Fiallos v. Aviles-Ramos

Background

Alexandra Fiallos sued on her own behalf and on behalf of L.V., a nineteen-year-old disabled student, against defendants connected with the New York City Department of Education and its Chancellor. The lawsuit concerns funding under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for L.V.’s education at the International Institute for the Brain, referred to as iBrain.

Fiallos filed an administrative due-process complaint in July 2025 seeking funding for L.V.’s education at iBrain during the 2025–2026 school year. An impartial hearing officer held a hearing on September 15, 2025, and issued a “Pendency Order.” That order required the Department of Education to pay L.V.’s tuition at iBrain, daily transportation costs, and daily nursing services while the administrative claim was being decided. The hearing officer extended the deadline for briefing on Fiallos’s underlying claim, and, as of the opinion, had not issued a final decision.

Fiallos’s first emergency motion asked the court to require the Department of Education and its administrative agency to expedite the proceedings or declare that the failure to meet certain IDEA deadlines was itself a denial of a free appropriate public education. The opinion addresses that first motion. The court had also previously summarily denied a second emergency motion seeking payment under the Pendency Order, and the court had separately denied Fiallos’s request for a temporary restraining order connected to a third motion. Those other rulings were not the motion decided in this Opinion and Order.

Legal Standard

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary order issued before a final decision. The moving party ordinarily must show likely irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the merits or serious legal questions deserving litigation together with a sharply favorable balance of hardships, and that an injunction would serve the public interest. Irreparable harm means an actual and imminent injury that cannot adequately be repaired with money damages. The court described irreparable harm as the most important requirement.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that Fiallos had not shown irreparable harm, or likely any harm, without an injunction. She did not claim in her first emergency motion that L.V. was at risk of losing the iBrain placement. The Pendency Order protected that placement while the administrative claim proceeded. The court also noted that Fiallos’s contract with iBrain appeared to suspend her payment obligations while a funding dispute was pending, further undermining the argument that L.V.’s placement was at risk.

The court rejected the premise that a bare violation of IDEA procedures, without concrete harm, automatically establishes the injury needed for federal standing or irreparable harm. It noted that the hearing had already occurred, the placement had been established for the relevant school year, and the Department of Education had represented that it would make the required payments through its ordinary procedures. The court therefore concluded that Fiallos had not shown an injury requiring emergency relief.

The court also briefly addressed the remaining injunction factors. It found that Fiallos had not shown that an injunction would serve the public interest or that the balance of hardships favored her. The court discussed the history of emergency motions filed by Fiallos’s counsel in related IDEA cases and stated that granting relief here could encourage additional meritless motions. It also found that Fiallos had not shown a likelihood of success because the IDEA permits hearing officers to extend deadlines at a party’s request and provides a process for addressing a missed resolution meeting. The court characterized the motion as an attempt to bypass the ordinary administrative process.

Disposition

Judge Jesse M. Furman denied Fiallos’s first emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate ECF No. 5, the docket entry for that motion.

Separately, the court ordered Fiallos to show cause, by October 30, 2025, why the lawsuit should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court explained that it was uncertain whether Fiallos had suffered a concrete injury sufficient to establish federal standing. The defendants were ordered to respond by November 10, 2025. The Opinion and Order did not itself dismiss the lawsuit.