Mendez v. Aviles-Ramos

Background

Eileen Mendez, individually and on behalf of her minor son, A.C., filed a second motion seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. She asked the court to compel the New York City Department of Education to immediately pay outstanding tuition and transportation costs for the 2025–2026 school year, along with any related late fees. The motion also referred to nursing services, but the court stated that Mendez had never sought nursing services in this case and that such relief was not included in the complaint’s request for relief.

Mendez argued that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s “stay-put” provision automatically entitled her to immediate payment of educational costs incurred while her challenge to A.C.’s 2025–2026 individualized education program was pending. The court said that argument had already been rejected in an earlier related proceeding involving Mendez and by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. According to the court, the stay-put provision protects a child’s current educational placement and the funding needed to maintain it, but does not automatically require immediate payment unless a delay or failure to pay threatens the placement.

Reason for Further Discovery

The new motion differed from Mendez’s earlier motion mainly because she argued that A.C.’s placement was at risk because iBRAIN might close due to delayed payments. A declaration from iBRAIN’s chief operating officer stated that the school could face a financial crisis that could result in closure. The court emphasized that the submission said iBRAIN “could” close and that delayed payments “may” lead to reductions or suspensions in services. No one had stated that services to A.C. had actually been reduced or suspended.

The court found that Mendez had not provided competent evidence showing an imminent threat to A.C.’s educational placement. It stated that iBRAIN had a contract requiring it to provide A.C. with educational services during the 2025–2026 school year. The court also noted that the Department of Education had represented that it would provide tuition and transportation funding under a September 3, 2025 pendency order, covering July 7 through December 31, 2025, and that payment was expected within two to three weeks.

Because Mendez placed iBRAIN’s financial condition directly at issue, the court ordered discovery before deciding the emergency motion. The Department of Education was directed to submit discovery demands to the court and Mendez’s counsel within ten days and serve them, with a third-party subpoena, on iBRAIN. The discovery includes at least two years of books, records, and bank statements, as well as depositions and interrogatories. The court specifically stated that the chief operating officer should be deposed and permitted possible discovery from Patrick Donohue and Sisters Transportation, subject to the conditions described in the opinion.

Standing and Irreparable Harm

The court also said discovery was needed to determine whether Mendez had Article III standing, meaning a concrete injury sufficient to invoke federal-court authority. The court explained that standing must be shown for each claim and each form of relief. Although a parent’s contractual obligation to pay educational costs can support standing to seek direct payment under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the court said Mendez still had to show that she—not merely iBRAIN—faced a real and immediate injury from the delayed payments.

The court concluded that allegations that delayed payments “may” cause reductions or suspensions in services were speculative. On the current record, the court could not determine whether Mendez had standing or establish irreparable harm, which is harm that cannot adequately be repaired later and is required for preliminary injunctive relief.

Sanctions Warning and Disposition

The court warned that if Mendez withdrew the emergency motion or voluntarily discontinued the lawsuit in response to the discovery order, it intended to consider ordering the attorneys and Liberty & Freedom Legal Group LLC to explain why sanctions should not be imposed for alleged misrepresentations about iBRAIN’s financial status. The court did not impose sanctions in this opinion and stated that the ordered discovery would remain relevant to any later sanctions proceeding.

The court reserved judgment on all issues pending completion of discovery. The motion remained in abeyance, and the requested emergency relief was not issued. The opinion expressly stated that it did not dispose of any motion.