Dominguez v. United States of America

Background

Carlos Alberto Dominguez, proceeding without a lawyer (pro se), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus — a legal action used to challenge the lawfulness of one's imprisonment or the conditions of a sentence. His specific claim was that he was entitled to have "time credits" applied to reduce his federal sentence. These credits are authorized under the First Step Act of 2018, which allows federal prisoners to earn time off their sentences by completing rehabilitative programming, including the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP).

The Legal Issue

Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i), expressly prohibits applying First Step Act time credits to prisoners who are "subject to a final order of removal" under immigration law. The government argued Dominguez has such an order, making him categorically ineligible for the credits regardless of his program completion.

Magistrate Judge David T. Shultz issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on November 10, 2025, concluding that because Dominguez is subject to a final order of removal, the time credits cannot be applied to his sentence. The district court is required to conduct a de novo (fresh, independent) review of the record when a party objects to an R&R.

Dominguez's Objections

Dominguez filed a response on November 17, 2025, which the court treated as objections to the R&R. The court noted that the objections raised a new issue not presented to the magistrate judge — which is generally not permitted under local rules — but chose to address them anyway because they could be resolved quickly.

Dominguez raised two arguments:

First, he contended that his 2014 removal order was never enforced and is therefore "null and void," requiring that a new order be reissued before he could be removed. He cited 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25 in support.

Second, he argued he cannot be removed to Cuba because the United States does not have an extradition agreement with Cuba.

The Court's Analysis

First Objection: Validity of the 2014 Removal Order

The court rejected this argument under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), which provides that if the Attorney General finds an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily under a removal order, the prior order of removal is automatically reinstated from its original date, is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, and the alien shall be removed under that prior order. The court noted that Dominguez's own filing suggested he did not comply with the original removal order, left the country, and reentered illegally — precisely the situation in which § 1231(a)(5) reinstates the original order. The regulation Dominguez cited, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25, was found irrelevant.

Second Objection: Extradition and Cuba

The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, extradition — a legal process for transferring a person accused or convicted of a crime from one country to another — is legally distinct from immigration removal. The court found extradition law simply inapplicable here. Second, the court cited public sources indicating that removals to Cuba have been ongoing, including referencing a January 12, 2017 White House statement from President Obama ending the so-called "wet-foot/dry foot" policy and noting that Cuban nationals who enter illegally without qualifying for humanitarian relief are subject to removal. The court was careful to state it takes no position on possible broader immigration issues affecting Dominguez's removal, finding only that the age and non-execution of the removal order are not legal bars to his removal.

Disposition

Judge Davis overruled Dominguez's objections, adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation in full, denied the habeas corpus petition, and dismissed the action without prejudice.