Gorrie-President v. A.D.

Background

Clarissa Gorrie-President appeared without a lawyer and invoked federal-question jurisdiction, alleging that the defendants violated her parental rights. She alleged that she filed a “writ” seeking the return of her 16-year-old child to Massachusetts, traveled to New York for a hearing, and that Judge Amanda White dismissed the writ. She also alleged that Claritza Garcia reported that A.D. had been trafficked to New York and that the Ali Forney Center contacted Brockton police and sought legal advice about where A.D. should be sent. Gorrie-President requested an order directing that A.D. be returned to Massachusetts to a legal guardian.

The court had previously allowed Gorrie-President to proceed without prepaying filing fees. It therefore screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a legally sufficient claim, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court also explained that it had to dismiss claims over which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, while reading a self-represented party’s allegations liberally.

Claims against Judge White

The court dismissed the claims for injunctive relief against Judge White. Judges generally have absolute immunity from damages claims based on acts within their judicial responsibilities. The court found that Gorrie-President challenged actions Judge White took in a case before her and alleged no facts showing that Judge White acted outside her judicial role or without jurisdiction.

The court also held that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Judge White violated a declaratory decree, that declaratory relief was unavailable, or that an appeal was unavailable. It therefore dismissed these claims under the judicial-immunity doctrine and for failure to state a claim.

Claims against A.D. and the Ali Forney Center

The court treated the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that permits certain claims against people acting under state law. The court held that A.D. and the Ali Forney Center were private parties and that Gorrie-President did not allege that they worked for a state or other governmental body.

The court concluded that providing emergency housing and related support services did not, on the allegations presented, make the Ali Forney Center a state actor for purposes of § 1983. It therefore dismissed the claims against A.D. and the Ali Forney Center for failure to state a claim. The court noted that Gorrie-President could reassert claims against the center if she had facts showing that it was a foster-care agency and therefore performed a public function that could make it a state actor.

Procedural due process

The court interpreted the complaint as attempting to allege that Gorrie-President was denied procedural due process when she lost custody of A.D. Procedural due process generally requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a protected liberty interest is taken away. The court recognized that the family relationship is a protected liberty interest and that parents ordinarily must receive a court proceeding before being deprived of the care, custody, or management of their children, subject to emergency circumstances.

The court found the allegations insufficient. Gorrie-President did not explain who initiated the custody proceedings, whether A.D. was removed after a full custody proceeding, what the hearing decided, who received custody and on what grounds, whether she sought further judicial review, or why the process provided was inadequate. The court dismissed the procedural due-process claims for failure to state a claim and allowed Gorrie-President to amend them against an individual state or local government official.

Substantive due process

The court also understood the complaint to assert substantive due-process claims based on the alleged loss of custody. Substantive due process protects certain fundamental rights, including the family’s interest in remaining together without coercive state interference. But a claim based on family integrity requires allegations that the state action was so arbitrary, egregious, and conscience-shocking that it was unconstitutional even if procedural protections had been provided. The alleged action must also have been specifically intended to interfere with the family relationship.

The court found that the complaint did not clearly establish that Gorrie-President had been denied custody. It did not identify where, when, or by whom her parental rights were allegedly terminated, or who received custody of A.D. Even assuming that she had been denied custody, the court found no facts suggesting conduct by Garcia or anyone else that was sufficiently egregious or conscience-shocking to violate substantive due process. It dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim but allowed Gorrie-President to amend them against an individual state or local government official.

Disposition and leave to amend

Judge Louis L. Stanton dismissed the complaint under the screening statute, with 30 days’ leave to replead. The court directed the Clerk to keep the matter open until a civil judgment is entered and stated that, if no amended complaint were filed within the allowed period, the Clerk would be directed to enter judgment.

The court also warned that any amended complaint would need to allege facts addressing the possible application of the Younger abstention doctrine, which can limit federal interference with certain ongoing state proceedings, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which can prevent a federal district court from reviewing or overturning a final state-court judgment. The court did not decide that either doctrine barred the claims at this stage.