Pagan v. Research Foundation of the City University of New York

Background

Teona Pagan brought nine employment-related claims arising from the end of her job with the Research Foundation of the City University of New York in 2022. She alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Pagan alleged that she became a Christian in April 2022 and then asked that another employee handle part of her work recruiting students for a fellowship involving internships promoting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer rights and causes. She alleged that her request was denied because of undue hardship, that she was pressured to respond immediately about the matter, placed on administrative leave, and notified that her contract would not be renewed. She claimed that the defendants acted because of her religion, her request for an accommodation, and her expression of religious beliefs.

Pagan was represented by counsel when she filed the operative complaint but was proceeding without a lawyer when the court decided the motion. The CUNY defendants—CUNY, Deborah Cheng, and Andrew Rich—asked the court to dismiss several claims. The Research Foundation and Gregory Stephenson did not move to dismiss.

Rulings on the claims

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss, accepting well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asking whether the complaint plausibly stated claims, not whether Pagan would ultimately win.

The court denied the motion as to Pagan’s Title VII disparate-treatment claim against CUNY. It held that the alleged timing of Pagan’s disclosure of her religious conversion, Rich’s alleged reaction during the accommodation meeting, and the end of her employment shortly afterward plausibly supported an inference that religion motivated the adverse employment action. The court declined to decide at this stage whether Pagan was actually fired because of offensive workplace comments rather than because of her religion, explaining that issue could be addressed with a factual record and later proceedings.

The court also denied the motion as to Pagan’s Title VII retaliation claim against CUNY. It treated her request for a religious accommodation as protected activity for purposes of the motion and found that the less-than-two-month period between her accommodation request and the end of her employment plausibly supported a causal connection. The court also found that Pagan’s allegations about her religious statements and her accommodation request were not necessarily contradictory.

The court granted the motion as to Pagan’s First Amendment retaliation and free-exercise claims against CUNY. It reasoned that CUNY is an arm of New York State and therefore has immunity from these federal-court claims under the Eleventh Amendment. The court did not reach whether the alleged conduct violated the First Amendment.

The court granted the motion as to Pagan’s New York State Human Rights Law discrimination claim against Rich. It held that Rich, identified in the opinion as the Dean of the Colin Powell School, was not Pagan’s employer for purposes of that state-law claim, and that individual employees could not be treated as employers under the applicable state law.

The court granted the motion as to Pagan’s New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claim against Rich. It held that Pagan’s request for a religious accommodation was not, under the state law, protected activity for retaliation purposes. The court also found that Pagan had not alleged that she protested or opposed illegal conduct after the accommodation request was denied.

The court denied the motion as to Pagan’s New York State Human Rights Law aiding-and-abetting claim against Cheng and Rich. It found that Pagan plausibly alleged that Rich personally participated in the relevant conduct and that Cheng’s involvement, though a closer question, was also sufficiently alleged at the pleading stage. The court noted that the Research Foundation’s related state-law claims had not been challenged in this motion.

The court denied the motion as to Pagan’s New York City Human Rights Law claim against Cheng and Rich. It read the amended complaint as asserting discrimination and retaliation claims and held that those claims survived because the city law is construed broadly and because the court had allowed the comparable Title VII claims to proceed. The court also noted that, under the city law, requesting a reasonable accommodation qualifies as protected activity.

Amendment and disposition

The court granted Pagan’s request to file a second amended complaint. It directed her to file it within 30 days, if she had a good-faith basis to do so, and to address the grounds for dismissal identified in the opinion and the defendants’ motion papers.

The final order states that the CUNY defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, it was granted as to Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7, and denied as to Counts 2, 3, 8, and 9. The court did not rule on the failure-to-accommodate claim in this motion.