Jemal R. Bell Jr. v. Judge Craig Brown, et al.
- Laura Swain
- 1:24-cv-07804
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 17
In Bell Jr. v. Brown, Judge Swain dismissed the constitutional-rights case, declined state-law claims, and denied further amendment.
Jemal R. Bell Jr.; Judge Craig Brown; Justice Leslie Kahn; Mitchell Maier; Melissa Robustello; Michael Davis; Martena Clark; and Officer Elison. The action was dismissed, Bell was denied further amendment and fee-free appeal status, and the defendants were not required to litigate the claims further in this action.
What happened
Jemal R. Bell Jr. v. Judge Craig Brown, et al. involved claims by Jemal R. Bell Jr., who represented himself, against two judges, probation officers, and three attorneys. He alleged that they violated his constitutional rights in criminal and probation proceedings and sought damages and orders affecting the defendants’ employment, licenses, and judicial conduct.
The court dismissed the federal civil-rights claims for several reasons. The judges and probation officer were protected by immunity for actions connected to judicial proceedings; the supervisor was not alleged to have personally participated in a violation; the attorneys were not shown to be acting for the state; and the conspiracy allegations were too vague. The court also declined to hear the state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.
In Jemal R. Bell Jr. v. Judge Craig Brown, et al., Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the action, denied permission to amend again, directed entry of judgment, and denied fee-free appeal status.
The detailed version
- Jemal R. Bell Jr. v. Judge Craig Brown, et al. · No. 1:24-cv-07804
- Laura Swain
- Oct. 15, 2025
Background
Jemal R. Bell Jr. filed the action without a lawyer and was previously allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees. The court treated his amended complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute, and state law.
The defendants were Judge Craig Brown, Justice Leslie Kahn, former attorney Mitchell Maier, current attorneys Melissa Robustello and Michael Davis, former Orange County probation officer Martena Clark, and Orange County Supervisory Probation Officer Elison. Bell alleged that the defendants violated his rights in connection with a criminal proceeding in the Town of Clarkstown Justice Court and a probation-violation proceeding in the County Court, Orange County. He challenged hearing delays, travel requirements, probation-transfer issues, alleged inaccurate information, his attorneys’ conduct, and an alleged conspiracy. He sought damages and injunctive relief, including termination of the probation officers, disbarment of the attorneys, and sanctions against the judges.
Screening standard
Because Bell was proceeding without prepaying filing fees, the court was required to dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a legally sufficient claim, sought money from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also applied the rule requiring enough factual detail to make a claim plausible, while reading the filing liberally because Bell did not have a lawyer.
Claims against the judges
The court dismissed the § 1983 claims against Justice Kahn and Judge Brown. Judges have absolute judicial immunity from damages claims for actions taken within their judicial responsibilities, even when a plaintiff alleges bad faith or improper motives. The court found that Bell’s claims arose from acts or rulings made while the judges presided over his criminal and probation proceedings. Bell did not allege facts showing that either judge acted outside judicial responsibilities or without jurisdiction. The court also concluded that the statutory limits on injunctive relief against judicial officers barred the requested injunctive relief here.
Claims against Officer Clark
The court dismissed the § 1983 claims against Officer Clark under judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. It understood Bell’s allegations to concern the transfer of probation supervision and Clark’s alleged failure to obtain probation reports for use in the pending probation-violation proceeding. The court stated that claims based on the speed of the transfer appeared moot because supervision appeared to have been transferred to what seemed to be the New York City Department of Probation. It further concluded that the remaining alleged actions and failures to act occurred while Clark was providing information to Judge Brown in connection with the probation-violation matter and therefore fell within her judicial-assistance duties.
The court also stated that it lacked authority to order Clark’s termination. It dismissed the related claims under the same immunity and screening provisions.
Claims against Officer Elison
The court dismissed the § 1983 claims against Officer Elison for failure to state a claim. A § 1983 claim requires facts showing the defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Bell alleged only that Elison allowed Clark to act as though laws and due process did not exist. The court found that this did not allege Elison’s direct and personal involvement. It also stated that a supervisor cannot be held liable solely because a subordinate allegedly violated someone’s rights. The court likewise stated that it lacked authority to order Elison’s termination.
Claims against the attorneys
The court dismissed the § 1983 claims against Maier, Robustello, and Davis for failure to state a claim. Section 1983 generally requires conduct by a person acting under state law. The court found that Bell did not allege facts showing that these attorneys—a private attorney and two Legal Aid attorneys—were state actors. The court explained that private, court-appointed, and Legal Aid attorneys do not become state actors merely because they represent a defendant in a criminal matter.
Conspiracy claims
The court dismissed Bell’s § 1983 conspiracy claims for failure to state a claim. It found that his allegations of a conspiracy were conclusory, vague, and lacked supporting detail.
State-law claims and further amendment
The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning its authority to hear related state-law claims, because it had dismissed all claims over which it had original federal jurisdiction. The court also denied leave to amend again, finding that the defects in the amended complaint could not be cured by another amendment.
Disposition
The court dismissed the action, directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment, and certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith. It therefore denied Bell permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal.
Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.