended complaint that included claims assigned to it by third-party defendant Cardinal Health, Inc., Merck raised several affirmative defenses arguing that those assigned claims were void or otherwise prohibited. UHS then filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings — a procedural request asking the court to rule in its favor based solely on the written filings — in an attempt to eliminate those affirmative defenses.

The court examined whether the type of motion UHS filed was the right procedural tool for what it was trying to accomplish. The court found that a motion for judgment on the pleadings (governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)) is designed to obtain a judgment on an actual claim, not merely to knock out an opponent's affirmative defenses. The proper tool for challenging the legal sufficiency of affirmative defenses is a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) — but the deadline for filing such a motion had already passed months earlier. The court also noted that applying the demanding pleading standards used for claims to affirmative defenses would disrupt normal civil litigation practice, as affirmative defenses are typically listed briefly in answers and tested later through discovery and trial.

Judge Doty denied UHS's motion. Because UHS was not seeking judgment on any of its own claims — only trying to eliminate Merck's defenses — Rule 12(c) was simply not the correct procedural vehicle. The court made clear that a judgment on the pleadings can only be entered when a party has established it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a claim, which was not what UHS was asking for here.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
United HealthCare Services v. Merck & Co. · No. 0:20-cv-01909
Judge
David Doty
Date
Dec. 9, 2025

Background

This antitrust lawsuit arises from alleged anticompetitive conduct by defendant Merck & Co., Inc. related to the sale of its lipid-lowering drugs Zetia and Vytorin (a combination pill containing Zetia and simvastatin, the generic form of Zocor). Plaintiff United HealthCare Services, Inc. (UHS) alleges that Merck's misconduct caused UHS to overpay — i.e., incur overcharges — for branded and generic Zetia and Vytorin products prescribed and dispensed to UHS's insureds.

In 2022, UHS filed an amended complaint that added claims assigned to UHS by third-party defendant Cardinal Health, Inc. Merck answered and raised dozens of affirmative defenses, including defenses contending that the claims assigned to UHS by Cardinal Health are void or otherwise prohibited. UHS moved for partial judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), seeking only to eliminate certain of Merck's affirmative defenses. UHS did not seek judgment on any of its own claims.

Legal Standard

The court applied the same standard used for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Under that standard — drawn from the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), commonly called the Iqbal/Twombly standard — a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of legal elements are not sufficient.

Analysis

Rule 12(c) Is Not the Proper Vehicle for Challenging Only Affirmative Defenses

The court agreed with Merck that a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is not the correct procedural tool for a plaintiff seeking solely to strike or eliminate affirmative defenses. The proper mechanism is a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which specifically governs "insufficient defenses." The court noted that the deadline to file a Rule 12(f) motion had elapsed months before UHS brought its motion, and the court was careful not to allow a litigant to repackage an untimely Rule 12(f) motion as a Rule 12(c) motion.

Policy Concerns with Applying Iqbal/Twombly to Affirmative Defenses

The court quoted Chief Judge Patrick J. Schiltz's reasoning from Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S., 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Minn. 2010), explaining that applying the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard to affirmative defenses would "radically change civil practice in the federal courts." In ordinary practice, affirmative defenses are listed briefly in answers; parties and courts sort out which are viable through discovery, summary judgment, and trial — not through early motion practice. Forcing defendants to plead detailed factual support for every affirmative defense at the outset would generate additional rounds of motions (e.g., motions to amend answers), increasing costs and delays for parties and courts alike.

Limited Circumstances Where Rule 12(c) May Address Affirmative Defenses

The court acknowledged that affirmative defenses can be considered in a Rule 12(c) motion where a party seeks judgment on an actual claim and the raised defenses do not create factual issues that would block entry of judgment. However, that scenario was not present here: UHS was not seeking judgment on any of its claims — it sought only to eliminate specific affirmative defenses. Under those circumstances, the motion was improper.

Disposition

Because UHS failed to move for judgment on any of its claims, and because a motion for judgment on the pleadings can only be granted when the moving party has clearly established it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court denied the motion.

Ruling

The motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 138) is denied.

The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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