Bernard T. Anderson Bey v. Roc Nation LLC, et al.

Background

Bernard T. Anderson Bey represented himself. He alleged that Roc Nation LLC, Sean C. Carter, and Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. conspired to exclude him from the hip-hop and recording industries and maintained a monopoly. He also alleged that these defendants influenced Coinbase, Renaissance Economic Development Corporation, the New York City Housing Authority, and the Internal Revenue Service in ways that caused him financial, business, housing, and other harms.

The amended complaint asserted claims under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, state-law claims against Coinbase concerning cryptocurrency assets, discrimination claims involving the Housing Authority and Renaissance Economic Development Corporation, claims against the Internal Revenue Service, and a claim alleging fraud on the court. Bey had brought related claims against Roc Nation, Carter, and Live Nation in an earlier round of litigation. In that earlier case, the court dismissed his amended complaint for failure to state a claim and imposed an anti-filing injunction.

Anti-Filing Injunction

The prior injunction required Bey to obtain permission before filing new actions or motions. To seek permission, he had to file a one-page motion explaining why the proposed filing should be allowed and a one-page sworn statement that the filing was not frivolous, made in bad faith, or submitted for an improper purpose, and that it complied with court and procedural rules. Filings that did not follow that procedure were to be stricken.

The court interpreted the injunction to cover both motions and new actions. It held that the injunction barred all of Bey’s claims in this case, including claims not previously asserted, because they relied on the same central theory that the earlier defendants influenced other people and entities to cause his hardships. The court therefore dismissed the action in its entirety with prejudice for violating the anti-filing injunction.

Alternative Grounds

The court stated that dismissal was also warranted for several additional reasons:

- Failure to comply with Rule 8: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to provide a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief. The court found that Bey’s factual allegations were largely conclusory, implausible, and difficult to understand. It concluded that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because the other defects identified could not be cured by another amendment. - Claim preclusion: Claim preclusion, sometimes called res judicata, generally prevents a party from bringing claims that were or could have been litigated in an earlier case involving the same parties or parties in a legally sufficient relationship. The court stated that Bey’s claims against Roc Nation, Carter, and Live Nation were identical to claims previously decided in the earlier case and could be dismissed on that basis. It also stated that the fraud-on-the-court claim was either precluded or failed under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim. - Housing Authority claim: The court dismissed Bey’s Fair Housing Act discrimination claim against the New York City Housing Authority because he did not provide facts supporting an inference that he suffered adverse treatment because of a protected classification. The court found that his allegations about lead testing and possible eviction were conclusory. - Renaissance Economic Development Corporation: The court found that service of process was improper because the receptionist who received the first complaint was not shown to be authorized to accept service, and Bey could not personally serve the amended complaint as a party to the case. The court therefore concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Renaissance Economic Development Corporation and dismissed the claims against it. - Internal Revenue Service: The court found that service was improper because Bey’s proof did not show that he served the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). The court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Internal Revenue Service and dismissed the claims against it.

Other Motions and Disposition

The court declined to reconsider its earlier rulings concerning preliminary injunctive relief, sanctions, discovery, and partial summary judgment. It also refused to allow another amendment because amendment would not cure the identified defects.

Bey sought the judge’s recusal based primarily on the shared surname between Judge Carter and defendant Sean C. Carter. The court stated that it knew of no family relationship and that the shared surname did not create a reasonable basis to question impartiality. It also stated that dissatisfaction with prior rulings was not a valid basis for recusal. The court denied the motion for recusal.

The conclusion states that the defendants’ motions to dismiss were granted, Bey’s motions for default judgment were denied, and his motion for recusal was denied. The claims were dismissed with prejudice, judgment was entered, and the case was closed.