Ashitey v. Networks

Background

Daniel Ashitey is an independent contractor who provides cloud-computing and networking training. He entered a March 15, 2022 Service Agreement with SDN Pros LLC under which he would provide training services on an order-by-order basis and receive $1,250 per training day, plus travel and living expenses. Through SDN Pros, Ashitey was assigned to teach Arista Networks certification courses.

Terry Jenkins, Arista’s head of training and certification, allegedly criticized Ashitey’s performance during Slack conversations on June 18, 2024. Jenkins told Ashitey that another instructor would finish the course and said the work did not support the level of technical accuracy or quality that Arista represented. Ashitey was removed from scheduled Arista courses, lost access to the SDN Pros worksite, and received no further training assignments from SDN Pros.

Ashitey sued Arista and Jenkins for two California claims: intentional interference with contractual relations and libel per se. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally recognized claim supported by enough factual allegations.

Claim 1: Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations

Ashitey alleged that he had a valid contract with SDN Pros, that Jenkins knew about it, that Jenkins intentionally disrupted it, that the disruption caused a breach, and that Ashitey suffered damages.

The court held that the claim failed for two reasons. First, the claim was based entirely on Jenkins’s conduct, while the complaint alleged that Jenkins ran or controlled SDN Pros, acted as its agent, or was otherwise effectively the same as SDN Pros. Under the California law discussed by the court, a contracting party or its agent cannot be liable for interfering with that contract as a stranger. The court therefore concluded that Jenkins was not a stranger to Ashitey’s contract with SDN Pros.

Second, the court determined that the Service Agreement was an at-will contract because it did not require SDN Pros to provide Ashitey with any minimum number of assignments or guarantee a particular duration. For interference with an at-will contract, Ashitey had to allege an independently wrongful act—an unlawful act separate from the interference itself. The court found that the complaint did not do so. Ashitey identified several alleged wrongful acts in his opposition to the motion, but those acts were not alleged in the complaint.

The court held that amendment would be futile as to the stranger-to-the-contract defect. It therefore granted without leave to amend the motion to dismiss Claim 1 for intentional interference with contractual relations.

Claim 2: Libel Per Se

Ashitey alleged that Jenkins’s Slack messages were libel per se, meaning defamatory written statements that are considered harmful without requiring additional explanation. The court considered the messages from two separate Slack conversations and found that, as alleged, they appeared to express Jenkins’s opinions about Ashitey’s performance rather than actionable statements of fact.

The court also determined that the complaint showed a business relationship among Ashitey, the defendants, and SDN Pros. It therefore found that the common-interest privilege appeared to apply. That privilege can protect communications made among people sharing a legitimate business interest, unless the plaintiff shows actual malice. The court found that Ashitey had not alleged facts showing that Jenkins acted out of ill will or with reckless disregard for Ashitey’s rights.

Because the defects in Claim 2 might be curable, the court granted with leave to amend the motion to dismiss the libel-per-se claim.

Leave to Amend and Order

The court found no undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to correct defects, or undue prejudice that would independently justify denying amendment. It found amendment of Claim 1 futile because Ashitey could not plausibly allege, based on the complaint’s allegations, that Jenkins was a stranger to the contract. Although the court had serious reservations about Claim 2, it was not clear that amendment would be futile.

The court ordered that any amended pleading be filed by January 15, 2026. Amendment was limited to Claim 2 for libel per se against Arista and Jenkins, and Ashitey could not add new claims or parties without the court’s express permission. The order terminated the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF 16.