Brown v. Google

Background

Sharon Leslie Brown, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Google, DistroKid, Spotify, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, “All Social Media Platforms,” Lulu.com, Ning.com, “Big Tech,” Boomdizzle, Deezer, Apple, Tidal, iTunes, and Boomplay. She invoked federal-question jurisdiction and referred generally to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, civil rights, intellectual-property rights, and other constitutional rights.

Brown alleged that defendants removed or failed to distribute her music, restricted or closed accounts, affected the visibility of her work and links, caused others to benefit from her content, and interfered with views, followers, revenue, and business opportunities. She appeared to seek $1 billion in damages and other relief. She also filed requests for immediate injunctive relief seeking, among other things, restoration of access to accounts, preservation or restoration of music and links, and an end to alleged interference with her content and sales.

The court had previously denied Brown’s first request for immediate injunctive relief. Brown later filed second and third requests for such relief. She also filed motions concerning an appeal of the earlier injunction order, including a request for more time to appeal and requests to proceed without prepaying appellate fees.

Legal standards

Because Brown had been allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees, the court screened her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court also had to dismiss claims over which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning legal authority to hear them.

The court said that a complaint must provide enough factual detail to make a claim plausible, rather than merely listing legal conclusions. It also said that pleadings filed by a person without a lawyer are read liberally, but still must satisfy the basic pleading rules.

For immediate injunctive relief, Brown had to show likely irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success or sufficiently serious questions about the merits together with a sharply favorable balance of hardships. The court found that her submissions did not meet that standard.

Rulings on the claims

Criminal-prosecution requests. To the extent Brown sought to have the defendants criminally prosecuted, the court dismissed those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that a private plaintiff cannot compel prosecutors to bring criminal charges.

Constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court treated Brown’s alleged federal constitutional violations as claims under Section 1983, a federal civil-rights statute. Such a claim generally requires both a violation of a federal right and action under state authority. The court found that Brown alleged no facts showing that the defendants—whom it described as private entities—acted as state actors. It dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim.

Copyright claims. The court dismissed Brown’s copyright-infringement claims for failure to state a claim. It found that she did not identify facts showing that she owned preregistered or registered copyrights for the works at issue, or clearly identify which defendants infringed which copyrights. The court granted Brown leave to replead these claims by alleging facts showing ownership, preregistration or registration with the United States Copyright Office, and infringement by specifically named defendants.

Trademark claims. The court understood Brown to possibly be asserting trademark-infringement claims under the federal trademark statute, commonly called the Lanham Act. It dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim because Brown did not allege facts showing that she owned a legally protected mark or that a defendant’s use of it was likely to confuse consumers about the source or sponsorship of goods or services. The court granted leave to replead these claims with the necessary facts.

State-law claims. The court understood the complaint to focus substantially on state-law claims. It dismissed those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to the extent Brown relied on diversity jurisdiction, because she did not adequately allege that she and all defendants were citizens of different states or provide nonconclusory facts showing that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. The court granted leave to replead state-law claims if Brown could allege facts establishing diversity jurisdiction. The court also stated that if only state-law claims remained after dismissal of the federal claims, it would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.

Injunctive-relief requests and appeal motions

The court explained its earlier denial of Brown’s first request for immediate injunctive relief and denied her second and third requests because her submissions did not show likely success, sufficiently serious merits questions, or the required balance of hardships.

The Court of Appeals had dismissed Brown’s appeal of the earlier injunction order effective August 15, 2025. Because no such appeal remained to pursue, the court denied as moot Brown’s motion for an extension of time to appeal, motion for leave to proceed without prepaying appellate fees, and application to appeal without prepaying fees.

Leave to amend and final disposition

The court dismissed the action but granted Brown 30 days to file an amended complaint addressing the copyright, trademark, and potentially diversity-based state-law claims for which leave to replead was granted. If she did not amend within that period, the clerk would be directed to enter judgment dismissing the action and denying pending requests for relief as moot.

The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Brown permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal. The clerk was directed to keep the matter open on the docket until judgment was entered.