Jenkins v. Superintendent Lynn Lilley

Background

Terrell Jenkins was convicted of second-degree murder after a trial. He later challenged the conviction in state court, arguing that his lawyers had been ineffective. After that motion was denied, Jenkins filed this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which allows a state prisoner to ask a federal court to review whether the conviction violated federal law. Jenkins represented himself in this federal case.

Jenkins raised three claims: (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the trial court’s refusal to give the jury a justification instruction; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for making statements during closing argument that Jenkins considered adversarial; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an intoxication instruction.

Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger issued a report and recommendation recommending that the petition be denied in full. Jenkins objected. The district court treated his objection concerning the justification instruction as sufficiently specific for fresh review. It reviewed his other objections under the clear-error standard because they were conclusory or repeated his earlier arguments.

Court’s Analysis

The court applied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, commonly called AEDPA. Under that law, a federal court generally cannot grant relief from a state-court decision unless the state court’s decision conflicted with clearly established Supreme Court law, unreasonably applied that law, or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also applied the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel: a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard and that the deficient performance probably affected the result.

Justification instruction and appellate counsel

The court rejected Jenkins’s argument that appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the refusal to give a justification instruction. Under New York law, a defendant using deadly force must have reasonably believed that the other person was using or about to use deadly force. The defendant must also have been unable to retreat safely, when the retreat requirement applies. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the first requirement: a reasonable belief that Edward Meyers was about to use deadly force. Because that requirement was not met, the court said it did not need to decide whether Jenkins had an opportunity or duty to retreat.

The court concluded that Jenkins’s appellate lawyer reasonably declined to raise an argument that lacked sufficient support. It therefore found no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on this claim.

Intoxication instruction

The court agreed with the recommendation that Jenkins’s trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to request an intoxication instruction. Such an instruction is warranted when the evidence of intoxication could cause a reasonable person to doubt whether the defendant could form the required intent. Jenkins testified that he had three drinks with dinner and smoked marijuana, but the court concluded that this testimony did not show impairment so severe that he could not form the intent to stab Meyers.

Closing argument

The court also adopted the recommendation concerning trial counsel’s closing statements. Because there was no dispute that Jenkins killed Meyers, counsel was seeking a conviction for a lesser offense rather than a complete acquittal. The court found that the challenged statements served reasonable strategic purposes: they attempted to show that Jenkins lacked the intent required for second-degree murder and addressed damaging evidence, including Jenkins’s own testimony. The statements therefore did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

Disposition

The court adopted Judge Lehrburger’s report and recommendation in full and denied Jenkins’s petition. It certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, denied Jenkins status allowing him to appeal without paying filing fees, and denied a certificate of appealability because Jenkins had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. The Clerk was directed to terminate outstanding motions, enter judgment for Superintendent Lynn Lilley, and close the case.