DeJesus v. Santiago
- Cathy Seibel
- 7:22-cv-09559
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Roberto Dejesus v. V. Santiago, Judge Seibel granted the request to seek volunteer counsel for Plaintiff’s remaining retaliation claims.
Roberto Dejesus is affected because the court will seek volunteer counsel for his remaining First Amendment retaliation claims, but he must continue representing himself unless a lawyer agrees to represent him.
What happened
In Roberto Dejesus v. V. Santiago, Roberto Dejesus asked the court to find a lawyer to represent him. He is incarcerated and had previously been allowed to proceed without paying court fees. Earlier, the court dismissed several defendants and claims, leaving claims that V. Santiago and Pasko Delovic retaliated against him under the First Amendment for reporting abuse of another inmate.
The court said civil litigants do not have an automatic right to a free lawyer. It considered whether Dejesus appeared unable to afford counsel, whether his claims had enough substance, and whether factors such as the need for cross-examination, the complexity of the case, and his ability to present it favored legal assistance. The court found that his claims had already survived summary judgment and were likely to go to trial unless the parties settled.
Judge Cathy Seibel granted Dejesus’s motion to the extent that the court will request a volunteer lawyer for the remaining proceedings, including settlement discussions and, if necessary, trial. The court warned that no lawyer is guaranteed to volunteer and that Dejesus must continue representing himself unless a lawyer agrees to take the case. It also denied fee-free status for any appeal from this order because the court found that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
The detailed version
- DeJesus v. Santiago · No. 7:22-cv-09559
- Cathy Seibel
- Oct. 27, 2025
Background
At a proceeding on October 27, 2025, Roberto Dejesus requested appointment of counsel. The court had previously granted his request to proceed without paying court fees, and he remained incarcerated. The court therefore treated him as unable to afford counsel.
During a September 17, 2025, bench ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court dismissed Felix Cotto, Robert Mayes, and Anthony Rodriguez as defendants. It also dismissed Dejesus’s due-process and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims against Vincente Santiago and Pasko Delovic. The remaining claims were claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Santiago and Delovic violated the First Amendment by retaliating against Dejesus for reporting their abuse of another inmate.
Legal standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court may request that a lawyer volunteer to represent a person who cannot afford counsel. In civil cases, the court does not have to provide a lawyer and lacks authority to appoint one; it may only request volunteer representation. Courts must consider such requests sparingly because they do not have funds to pay lawyers in civil matters.
The court applied factors from Hodge v. Police Officers. These include whether the claim appears likely to have substance, the person’s ability to investigate and present the case, whether conflicting evidence will make cross-examination important, the complexity of the legal issues, efforts to obtain counsel, and whether a lawyer would be more likely to produce a fair result.
Court’s analysis
The court found that Dejesus’s remaining claims were sufficiently substantial because they had survived summary judgment and, unless the parties settled, would proceed to trial. The court also found that the other factors favored counsel. It noted that Dejesus apparently had been unsuccessful in retaining a lawyer, that cross-examination would be important at trial, and that counsel would present the case more clearly and efficiently.
Ruling
Judge Cathy Seibel granted Dejesus’s motion to the extent that the court will request volunteer counsel for the remainder of the proceedings, including settlement and, if settlement is unsuccessful, trial. The court explained that a volunteer lawyer might not be found and that a lengthy wait was possible, but the case would continue at a normal pace. Until a lawyer volunteers or Dejesus finds one independently, he must continue representing himself.
The court also certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.